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4 Synopsis 
 
This dissertation empirically examines the impact of short-selling in financial 
markets. Given the increasing participation of short-sellers in financial markets, this 
research provides empirical evidence on an increasingly important issue. Each chapter 
addresses a research question with scarce or conflicting prior research findings to 
provide evidence which can assist researchers, investors and regulators to understand 
and manage the impact of short-selling in financial markets. 
The first issue examined is the impact of the 2008 short-selling bans on the market 
quality of stocks. While short-selling has long been a contentious issue, relatively 
little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact of short-sale restrictions on 
market quality. The results indicate that restrictions on short-selling lead to artificially 
inflated prices, indicated by positive abnormal returns. This is consistent with Miller’s 
(1977) overvaluation theory and suggests that the bans have been effective in 
temporarily stabilising prices in struggling financial stocks. Market quality is reduced 
during the restrictions, as evidenced by wider bid-ask spreads, increased price 
volatility and reduced trading activity. Overall, whether the net effect of the short-
selling bans is positive (higher prices versus lower market quality) is open to debate.  
 
The second issue examined is the impact of allowing naked short-selling on the 
securities lending and equity market in a unique market setting where naked short-
sales are restricted to certain securities on an approved list. The existing literature on 
the impact of short-selling examines changes in the rules governing either covered 
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short-sales, or changes to short-sale constraints that affect both naked and covered 
short-sales. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) intuition, stocks with the highest 
dispersion of opinions and highest short-sale constraints (higher lending fees) are the 
only stocks to exhibit significant and negative abnormal returns in the post event 
period. Allowing naked short-selling leads to slightly higher stock return volatility 
and a small reduction in liquidity (wider bid-ask spreads and effective spreads). 
Further testing reveals that the impact of naked short-selling on market quality 
variables is greater, both in magnitude and significance, in stocks with higher short-
sale constraints. Using the Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) spread decomposition 
model, the increase in bid-ask spread is attributed to an increase in the adverse 
selection component. This is consistent with the notion that short-sellers are likely to 
be informed traders.  
 
Analysis of the securities lending market reveals that the demand for securities 
lending is reduced following the introduction of naked short-selling. While not 
providing conclusive evidence, naked short-selling appears to occur once stocks are 
added to the designated list of eligible stocks. Therefore the results in this chapter can 
be attributed (at least in part) to the introduction of naked short-sales. Overall, 
allowing naked short-selling impairs market quality (liquidity and volatility) but there 
appears to be some improvement in price efficiency and the results are largely limited 
to stocks with high short-sale constraints.   
 
The third issue examined is the determinants of firm-level CDS spreads, using a new 
measure of the likelihood of firm default - short-selling. By examining the 
13 
 
relationship between CDS spreads and short-selling, this chapter adds to the existing 
literature which examines the determinants of CDS spreads and also adds to the 
existing literature on the information content of short-selling. After controlling for the 
determinants of CDS spreads (credit ratings, firm-specific variables and macro-
financial variables), the coefficient on the measures of short-selling (short-interest and 
utilisation) are positive and significant. These results are economically significant and 
robust to various controls including controlling for the supply of stock for short-
selling, the use of changes in CDS spreads, cross-sectional controls for fixed effects, 
subgroup analysis by industry sector and credit rating categories, calculation of 
average regression coefficients using time-series regressions and the use of 
contemporaneous explanatory variables. 
 
While results indicate that short-selling exhibits a positive relationship with CDS 
spreads, the question remains whether short-selling leads the CDS market or vice 
versa. Previous studies which examine the relationship between CDS spreads and 
stock markets (see inter alia Norden and Weber, 2009, and Forte and Pena, 2009) 
document that stock market returns lead CDS spread changes, suggesting price 
discovery occurs in the stock market more often than in the CDS market. Given short-
selling occurs in the stock market, this implies that short-selling is likely to lead the 
CDS market. This is consistent with the notion that short-sellers are informed (see 
inter alia Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008), given the majority of price discovery 
occurs in the stock market. Possible explanations for stock returns leading CDS 
spreads could be the structural difference between the markets in which the assets are 
traded. The structural differences could imply probable differences in the relative 
14 
 
speed with which respective markets respond to the changes in credit conditions. For 
example, CDS markets for individual firms are OTC compared to stock markets 
which are traded through an electronic exchange. 
15 
 
1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Short-selling plays a prominent role in financial markets and has recently achieved 
notoriety over its part in the Global Financial Crisis. For example, according to former 
Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers, the collapse of the investment bank is partly 
due to short-selling, which allegedly depressed the stock price.1 Short-selling is also 
responsible for briefly making car manufacturer Volkswagen the most valuable listed 
company in the world on 28 October, 2008. The carmaker's shares peaked at 1,005 
Euros, which valued the company at 296bn Euros ($370bn; £237bn), exceeding the 
$343bn value of Exxon Mobil (the largest company at the time). The dramatic 
increase is attributable to short-sellers of Volkswagen shares desperately trying to buy 
them back so they could close their positions.2  
 
While the role of short-selling is a current area of interest in financial markets, short-
selling is not a new concept. The earliest evidence of short-selling in financial markets 
dates back to the 16th century in Shakespeare’s play The Merchant of Venice, which 
references the activity of short-selling. The first records of actual short-selling date 
back to 1609 when a group of Dutch businessmen sold shares (not in their possession, 
promising future delivery) in the East India Company in anticipation of the 
incorporation of a rival firm. Over the next year the group profited as East India 
Company shares dropped by 12%, angering shareholders who learned of their plan. 
                                                 
1
  See Richard J. Fold Jr., Statement before the United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 6 October 2008. 
2
  See BBC News, VW becomes world’s biggest firm, 28 October 2008. 
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The notables spoke of an outrageous act and this led to the first real stock exchange 
regulations: a ban on short-selling in January of 1610. Laws to forbid short-selling 
were also passed in England in 1733 and in France under Napoleon in 1802.  
 
This reflects the common belief that short-selling precedes market price declines and 
produces unfair speculative profits. In principle, both short-sellers and other traders 
can use abusive tactics to wrongfully increase their profits. Just as those traders taking 
long positions may, for example, misleadingly spread positive rumours about their 
company (e.g., the conclusion of an important deal) in order to sell their stock for a 
higher price, short-sellers may do so with negative information (Gruenwald, Wagner 
and Weber, 2010).  
 
However, not all short-sellers are alike, and traders can use short-sales to hedge a long 
position in the same stock, to conduct convertible or index arbitrage, to hedge their 
option positions, for tax considerations and for market making or dealing activities. 
Advocates argue that short-selling plays a vital role in providing liquidity and 
enhancing price discovery in financial markets. If short-selling is prohibited, not all 
information will be fully reflected in stock prices. Poor price discovery, in turn, 
implies misallocation of capital in the economy. Hence, market inefficiency would 
lead to social (allocative) inefficiency. Short-selling can also enhance liquidity, i.e., 
make the completion of trades more likely by increasing the number of potential 
sellers in the market. Larger trading volumes again reduce transaction costs and, 
hence, tend to increase efficiency. 
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The evidence in Diether, Lee and Werner (2009a) indicates that short-sales are 
extremely prevalent, and in late 2007, approximately 40% of trading volume involves 
a short-seller. Given the prevalence of short-selling and the potential harm to markets, 
it is critical for investors, regulators, and academics to further understand the impact 
of short-selling in financial markets. Hence, the main objective of this dissertation is 
to empirically examine the impact of short-selling in financial markets.  
 
1.1 Short-sale constraints and market quality: Evidence from the 2008 short-
sale bans 
 
The first chapter examines the impact of the 2008 short-selling bans on the market 
quality of stocks subject to the bans. While short-selling has long been a contentious 
issue, relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact of short-sale 
constraints on market quality. Beginning on 14 September, 2008 with the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, the global financial crisis entered a new phase marked by the 
failure of prominent American and European banks. Globally, governments responded 
by announcing drastic rescue plans for distressed financial institutions. As the 
financial crisis worsened and with share prices falling sharply, financial market 
regulators turned to a familiar scapegoat, imposing tight new restrictions on short-
selling. The restrictions commenced on September 19, 2008, with regulators in the 
United Kingdom banning short-selling (both covered and naked)3 on leading financial 
                                                 
3
  A naked short-sale is where the participant, either proprietary or on behalf of a client, enters an 
order in the market and does not have in place arrangements for delivery of the securities. The other 
form of a short-sale, covered short-sale, differs in that arrangements are in place, at the time of sale, 
for delivery of the securities. 
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stocks. On the same day the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a 
ban on the short-selling on financial stocks effective September 22, 2008 until 
October 9, 2008. Other markets soon followed and announced their own bans: 
Australia and Korea banning short-selling on all stocks; Canada, Norway, Ireland, 
Denmark, Russia, Pakistan and Greece banning short-selling on leading financial 
stocks; France, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria and Belgium 
banning naked short-selling on leading financial stocks; and Japan banning naked 
short-selling on all stocks (See Table 3-1 for details of changes worldwide). 
 
The view of regulators is homogenous with respect to the rationale behind the 
restrictions. For example the Financial Services Authority (FSA) CEO Hector Sants 
notes that action was taken to “protect the fundamental integrity and quality of 
markets and to guard against further instability in the financial sector”.4 Callum 
McCarthy, Chairman of the FSA, notes “(T)here is a danger in a trading system which 
allows financial institutions to be targeted and subject to extreme short-selling 
pressures, because movements in equity prices can be translated into uncertainty in 
the minds of those who place deposits with those institutions with consequent 
financial stability issues. It (the short-selling ban) is designed to have a calming effect 
– something which the equity markets for financial firms badly need.”5 The SEC had 
similar concerns, noting “Recent market conditions have made us concerned that 
short-selling in the securities of a wider range of financial institutions may be causing 
sudden and excessive fluctuations of the prices of such securities in such a manner so 
                                                 
4
 FSA statement on short positions in financial stocks, September 18, 2008, FSA/PN/102/2008. 
5
 Callum McCarthy: Comments on short positions in financial stocks, September 18, 2008, 
FSA/PN/103/2008. 
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as to threaten fair and orderly markets”.6 Overall the comments of regulators suggest 
that the bans are intended to maintain fair and orderly markets by preventing 
speculators from placing excessive downward pressure on troubled financial firms. 
 
The purpose of the first chapter is to empirically examine the impact of the 2008 
short-selling bans on the market quality of stocks subject to the bans. Thus, in doing 
so the chapter also examines whether the short-selling bans achieved their desired 
outcome. Data from 14 equity markets around the world is employed to examine 
market quality in terms of abnormal returns, stock price volatility, bid-ask spreads and 
trading volume. To control for market-wide factors or different shocks affecting the 
market, banned stocks are compared to a group of non-banned stocks. Statistics for 
similar stocks in markets where short-selling restrictions were not imposed are also 
examined. The 2008 short-sale bans provide an ideal setting for these tests because it 
provides a binding constraint.
 
Thus, it is not necessary to rely on proxies for short-sale 
constraints, as in previous research.7 The previous research emanates from Miller 
(1977), who developed a model that details how short-sale constrained securities 
become overpriced because pessimists are restricted from acting on their beliefs. In 
this scenario, stock prices reflect the beliefs of only optimistic investors. Consistent 
with Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, the empirical evidence which utilises proxies of 
short-sale constraints uniformly indicates that implementing short-sale constraints 
leads to overvaluation (see inter alia Chang, Chang and Yu, 2007).  
                                                 
6
  SEC RELEASE NO. 34-58592 / September 18, 2008.  
7
  Examples of proxies include Figlewski (1981) and Senchack and Starks (1990), who use changes in 
short interest, Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), who employ declines in breadth of ownership, 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), who utilise option introductions, Ofek and Richardson (2003), who 
use stock option lockups, Jones and Lamont (2002), who employ the cost of short-selling and 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006), who use experimental markets. 
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The relationship between short-sales and stock return volatility is a contentious issue 
and has received limited academic attention. Ho (1996) documents that the daily 
volatility of stock returns increases when short-sale constraints are imposed. Chang, 
Chang and Yu (2007), however, using a direct measure of short-sale constraints, find 
the volatility of stock returns increases when the constraints are lifted.8 Consistently, 
Henry and McKenzie (2006) find that the Hong Kong market exhibits greater 
volatility following a period of short-selling and that volatility asymmetry is 
exacerbated by short-selling. Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and 
Werner (2009b) both examine the removal of price tests (short-sale constraint) and 
observe insignificant or weak increases in daily and intraday return volatility.  
 
Evidence on short-sale constraints and liquidity is relatively unexplored. Alexander 
and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b) are the only exceptions, 
and find that short-sale constraints have a limited effect on market liquidity. A 
reduction in constraints increases short-sale activity, but both find that the restriction 
results in only slightly wider spreads. The first chapter adds to the limited evidence of 
the impact of short-sale constraints on liquidity, in addition to examining the impact 
of short-sale constraints on returns and volatility.  
 
                                                 
8 
 Ho (1996) utilises an event where the Stock Exchange of Singapore suspended trading for three 
days from December 2, 1985 to December 4, 1985. When trading was resumed on December 5, 
1985, contracts could only be executed on an immediate delivery basis (i.e., delivery and settlement 
within 24 hours) which implies that short-selling was severely restricted. 
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1.2 The impact of naked short-selling on the securities lending and equity 
market 
 
While the first chapter examines the impact of short-sale constraints via the 2008 
short-sale bans, the second chapter examines the impact of allowing naked short-
selling on the securities lending and equity market in a unique market setting where 
naked short-sales are restricted to certain securities on an approved list. This 
opportunity is provided by a unique feature of the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) which allows naked short-sales for certain securities on an approved short-sale 
list that is revised over time. 
 
The impact of naked short-selling in financial markets is a controversial issue which 
has concerned regulators in recent times. In an effort to stop unlawful stock price 
manipulation, on July 9, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
announced an emergency order to immediately curb naked short-selling on 19 
financial firms.9 On September 19, 2008, regulators in the United Kingdom also acted 
by banning short-selling (both covered and naked) on leading financial stocks. The 
SEC subsequently moved to ban short-selling on financial stocks from September 22, 
2008 until October 9, 2008. Other markets soon followed and announced their own 
bans: Australia temporarily banned all forms of short-selling and later placed an 
indefinite ban on naked short-selling; Germany, Ireland, Canada, Indonesia and 
Greece banned short-selling on leading financial stocks; Korea banned short-selling 
on all stocks; France, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Belgium 
                                                 
9
  The emergency order took effect on July 21, 2008 and ended August 12, 2008. 
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banned naked short-selling on leading financial stocks; and Japan and Switzerland 
banned naked short-selling on all stocks. 
 
Although short-selling has long been a contentious issue (see Chancellor, 2001), this 
latest series of bans on short-selling serves to highlight a common concern among 
market participants over the use of short-selling and, in particular, naked short-selling. 
It is interesting to note that while most markets have reinstated covered short-selling 
as a legitimate trading activity, naked short-selling remains largely outlawed.10 This is 
an interesting development as, despite the apparent assumption that naked short-
selling is detrimental, relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on the 
impact that naked short-selling has on financial markets.  
 
The existing literature examines changes in the rules governing either covered short-
sales (see Chang, Chang and Yu, 2007), or changes to short-sale constraints that affect 
both naked and covered short-sales (see Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu, 2006). The 
purpose of the second chapter is to bridge this gap in the literature by directly 
examining the impact of allowing naked short-selling on returns, volatility and 
liquidity. This opportunity is provided by a unique feature of the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) which allows naked short-sales for certain securities on an approved 
                                                 
10
  Naked short-sales are not permitted on any stocks in Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, China, 
Switzerland, Spain, Russia, Luxembourg and Korea. Naked short-sales are not permitted on certain 
financial stocks in the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and France. In the United States, naked short-
sales are restricted by requiring that sellers deliver securities by the settlement date. If violated, the 
broker-dealer acting on the short-seller's behalf will be prohibited from further short-sales (for all 
customers) in the same security unless the shares are not only located but also pre-borrowed 
(www.sec.gov). 
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short-sale list that is revised over time.11 The addition of a security to the designated 
list of eligible stocks represents a shift from only allowing covered short-sales to 
allowing both covered and naked short-sales, thus allowing an isolation of the impact 
of allowing naked short-sales on financial markets. 
 
This shift to naked short-selling may circumvent the fee charged by the stock lender, 
which represents a significant cost associated with covered short-selling.12 In addition 
to this direct cost, there are several risks associated with covered short-selling, 
including the risk of a short squeeze due to an involuntarily closure of the stock loan 
(the short-seller is unable to find an alternative supply of stock in the event that the 
loan is closed). Further, naked short-selling circumvents search costs associated with 
locating and negotiating securities for lending. Together, these costs and risks 
represent a short-sale constraint which could be removed when naked short-sales are 
permitted.  
 
The existing literature on short-sale constraints typically focuses on the effect of such 
restrictions on asset prices and volatility. Naked short-sale constraints could affect the 
mix of passive and active strategies of short-sellers, which could in turn affect 
liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads and order-depth. As mentioned above, 
there is little empirical or theoretical evidence on how short-sale constraints affect 
liquidity. Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b) are the 
                                                 
11
  Securities are added or removed from the list based on market capitalisation, shares issued and 
liquidity. See Section 4.3.1 for further detail.  
12
  Naked short-sellers at the time of sale have not borrowed or entered into an agreement to borrow 
the stock and may repurchase the stock without incurring the borrowing fee. The Australian 
Securities Lending Association Limited estimate that these costs can range between 25 and 400 
basis points, representing a significant barrier to covered short-sales. See Section 4.3.1 for further 
detail. 
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only exceptions, and examine the impact of short-sale price tests on market liquidity. 
The second chapter adds to the limited evidence of the impact of short-sale constraints 
on liquidity, in addition to examining the impact of naked short-selling on returns and 
volatility.  
 
Differences between the behaviour of naked and covered short-sellers may lead to the 
impact of allowing naked short-sales on returns and volatility to differ from that of 
covered short-sales. While not academically documented, naked short-sales are often 
associated with market manipulation.13 To the extent that naked short-sellers may 
engage in the downward manipulation of stock prices,  one could expect their trades 
to increase stock price volatility. However, the possible shorter-term strategy of naked 
short-selling compared to covered short-selling may result in changes to volatility at 
the intraday level, rather than daily.14 Volatility measured over shorter periods, such 
as 15-minute intervals and trade-by-trade based measures, contain less fundamental 
news and are more reflective of transitory price changes due to market structure 
differences or order imbalances (Bennett and Wei, 2006). Subsequently, the second 
chapter examines the relationship between naked short-sale constraints and volatility 
using daily, intraday and trade-by-trade based volatility measures. 
 
                                                 
13
  Naked short-selling is often associated with market manipulation in the financial press. Examples 
include articles published in the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times (see Crittenden and 
Scannell, 2009 and Shapiro, 2008). 
14
  See Section 4.3.2 for explanation of possible strategies of naked and covered short-sellers. 
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1.3  An empirical analysis of the relationship between credit default swap 
spreads and short-selling activity 
 
With the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, credit default swaps (CDS) made the 
transition from being an esoteric financial instrument to appearing on the front page of 
mainstream newspapers. This increase in public awareness resulted from their 
implication in a series of high-profile company failures, most notably that of the 
American Insurance Group, AIG, which posted a record loss of US$61.7bn in the 
fourth quarter of 2008.  In its simplest form, a CDS is a privately negotiated contract 
that insures the holder against any losses in the event that the issuer of a bond defaults 
on their payment obligations. The holder makes a periodic payment in return for this 
service, called the spread. The spread is conceptually similar to the premium charged 
by an insurance company and compensates the issuer for the risk they incur in 
providing the guarantee (the losses incurred during the current financial crisis tend to 
suggest that CDSs were significantly underpriced relative to their true risk). 
 
Academia has a long-standing interest in the burgeoning CDS market and a 
substantial body of work has developed which focuses on credit-sensitive instruments. 
This literature is broadly categorised based on two theoretical approaches to pricing 
corporate bonds and credit spreads. Reduced-form models, developed by Litterman 
and Iben (1991), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Jarrow, Landow and Turnbull 
(1997), use market data to recover the parameters needed to value credit-sensitive 
claims. Empirical applications of reduced-form models include Duffie (1999) and 
Duffie, Pedersen and Singleton (2003).  
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The second approach, developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), 
uses structural models to connect the price of credit-sensitive instruments directly to 
the economic determinants of financial distress and loss, given default. Structural 
models imply that the main determinants of the likelihood and severity of default are 
financial leverage, volatility, and the risk-free term structure. Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001) use the structural approach to identify the theoretical 
determinants of corporate bond credit spreads. These variables are then used as 
explanatory variables in regressions for changes in corporate credit spreads, rather 
than inputs to a particular structural model. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
(2001) find that the explanatory power of the theoretical variables is modest, and that 
a significant part of the residuals is driven by a common systematic factor that is not 
captured by the theoretical variables. Campbell and Taksler (2003) extend this 
analysis using regressions for levels of the corporate bond spread, rather than changes 
in corporate credit spreads. They show that firm-specific equity volatility is an 
important determinant of credit spreads, and that the economic effects of volatility are 
large. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2008) confirm and extend this 
analysis by showing that option-based volatility contains increased explanatory power 
that is different from historical volatility. 
 
This previous literature focuses on corporate bond spreads, i.e., the difference 
between the corporate bond yield and the risk free rate.  More recent studies, however 
(see Benkert, 2004, Greatrex, 2009, Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo, 2009, and Zhang, 
Zhou and Zhu, 2009), focus on the relationship between CDS spreads and key 
variables suggested by economic theory.  Thus, while the main focus of these more 
recent papers remains on credit risk, an important distinction is the use of CDS 
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spreads rather than corporate bond spreads as the variable of interest. 
 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) advocate the use CDS spreads in preference to 
bond spreads for a number of reasons. While economically comparable to bond 
spreads, CDS spreads do not require the specification of a benchmark risk-free yield 
curve, as they are already quoted as spreads. This avoids undue noise which may arise 
from the use of a misspecified model of the risk-free yield curve. The choice of the 
risk-free yield curve includes the choice of a reference risk-free asset, which can be 
problematic (see Houweling and Vorst, 2005), but also the choice of a framework to 
remove coupon effects.  
 
CDS spreads could reflect changes in credit risk more accurately and quickly than 
corporate bond yield spreads. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2003) show that a change 
in the credit quality of the underlying entity is more likely to be reflected in the CDS 
spread before the bond yield spread. This could be due to important non-default 
components in bond spreads that obscure the impact of changes in credit quality. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) document the existence of an illiquidity component 
in bond yield spreads. Related to this, trading in CDS markets has increased, while 
many corporate bonds are rarely traded. Partly as a result, CDS data is collected at a 
daily frequency, while many studies that use corporate bonds typically use 
observations at a monthly frequency; the greater sampling frequency should allow for 
cleaner tests. 
 
The aim of the third chapter is to extend the literature that empirically investigates the 
determinants of CDS prices. The previous literature in this area uses a range of 
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theoretical determinants of default risk to model CDS spreads. Benkert (2004), 
Greatrex (2009) and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) document that individual 
firm CDS prices are related to risk-free interest rates, share prices, equity volatility, 
bond ratings and firm leverage. These studies suggest that theoretical determinants of 
default risk explain a significant amount of variation in CDS prices. Other studies 
incorporate new determinants to better explain the variation in CDS spreads. Zhang, 
Zhou and Zhu (2009) use theoretical determinants along with volatility and jump risk 
of individual firms from high-frequency equity prices to explain variation in CDS 
spreads. Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) find that individual firms put option-implied 
volatility is superior to historical volatility in explaining variation in CDS spreads. 
Tang and Yan (2007) find that measures of CDS liquidity are significant in explaining 
variation in CDS spreads. 
 
The third chapter extends this work by proposing a new measure of the likelihood of 
firm default - short-selling. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that, since short-
sellers do not have the use of sale proceeds, market participants never short-sell for 
liquidity reasons, which ceteris paribus implies relatively few uninformed short-
sellers. Empirical studies confirm heavily shorted stocks underperform, implying 
short-sellers are informed (see inter alia Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and 
Balachandran, 2002, Jones and Lamont, 2002, Boehme, Danielson and Sorescu, 2006, 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008 and Diether Lee and Werner, 2009a). Therefore 
short-sellers are informed traders who take positions by selling a company’s stock in 
the expectation that prices will fall in the near future following the revelation of bad 
news specific to that firm. As such, the level of short-selling is a direct measure of the 
prospects for a company. High (low) short-selling indicates a more (less) pessimistic 
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view of a company and an increased (decreased) likelihood of default. Therefore, 
CDS spreads should exhibit a positive and significant relationship to the level of 
short-selling. By examining the relationship between CDS spreads and short-selling, 
this chapter adds to the existing literature which examines the determinants of CDS 
spreads and also adds to the existing literature on the information content of short-
selling.   
 
1.4 Summary 
 
The three chapters in this dissertation provide evidence regarding the impact of short-
selling in financial markets. This chapter motivates each issue by illustrating the 
importance of this evidence to both academics and regulators faced with a litany of 
inconclusive literature in an area of ever growing importance. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a 
review of prior literature regarding short-selling in equities markets and CDS markets. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine the three issues discussed in this chapter. Each chapter 
contains sections describing the data and sample, research design, empirical results, 
additional tests and conclusions reached.  Chapter 6 concludes by highlighting how 
the evidence presented in this dissertation can be used by academics and regulators in 
assessing the impact of short-selling in financial markets and assist in making 
informed decisions regarding the regulation of short-selling in financial markets. 
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2 Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to empirically examine the impact of short-
selling in financial markets. Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation examine the impact 
of short-selling in equities markets, while Chapter 5 examines the relationship 
between equity market short-selling and CDS spreads. This chapter reviews the 
literature regarding short-selling in equities markets and CDS markets. Previous 
literature that examines equity markets provides inconsistent evidence regarding the 
impact of covered short-sales on market quality, while evidence regarding the impact 
of naked short-sales on market quality is effectively non-existent. There is no previous 
literature examining the relationship between CDS spreads and short-selling in 
equities markets. A review of the literature concerning these issues is provided in this 
chapter. 
 
Section 2.1 provides a basic description of short-selling, including the origins of 
short-selling and a review of the literature examining the motivations for short-selling. 
Section 2.2 focuses on literature concerned with examining the pricing implications of 
short-sale constraints in equity markets. Section 2.3 reviews the literature regarding 
the impact of short-selling on equity market quality. Section 2.4 evaluates literature 
relating to the CDS market.  
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2.1 Short-selling: Description and motivations 
 
To understand the literature on short-selling this section provides a basic description 
of short-selling, including the origins of short-selling, different forms of short-selling 
and basic motivations for short-selling. 
 
2.1.1 Origins of short-selling 
 
While the role of short-selling is a current area of interest in financial markets, short-
selling is not a new concept. The earliest evidence of short-selling in financial markets 
dates back to the 16th century in a reference to short-selling in Shakespeare's play The 
Merchant of Venice. The first records of actual short-selling date back to 1609 when a 
group of Dutch businessmen sold shares (not in their possession, promising future 
delivery) in the East India Company in anticipation of the incorporation of a rival 
firm. Over the next year the group profited as East India Company shares dropped by 
12%, angering shareholders who learned of their plan. The notables spoke of an 
outrageous act and this led to the first real stock exchange regulations: a ban on short-
selling in January of 1610. This reflects the common belief that short-selling precedes 
market price declines and produces unfair speculative profits. Laws to forbid short-
selling were also passed in England in 1733 and in France under Napoleon in 1802.  
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2.1.2 Types of short-selling 
 
The terms ‘short-selling’ or ‘shorting’ are used to describe the process of selling 
financial instruments that the seller does not actually own. If the value of the 
instrument declines, the short-seller can repurchase the instrument at a lower price. 
The two basic types of short-selling are ‘covered’ and ‘naked’. In most markets, when 
a covered short-sale occurs, the trader borrows securities from a securities lender and 
enters into an agreement to return them on demand. The trader then sells the stock and 
delivers the shares to a buyer on settlement. While the position is open, the lender 
requires a cash collateral and no separate fee is payable for the loan.15 This collateral 
(usually the proceeds from the sale) earns interest payable to the borrower at less than 
a normal market rate (rebate rate). The spread between the normal market rate and the 
rebate rate is the ‘lending fee’ which the lender earns and the borrower pays. When 
closing a position the trader buys back equivalent shares in the market and returns 
them to the stock lender. The collateral is then returned to the borrower plus interest 
earned at the rebate rate. There is no set time frame on how long a covered short 
position can be held, provided the lender does not recall the stock and the trader can 
meet the margin requirements.  
 
When conducting a naked short-sale, the trader must either buy back the stock within 
a short time frame (usually on the same day), or arrange to borrow the stock before 
settlement. If the stock is bought back on the same day then naked short-sellers can 
avoid the cost of borrowing the stock (‘lending fee’) which is incurred by covered 
                                                 
15 Collateral is commonly in the form of cash but may also be in the form of securities or occasionally 
irrevocable standby letters of credit. 
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short-sellers. When this occurs the traders’ broker will ‘net off’ the sell and buy order 
in the same stock and the trader will only pay/receive the difference upon settlement. 
However if the naked short-seller does not buy back the stock on the same trading day 
they must borrow the stock and deposit the sale proceeds as collateral, thus incurring a 
lending fee. If the trader does not meet settlement they will have ‘failed to deliver’ 
and may incur fail fees. Despite the widespread criticism, not all naked short-selling is 
abusive. Naked short-selling is often used for intraday trading, where the position is 
opened and then closed at some point later in the day. Also, if a market-maker does 
not have a sufficient supply of a particular share to meet client demand then the 
market-maker may employ naked short-selling to meet that demand. Some naked 
short-selling occurs unintentionally when a short-seller locates shares to borrow (or 
has reasonable belief that shares can be located and borrowed), but subsequently is 
unable to borrow the stock in time for delivery.  
 
There are generally three groups of participants in the short-sale process. The groups 
are securities lenders, securities borrowers (short-sellers), and agent intermediaries. 
Securities lenders are large institutions typically including mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds and endowments. Securities borrowers are institutions that 
engage in short-selling and typically include hedge funds, mutual funds, ETF 
counterparties and option market-makers. Agent intermediaries are institutions that 
facilitate the lending and borrowing of securities and may include custodian banks, 
broker-dealers and prime brokers.  
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2.1.3 Motivations for short-selling 
 
While there are many reasons for short-selling, the ‘speculative motive’ associated 
with expected decreases in a stock's market value receives the most notoriety. A New 
York Stock Exchange survey, requested by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1947, indicates that short positions established with a speculative motive comprise 
about two-thirds of the total short-interest of members and non-members.16 Other 
non-speculative based reasons can include hedging and arbitrage activities, tax 
considerations and short-selling by market-makers and dealers. Similarly, Diether, 
Lee and Werner (2009a) highlight that not all short-sellers are alike, and traders can 
use short-sales to hedge a long position in the same stock, to conduct convertible or 
index arbitrage, to hedge their option positions, etc.  
 
‘Shorting against the box’ occurs when investors take a short position in a security 
that they already hold long. Shorting against the box is a strategy commonly used to 
defer taxable gains (Brent, Morse and Stice, 1990). This allows an investor to lock in 
a profit and importantly delay the recognition of a capital gain (or to defer capital 
losses). Brent, Morse and Stice (1990), using short-interest for all securities on the 
NYSE from 1974-1986, attempt to explain the level and changes in short-interest and 
in doing so examine the motivations for short-selling. Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) 
hypothesise that shorting against the box should be most prevalent around the turn-of-
the-year for high-variance stocks that have experienced capital gains over the previous 
year. Their results show that partitioning the firms based on residual variance, beta, 
                                                 
16
 Short-interest is the number of shares of a stock borrowed for sale and not yet replaced. 
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and the existence of capital gains or losses did not explain the degree of drop in short-
interest in January. Therefore, the seasonal pattern of short-interest is only weakly 
consistent with the use of short-selling to delay taxes. 
 
However, after 1997, the Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA97) in the United States 
eliminated the opportunity to defer capital gains taxes using option strategies like 
shorting against the box (Arnold, Butler, Crack and Zhang, 2005). Arnold, Butler, 
Crack and Zhang (2005) examine the determinants of short-interest and demonstrate 
that, prior to TRA97, short-selling against the box was a popular trading strategy. Kot 
(2007) tests several explanations for short-selling using a sample of the NYSE and 
Nasdaq stocks during the 1988-2002 period. Consistent with Arnold, Butler, Crack 
and Zhang (2005), he finds that short-selling for tax reasons is present prior to the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, but disappears with the introduction of the legislation. 
 
Short-selling is also an important function in arbitrage and hedging strategies. By 
simultaneously taking a long and a short position, market participants can hold a 
position in the marketplace and lock in profits without further risk from unfavourable 
asset price movements. Short-selling can also be used to exploit profitable arbitrage 
opportunities in the market. This trading strategy typically involves some form of 
pairs trading whereby the relative price of highly correlated assets has diverged from 
equilibrium (long/short hedge funds typically employ this type of strategy). By buying 
the stock whose price has gone down and shorting the stock whose price has gone up, 
profits can be made when the spread converges back to its long run equilibrium. 
While shorting the box in its own right cannot yield any profits, in the presence of a 
second asset whose value is linked to the cash market, opportunities for arbitrage 
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profits exist. The most obvious candidates for this are futures, options or, if the stocks 
are sufficiently large, market index derivatives themselves. An investor might short to 
arbitrage a price differential between the stock and convertible securities of the stock 
or short an acquirer’s stock from a merger and acquisition announcement (Kot, 2007).  
 
Derivative issuers and stock options market-makers may also short-sell to hedge their 
price risk, in which case their net positions are market neutral. For example, when a 
put is purchased from an options market-maker he will normally hedge by shorting 
the stock, and possibly buying a call to turn the position into a reverse conversion 
arbitrage. Figlewski and Webb (1993) suggest that the put buyer's desire to sell the 
stock is transformed through the options market into an actual short-sale by a market 
professional who faces the lowest cost and fewest constraints. 
 
Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) investigate arbitrage opportunities, through the 
existence of options and other securities, as an explanation of short interest. Investors 
may employ options jointly with short-sales and other securities to achieve arbitrage 
positions. The cross-sectional results indicate that firms with listed options and 
convertible securities tend to have more shares held short. The significance of these 
variables is consistent with short-selling for hedging and arbitrage reasons. Figlewski 
and Webb (1993) document a positive relationship between the existence of options 
and the average level of short interest, due to the hedging activities of options market-
makers and professional traders. Kot (2007) also finds evidence to suggest that short-
selling activity is positively related to dummy variables for convertible debt, option 
listing, and merger and acquisition activity on the NYSE and Nasdaq. 
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The above studies demonstrate that short-selling can be employed for a variety of 
reasons other than speculation. While these studies demonstrate the existence of short-
selling for various motivations, there is a growing body of literature which examines 
the relationship between short-selling and stock returns. These studies attempt to 
examine the speculative motive for short-selling and aim to identify not only whether 
short-sellers are speculators, but also whether short-sellers are informed. Section 2.2.3 
surveys the literature which examines the relationship between short-selling and stock 
returns, and, in turn, whether short-sellers are informed. 
  
2.2 Pricing implications of short-selling 
 
Asset pricing models usually assume unrestricted short-sales with full use of the 
proceeds. Most traders, however, face some type of short-sale constraint. Examples of 
short-sale constraints (besides margin requirements and the associated costs) include 
unavailability of sale proceeds, pass-through of any dividends, the up-tick rule on 
organised exchanges, an insufficient pool of shares to borrow, forced covering of a 
short position and legal or contractual prohibitions (Senchack and Starks, 1993). 
Recognising these constraints, an extensive body of theoretical and empirical 
literature has developed with regard to information arrival and asset trading models 
that contain the effect of costly short-selling on an asset’s equilibrium price. Testable 
implications derived from the existing theoretical models have led to the development 
of empirical research on the effects of short-selling restrictions. This section reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of short-sale constraints on asset 
pricing. 
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2.2.1 Theoretical predictions  
 
A large literature explores the theoretical link between short-sale constraints and asset 
prices. This literature emanates from the seminal work of Miller (1977), who develops 
a model detailing how short-sale constrained securities become overpriced because 
pessimists are restricted from acting on their beliefs.  In this scenario, stock prices 
reflect the beliefs of only optimistic investors. Miller’s theory is driven by short-sale 
constraints and the heterogeneous beliefs among investors. Given heterogeneous 
beliefs and no short-sale constraints, pessimistic investors can short the stock, which 
counteracts optimistic investors who buy long, and they jointly set equilibrium stock 
prices and, as a consequence, subsequent returns. However, under short-sale 
constraints, pessimistic investors are unable to short the stock freely, and the 
equilibrium price will reflect a positive bias and subsequent returns will be low. For 
any given level of short-sale constraint, the more heterogeneous the expectations, the 
greater will be the price and return bias. Likewise, given the amount of divergence in 
expectations, the greater the constraint on short-sales, the greater the price and return 
bias. In essence, binding short-sale constraints inhibit the incorporation of negative 
information in prices. As there is no barrier to going long, positive information is not 
withheld. 
 
Jarrow (1980) is one of the first to extend the work of Miller (1977) by arguing that 
the impact of short-sale constraints depends on the beliefs of investors about the 
covariance matrix of future prices. Jarrow (1980) argues that asset prices may rise or 
fall with short-sale constraints depending on the belief of investors. Figlewski (1981), 
on the other hand, concurs with Miller (1977), arguing that when investors with 
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unfavourable information are constrained from selling short, excess demand exists 
and equilibrium prices exceed the market-clearing price they would obtain if short-
sale constraints did not exist. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) directly model Miller’s 
(1977) idea (allowing for risk aversion) and find stocks with short-sale constraints 
reflect optimistic beliefs and thus realise lower future returns. Duffie, Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2002) present a dynamic model to show that the prospect of lending fees 
(short-sale constraint) may push the initial price of a stock above even the most 
optimistic buyer’s valuation.  
 
The Miller (1977) theory implicitly assumes that investors do not obtain information 
from market prices. Diamond and Verrechia (1987) provide an alternative view by 
modelling the effects of short-sale constraints in a rational expectations framework. 
An important implication of this model is that short-sale constraints do not bias prices 
upwards if investors are rational. They argue that in a rational market, traders will 
recognise the existence of short-sale constraints and will adjust their beliefs such that 
no overpricing of securities will exist, on average. Rational investors are aware that, 
due to short-sale constraints, negative information is withheld, so individual stock 
prices reflect an expected quantity of bad news. If short-constraints prohibit some 
trades by informed and uninformed traders, constraints reduce unconditional 
informational efficiency especially with respect to private bad news. Thus the 
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) model predicts that short-sale constraints will reduce 
the speed of adjustment to negative information. While the Miller (1977) and 
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) models have different implications, the overriding 
theoretical view is that binding short-sale constraints inhibit the incorporation of 
negative information. 
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2.2.2 Empirical findings  
 
The effect of short-sale constraints on stock prices is ultimately an empirical question. 
Careful empirical investigation is required to examine the relative validity of the 
predictions of the foregoing models. Consistent with the Miller (1977) and Diamond 
and Verrechia (1987) models, the available empirical evidence largely indicates that 
short-sale constraints hinder price discovery. One key empirical issue is determining 
an appropriate measure of short-sale constraints. Ideally a perfect test would involve 
two economies that are identical except for whether or not they have short-sale 
constraints. However, most tests are conducted out indirectly using measures that 
attempt to identify stocks subject to short-sale constraints. These measures are 
outlined in Table 2-1 and include: short-interest (Figlewski, 1981); breadth of 
ownership (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002); Institutional ownership (see inter alia 
Nagel, 2005); the cost of short-selling (see inter alia Jones and Lamont, 2002); option 
introductions (Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001); stock option lockups (Ofek and 
Richardson, 2003); experimental markets (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006); and 
institutional changes (see inter alia Chang, Chang and Yu, 2007). 
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Table 2-1 Literature summary: Measures of short-sale constraints 
This table summarises the measures employed to proxy for short-sale constraints and the main results. 
 
Study Short-sale constraint  Sample period Main Findings 
Figlewski (1981) Short-interest 1973-1979 
While the least shorted firms produce positive abnormal returns with high statistical significance, the 
most shorted deciles do not produce statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Figlewski 
(1981) concludes that the prices of stocks for which there is relatively more adverse information 
among investors would tend to be high. 
Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2002) 
Institutional ownership  1979-1998 
The change in the number of mutual funds holding a stock is positively related to subsequent stock 
returns. The results imply that stocks experiencing declines in breadth of ownership—a proxy for 
short-sale constraints becoming more tightly binding—subsequently underperform those for which 
breadth has increased. 
Nagel (2005)  Institutional ownership  1980-2003 
Underperformance in growth stocks and high-dispersion stocks is concentrated among stocks with 
low Institutional ownership.  
Jones and Lamont 
(2002)  
Shorting costs  1926-1933 
Stocks which are expensive to short have low subsequent returns, consistent with the hypothesis that 
they are overpriced.  
Ofek, Richardson 
and Whitelaw 
(2004) 
Shorting costs  1999-2001 Stocks with abnormally low rebate rates have lower subsequent returns. 
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Table 2-1 – Continued 
Isaka (2007) Shorting costs  1998-2001 Short-sale constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information.  
Boehme, Danielsen 
and Sorescu (2006)  
Shorting costs/short-
interest/option listing  
1988-2002 
Using a variety of measures for heterogeneity of investor opinion (e.g., analyst recommendations, 
return volatility) they find strong support for Miller’s (1977) hypothesis on how short-sale constraints, 
simultaneously with divergence of opinion, are linked to overpricing. Importantly, stocks are not 
systematically overvalued when either one of these two conditions is not met. 
Figlewski and 
Webb (1993)  
Option listing  1973-1983 
High relative short-interest on a stock is associated with future underperformance in terms of its 
returns, because constraints on short-sales cause negative information to be underweighted in the 
market price. This finding is weaker for optionable stocks, which is consistent with the argument that 
the existence of options reduces the information inefficiency caused by short-selling constraints.  
Sorescu (2000)  Option listing  1981-1995  
The introduction of options for a specific stock causes its price to fall. This is consistent with the idea 
that options allow negative information to become impounded into the stock price.  
Danielsen and 
Sorescu (2001)  
Option listing  1981-1995 
Option introductions are associated with negative abnormal returns in underlying stocks. This implies 
that negative information is slower to be incorporated into prices when shorting is constrained. 
Ofek and 
Richardson (2003)  
Stock option lockups 1998-2000 
Short-sale constraints have a considerable and persistent negative impact on subsequent stock returns, 
also supporting the argument that stock prices do not fully incorporate information under short-sale 
constraints.  
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Table 2-1 – Continued 
Haruvy and 
Noussair (2006) 
Experimental markets N/A Short-selling has the effect of reducing market prices.  
Biais, Bisere and 
Decamps (1999)  
Unique institutional features  1996 Short-sale constraints reduce the speed at which negative information is impounded into the price. 
Bris, Goetzmann 
and Zhu (2007)  
Unique institutional features  1990-2001 
The evidence is weakly consistent with short-selling facilitating more efficient price discovery at the 
individual security level. 
Chang, Chang and 
Yu (2007) 
Unique institutional features  1994-2003 
Significant negative cumulative mean abnormal returns after stocks are added to the list of designated 
securities for short-selling. They regress these abnormal returns over variables that proxy for the 
dispersion of investor opinions and find that the decline increases with the divergence of investor 
opinions.  
Asquith, Pathak 
and Ritter (2005) 
Short-interest (shorting 
demand) and Institutional 
ownership (shorting supply) 
1988-2002 
Stocks in the highest percentile of short-interest (their proxy for shorting demand) and the lowest third 
of Institutional ownership (their proxy for shorting supply) underperform by 215 basis points per 
month. 
Cohen, Diether and 
Malloy (2007)  
Amount on loan (shorting 
demand) and lending fee 
(shorting supply) 
1999-2003 
Increases in shorting demand have economically large and statistically significant negative effects on 
future stock returns. The cross-sectional relation between high shorting costs and future negative 
returns, documented previously in the literature, is only present when shorting costs are driven by 
increases in shorting demand. The findings suggest that the shorting market is, most importantly, a 
mechanism for private information revelation. 
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The earliest empirical tests examine short-sale constraints using short-interest as a 
proxy for shorting demand. Figlewski (1981) tests the effect of short-sale constraints 
by looking at the relationship between the level of short-interest and subsequent stock 
returns. Figlewski (1981) argues that short-interest proxies for the level of shares that 
would be sold short if short-sale constraints were nonexistent, and therefore, the 
amount of adverse information that was excluded from the market price. Using a 
sample from 1973 to 1979, he documents weak evidence that more heavily shorted 
firms underperform less heavily shorted firms. While the least shorted firms produce 
positive abnormal returns with high statistical significance, the most shorted deciles 
do not produce statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Figlewski (1981) 
concludes that the prices of stocks for which there is relatively more adverse 
information among investors tend to be high.  
 
In many subsequent studies authors criticise the use of short-interest as a proxy for 
shorting demand (see inter alia D’Avolio, 2002, Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002 and 
Jones and Lamont, 2002). Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) note that the majority of 
stocks have virtually no short-interest outstanding at any given point in time. Thus if 
the test design involves tracking the abnormal returns of a portfolio of high short-
interest stocks, this portfolio will by definition be small, thereby potentially reducing 
the power of any tests, as well as calling into question the generalisability of the 
results. Jones and Lamont (2002) note that using short-interest as a proxy for shorting 
demand is problematic, because the quantity of shorting represents the intersection of 
supply and demand. Demand for shorting should respond to both the cost and benefit 
of shorting the stock, so that stocks that are very costly to short will have low short 
interest. Stocks that are impossible to short have an infinite shorting cost, yet the level 
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of short-interest is zero. Thus short-interest can be negatively correlated with shorting 
demand, overpricing, and shorting costs. For example, a low level of short-interest 
may not indicate low shorting demand: stocks that are impossible to short could have 
a large shorting demand, yet the level of short-interest is zero. Direct supporting 
evidence is found in D’Avolio (2002). For stock deciles sorted by short interest, 
neither the mean loan fee nor the percentage of stocks with high loan fees in the 
portfolio is monotonic in the actual short interest. This finding shows that short-
interest is not an effective measure of short-sale constraints. 
 
Another strand of the literature utilises institutional ownership to proxy for short-sale 
constraints. This literature argues that short-sale constraints are most likely to bind 
among stocks with low institutional ownership because of institutional constraints. 
Most professional investors never short-sell, and hence cannot trade against 
overpricing of stocks they do not own. Consistently, Almazan, Brown, Carlson and 
Chapman (2000) find that only about 30% of mutual funds are allowed by their 
charters to sell short and only 2% actually do sell short. Further, short-selling can be 
costly and short-sellers must borrow shares from an investor willing to lend. If loan 
supply is sparse, the short-seller may have to pay a significant fee. D’Avolio (2002) 
shows that the main suppliers of stock loans are institutional investors. He finds that 
the degree of institutional ownership explains much of the variation in loan supply 
across stocks, and stocks with low institutional ownership are more expensive to 
borrow.  
 
Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) posit that short-sale constraints are strongly linked to 
the availability of shares to borrow, and argue that when the number of institutions 
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(mutual funds) owning a stock increases or decreases, short-sale constraints are either 
relaxed or tightened, respectively. Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) argue that a more 
reliable proxy for how tightly short-sale constraints bind (and hence for the amount of 
negative information withheld from the market) can be constructed by looking at data 
on breadth of ownership, where breadth is defined as the number of investors (mutual 
funds) with long positions in a particular stock. Specifically, when breadth for a stock 
is lower, more investors are sitting on the sidelines, with their pessimistic valuations 
not registered in the stock’s price. Using quarterly data from 1979–1998, Chen, Hong 
and Stein (2002) find that the change in the number of mutual funds holding a stock is 
positively related to subsequent stock returns. The results imply that stocks 
experiencing declines in breadth of ownership—a proxy for short-sale constraints 
becoming more tightly binding—subsequently underperform those for which breadth 
has increased.  
 
Nagel (2005) modifies this proxy by considering the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions instead of the number of institutions owning shares. During the sample 
period (1980–2003), Nagel (2005) finds that underperformance in growth stocks and 
high-dispersion stocks is concentrated among stocks with low institutional ownership. 
This is consistent with the idea that short-sale constraints hold off negative opinions 
for these stocks. However, Nagel (2005) also finds that when he combines his sample 
period with that in Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), there is no longer a reliable pattern 
during the 1980 to 2003 period between breadth of mutual fund ownership and future 
returns. The use of institutional ownership is an improvement over short-interest as a 
proxy for short-sale constraints. However, various issues arise from these studies, 
including the use of mutual fund data. Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) note that 
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mutual fund and institutional investment, aside from representing only a portion of the 
investing universe, are also driven by non-shorting considerations such as investment 
style. Further, the measure is based not on the entire investing universe—as the theory 
suggests it should be—but rather on just the mutual-fund sector. Chen, Hong and 
Stein (2002) note that this is an important limitation, and suggest interpreting the 
results with some caution due to the possibility that the results do not fully reflect 
binding short-sale constraints, but rather potential superior stock-picking skill on the 
part of mutual fund managers.  
 
Short-selling can be expensive as stock needs to be borrowed from an available lender 
who charges a fee to the short-seller. Given this cost, another strand of the literature 
analyses direct measures of shorting costs as a proxy for short-sale constraints (see 
inter alia Jones and Lamont, 2002, Geczy, Musto and Reed 2002).  Jones and Lamont 
(2002) provide a description of shorting costs and a description of the motivation for 
its use as a proxy for short-sale constraints. The most commonly used metric is the 
rebate rate, and in particular, the spread between the rebate rate and the market 
interest rate. As described in Section 1.1.2, the difference or spread between the 
interest rate on cash funds and the rebate rate is a direct cost to the short-seller, and is 
often referred to as the loan fee. The rebate rate serves to equilibrate supply and 
demand in the stock lending market, much like the ‘repo’ rate in the fixed income 
market.  
 
Given rebate rates are not publicly available, empirical research is typically limited to 
proprietary databases over short time periods. Jones and Lamont (2002) examine a 
unique data set of shorting costs for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 
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1926 to 1933. During this period, the cost of shorting certain NYSE stocks was set in 
the ‘loan crowd’, a centralised stock loan market on the floor of the NYSE. A list of 
loan crowd stocks and their associated loaning rates was printed daily in the Wall 
Street Journal. From this public record, Jones and Lamont (2002) collect eight years 
of data on an average of 90 actively traded stocks per month. The results show that 
stocks which are expensive to short have low subsequent returns, consistent with the 
hypothesis that they are overpriced. Stocks that newly enter the borrowing market 
exhibit substantial overpricing. Prices rise prior to entering the loan list, peak 
immediately before a stock enters the loan list, and subsequently fall as the apparent 
overpricing is corrected. However, given the period of analysis (1926-1933), 
questions arise as to the applicability of the results to current markets.  
 
Using more recent data from a single lender (November 1998 through October 1999), 
Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) also measure the effect of short-selling costs and 
constraints on trading strategies that involve short-selling. Geczy, Musto and Reed 
(2002) report that the higher costs of borrowing stocks that are on ‘special’ do not 
eliminate the abnormal returns from the short-selling strategies they examine.17 They 
also conclude that short-sale constraints are unable to explain anomalous patterns in 
stock returns. However, the use of data from a sole lender and over a short time period 
may not be generalisable to the entire market. D’Avolio (2002), also using a database 
from a single lender for the period April 2000 through September 2001, reports that 
only 9% of the stocks in his sample are ‘on special’ on a typical day. The other 91% 
have a rebate rate approximately equal to the Fed funds overnight rate. He also finds 
                                                 
17
 Stocks that are expensive to borrow are known as ‘special’, ‘specials’ or ‘on special’. 
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that stocks that are on special have higher short-interest ratios. Ofek, Richardson and 
Whitelaw (2004), using a proprietary database of rebate rates from July 1999 to 
December 2001, document that stocks that are on special are more likely to violate 
put-call parity. Consistent with D’Avolio (2002), they find that 10.8% of their sample 
stocks have rebate rates more than 100 basis points below the Fed funds rate. Further, 
they report that stocks with abnormally low rebate rates have lower subsequent 
returns. 
 
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) obtain rebate rates and loan fee data over the 
period March 2001 to December 2002. Given the short time period, the authors use 
the available fee data to validate other constraint proxies and develop a proxy for 
short-sale constraints. Specifically, for each month from 1988 to 2002, the authors 
construct a constraint variable which recognises the lending fee and also employs 
information contained in short-interest and option availability (both measures of 
constraints). Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) emphasise in Miller’s (1977) 
model, if a stock is subject to short-sale constraints but there is no disagreement about 
the firm value (i.e., there are no optimists or pessimists), then the stock price will not 
be overpriced. Likewise, if there is high dispersion of opinions (i.e., there are 
optimists and pessimists), but no short-sale constraints, then both (optimists and 
pessimists) are able to trade and the market price will not be overvalued. Boehme, 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) address this issue by examining the valuation effects of 
the interaction between differences of opinion and short-sale constraints. Using a 
variety of measures for heterogeneity of investor opinion (e.g., analyst 
recommendations, return volatility), they find strong support for Miller’s hypothesis 
on how short-sale constraints, simultaneously with divergence in opinion, are linked 
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to overpricing. Importantly, stocks are not systematically overvalued when either one 
of these two conditions is not met. 
 
Isaka (2007) employs stock lending fees for the Japanese market to examine the 
effects of short-sale constraints on the informational efficiency of stock prices. The 
author aims to test the Diamond and Verrechia (1987) hypothesis that short-sale 
constraints reduce the speed of adjustment to stock prices in response to private 
information and cause a sharp decline in prices when announcements occur that reveal 
negative information to the public. Results indicate that short-sale constraints reduce 
the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the 
announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
the stocks with high short-sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre-
announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the 
CARs of the stocks with low short-sales costs when the announcements reveal 
negative information to the public.  
 
The proxies for short-sale constraints reviewed so far include various measures of 
shorting supply (i.e., institutional ownership or lending fees) and demand (i.e., short 
interest). Another strand of the literature attempts to examine short-sale constraints 
directly using institutional changes. The first studies to use institutional changes as a 
proxy for short-sale constraints examine the listing of exchange-traded options (see 
inter alia Figlewski and Webb, 1993, Sorescu, 2000 and Danielsen and Sorescu, 
2001). Options can facilitate shorting, because options can be a cheaper way of 
obtaining a short position and allow short-sales constrained investors to trade with 
51 
 
other investors who have better access to shorting. To the extent that the listing of 
publicly traded options effectively facilitates short-selling, it is expected that option 
listings will be associated with negative underlying stock price reactions and with 
increases in relative short interests (Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001).  
 
Figlewski and Webb (1993) show that optionable stocks exhibit significantly higher 
levels of short-interest than stocks without options. They argue that options trading 
creates a channel which effectively allows investors who are constrained from taking 
direct short positions to short a stock through the options market. Figlewski and Webb 
(1993) suggest that the listing of options artificially alleviates short-sale constraints 
and may also increase information efficiency in the market. They demonstrate that 
high relative short-interest on a stock is associated with future underperformance in 
terms of its returns, because constraints on short-sales cause negative information to 
be underweighted in the market price. This finding is weaker for optionable stocks, 
which is consistent with the argument that the existence of options reduces the 
information inefficiency caused by short-selling constraints. Similarly, Sorescu (2000) 
finds that in the period 1981–1995 the introduction of options for a specific stock 
causes its price to fall. This is consistent with the idea that options allow negative 
information to become impounded into the stock price. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) 
also examine stock returns following option listings over the period 1981 to 1995. 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) find that option introductions are associated with 
negative abnormal returns in underlying stocks. This implies that negative information 
is slower to be incorporated into prices when shorting is constrained.  
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Ofek and Richardson (2003) examine a unique institutional feature (stock option 
lockups) as a proxy for short-sale constraints. Given lockup agreements represent a 
stringent form of short-sales constraint (investor cannot sell the share), they argue that 
lockup expirations are equivalent to loosening a short-sales constraint. The results 
show that short-sale constraints have a considerable and persistent negative impact on 
subsequent stock returns, also supporting the argument that stock prices do not fully 
incorporate information under short-sale constraints. Consistently, Haruvy and 
Noussair (2006), using a series of experimental markets, show that short-selling has 
the effect of reducing market prices. However, they find that allowing a sufficiently 
large short-selling capacity reduces prices to levels below fundamental values. This 
suggests that allowing short-selling overcompensates for bubbles and leads to prices 
lower than fundamental values. In financial asset markets, this could translate into a 
misallocation of capital. Biais, Bisere and Decamps (1999) examine a unique feature 
on the Paris Bourse where several stocks are traded on a spot basis, while others are 
traded on a monthly settlement. The authors argue that short-sale constraints are more 
likely to be binding in stocks traded on a spot basis. Consistent with Diamond and 
Verrechia (1987), results indicate that short-sale constraints reduce the speed at which 
negative information is impounded into the price.  
  
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) use cross-sectional and time-series information from 
46 equity markets around the world to examine whether short-sales restrictions affect 
the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of individual as well 
as market returns. Information regarding the history and current practice of short-sales 
restrictions from market regulators, investment banks, and institutional investors 
specialising in short-sales is obtained. This data set allows a characterisation of each 
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country in terms of the legality, as well as practice, of short-selling for the period 
1990 to 2001. Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) do not carry out tests of overvaluation 
directly but examine whether short-sales are associated with more cross-sectional 
variation in equity returns, based on the assumption that more efficient price 
discovery results in higher idiosyncratic risk and less price co-movement. The 
evidence is weakly consistent with short-selling facilitating more efficient price 
discovery at the individual security level.  
 
Nilsson (2008) examines a unique institutional feature in Sweden to examine the 
effect of short-sale constraints on asset prices. Between 1980 and the end of 1991, 
banks and brokerage houses were prohibited by law from participating in stock 
lending/borrowing transactions; thus a marketplace for lending and borrowing stocks 
in Sweden did not exist during this period. Further, in 1985 the derivatives exchange, 
OM, was established and began trading stock options. Between 1985 and 1991, a 
rather unusual situation prevailed in Sweden where stock options were traded, but the 
underlying stock was virtually impossible to short. At the end of 1991 the law 
prohibiting banks and brokerage houses from being involved in stock lending and 
borrowing was abolished, and several market places were established. Nilsson (2008) 
finds the impact on pricing is consistent with a short-sale constraint and access to 
international shorting markets can alleviate local short-sale constraints. 
 
Chang, Chang and Yu (2007) offer the only direct examination of the relationship 
between short-sale constraints and stock overvaluation. They use the unique 
regulatory feature on the Hong Kong market that uses a short-sale approved list that is 
revised over time. This unique market structure enables the authors to trace stock 
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price movements before and after stocks are added to the official list, controlling for 
the other characteristics of the sampled stocks. Moreover, since short-sales restrictions 
for different stocks are released at different times, the cross-sectional analysis suffers 
less from the potential confounding effects of other concurrent events. They find 
significant negative cumulative mean abnormal returns after stocks are added to the 
list of designated securities for short-selling. They regress these abnormal returns over 
variables that proxy for the dispersion of investor opinions and find that the decline 
increases with the divergence of investor opinions. These results provide possibly the 
strongest evidence consistent with Miller’s (1977) theory.  
 
Finally, a recent strand of literature, which emanates from Asquith, Pathak and Ritter 
(2005), recognises the competing effects of shorting supply and shorting demand, 
arguing that stocks with high shorting demand and low shorting supply are the most 
likely to face binding short-sale constraints. Asquith, Pathak and Ritter (2005) posit 
that short-interest ratios are a proxy for short-sale demand and institutional ownership 
is a proxy for lendable supply. They show that stocks in the highest percentile of 
short-interest (their proxy for shorting demand) and the lowest third of institutional 
ownership (their proxy for shorting supply) underperform by 215 basis points per 
month during the 1988 to 2002 period on an equal-weight basis.  
 
Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) extend this research by using actual data on loan 
fees and loan amounts to decompose the effect on stock prices into the part that is due 
to shorting demand, and the part that is due to shorting supply. The proprietary 
database contains stock lending activity from a large institutional investor and 
contains rebate rates, number of shares on loan and collateral amounts/rates, from 
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September 1999 to August 2003. Employing an identification strategy that isolates 
shifts in the supply and demand for shorting, the results show that increases in 
shorting demand have economically large and statistically significant negative effects 
on future stock returns.  However, the authors do not find strong evidence that shifts 
in shorting supply are linked to future returns. These findings suggest that private 
information and/or additional non-price costs of shorting are important aspects of the 
link between the shorting market and stock prices, while the short-run effects of 
relaxing/tightening short-sale constraints are less important. Cohen, Diether and 
Malloy (2007) also show that the cross-sectional relation between high shorting costs 
and future negative returns, documented previously in the literature, is only present 
when shorting costs are driven by increases in shorting demand. The results of Cohen, 
Diether and Malloy (2007) cast doubt on the view that the primary link between the 
shorting market and future stock returns is due to costly market frictions. The findings 
suggest that the shorting market is, most importantly, a mechanism for private 
information revelation. 
 
2.2.3 Information content of short-selling 
 
The theoretical and empirical evidence presented above largely indicates that short-
sale constraints hinder price discovery and lead to less efficient asset pricing. The 
evidence also indicates that removing short-sale constraints results in negative 
abnormal returns as previously overpriced securities are sold. An implication of these 
studies is that short-sellers remove the upward price bias from stock prices. Given 
short-selling removes upward biases in prices, this suggests that on average short-
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sellers are able to identify overpriced securities and may be informed. Diamond and 
Verrechia (1987) suggest that, since short-sellers do not have the use of sale proceeds, 
market participants never short for liquidity reasons, which ceteris paribus implies 
relatively few uninformed short-sellers. Consequently, if informed traders are more 
likely to engage in short-selling, high short-interest conveys adverse information, 
implying a negative relationship between short-interest and stock returns. There is a 
growing body of literature which examines the information content of short-selling 
and ultimately examines whether short-sellers are informed. This section reviews 
these studies, which largely indicate that short-sellers are informed (see inter alia 
Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran, 2002 and Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 
2008). 
 
As previously discussed, while there are many reasons for short-selling, the 
‘speculative motive’ associated with expected decreases in a stock's market value 
receives the most notoriety. Under this motive, a high level of short-interest or an 
increase in short-interest can be considered bearish, since it reflects pessimism among 
market participants concerning the future level of stock prices. Alternatively, a high or 
increasing level of short-interest could be interpreted as bullish since all short 
positions must eventually be covered, implying an increase in demand for the stock. 
Given the availability of data on short-selling (short-interest), early studies examine 
the relationship between short-interest and stock returns. These early studies use 
monthly short-interest data (number of shares sold short at a particular point in time 
each month) and find mixed results. 
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The earliest reported short-selling data, short-interest statistics in the United States, 
did not begin until May 1931, and analysis of data from the subsequent decade reveals 
no systematic relationship between a stock’s short-interest and price changes 
(Macaulay and Durand, 1951). Biggs (1966) studied a sample of 33 stocks: for 14 
stocks there was a positive relationship between short-interest and subsequent price, 
for 16 stocks the relationship was negative, and there was no relationship for the 
remaining three stocks. Seneca (1967) uses a second-order autoregressive scheme to 
study the effect of a modified short-interest ratio, lagged two weeks, on the deflated 
1946-65 Standard and Poor's 500 stock index. He includes deflated corporate 
dividends as a regressor, to account for other factors, such as the economy. He finds 
his short-interest variable to have a significant negative effect. He hypothesises that 
short-interest changes are reflections of investors’ expectations regarding future stock 
prices. Seneca’s (1967) study was criticised by Hanna (1968) for the shortness of the 
15-day lag and for the apparent confusion between the short-interest and the short 
ratio. 
 
Mayor (1968) tests both aggregate (Standard and Poor's 500 stock index) and 
individual (14 randomly selected, frequently shorted common stocks) for 1962-1966 
data by regressing the index level or individual stock price on the appropriate short 
position lagged two weeks. He uses four different regression models. He also 
simulates short-interest trading activities. He concludes: "Contrary to public opinion, 
the view which emerges from this study is that there is no significant relationship 
between short-interest levels and stock prices." Consistently, Smith (1968) does not 
find any relationship between rising short-interest levels and stock prices. Smith 
(1968) reports that "strategies of buying stocks with high short positions did not 
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improve on random selection of stocks." McEnally and Dyl (1969) simulate randomly 
selling stocks for 1961-1965, a period of rising stock prices. They find that short-
sellers, on average, lose money, with their losses being greater the longer they hold 
the position. Heiby (1970) tests complicated rules to profit from knowledge of the 
short-sales by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) members. He reports a 50% 
average annualised profit through trading based on his rules.  
 
McDonald and Baron (1973) analyses the relationship between the risk of stocks and 
the frequency of the reported short positions. They find that riskier stocks often have 
higher levels of short-interest than others, and also have more highly variable short 
positions. They find that in a period of generally rising stock prices, short-sellers on 
average earn negative returns. Kerrigan (1974), using a sample of 200 firms, finds that 
the short ratio can be used to predict stock price movements. He finds a negative 
correlation between the level of the short ratio and the subsequent level of the S&P 
500 Index. He concludes, however, that this is probably caused not by changes in the 
level of short interest, but by changes in the level of trading volume. According to 
Kerrigan (1974), trading volume would be high in bull markets and low in bear 
markets. Hanna (1976), using various levels of filters, finds that it is possible to earn 
significantly higher returns than a buy-and-hold strategy by trading on the assumption 
that large increases in the short-interest are bullish and large declines are bearish. 
Hanna (1976) hypothesises that when speculative expectations become extreme, stock 
prices are likely to revert in the unanticipated direction. He tests the hypothesis with a 
model which uses changes in individual stocks' short-interest ratios (relative to their 
average daily trading volume) to measure shifts in investors' speculative expectations. 
He finds that returns generated by the model significantly exceed returns generated by 
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other strategies, e.g., random trading and buy-and-hold. He concludes, "The test 
indicates a systematic tendency for investors to over-discount events when an 
overwhelming majority share the same optimism (pessimism) about future stock 
prices."  
 
Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) examines the relationship between short-interest and stock 
returns for individual stocks. Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) attempts to correct 
systematically for both the risk and general state of the market using the capital asset 
pricing model. None of the previous studies (except for McDonald and Baron, 1973, 
and perhaps Seneca, 1967) attempts any correction for such factors. This study has 
larger individual stock samples than any of the other studies. However, it covers a 
shorter time period. A more robust statistical technique than regression analysis is 
used, non-parametric analysis of variance. Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) finds that an 
investor cannot profit from knowledge of the short-interest data. However, in a 
departure from previous work, this study offers evidence that short-sales act as a 
stabilising force on the movement of stock prices.  
 
In contrast to Hurtado-Sanchez (1978), Figlewski (1981) documents that stocks with 
high short-interest in one period tend to have low risk-adjusted returns in the 
following period. More recently, Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) document that, like 
Hurtado-Sanchez (1978), periods of high short-interest tend to follow periods of high 
returns. Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) show that the security returns in the month 
following an increase in short-interest are 0.1% greater than security returns in the 
month following a decrease in short interest. These differences are generally not 
significant and suggest that a trading strategy based on changes in short-interest 
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would be unsuccessful in the short run. Senchack and Starks (1990) test stock price 
reactions to the announcement of a substantial increase in short interest. Stocks with 
unexpected increases in short-interest are found to generate negative abnormal returns 
for a short period around the announcement date. The results also indicate that an 
unusual increase in short-interest is non-informative when there are options listed over 
the stocks. 
 
The early literature, discussed so far, provides mixed findings on the relationship 
between short-interest and stock returns. Several studies find that the levels of (or the 
changes in) short-interest are associated with changes in stock returns, while other 
studies do not. In the studies where an association is observed, its sign is positive in 
some cases and negative in others. Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran 
(2002) argue that the weak results could be due to the use of small and/or biased 
samples. The early data is likely to exclude firms with large and significant short 
positions relative to the shares outstanding. Also, since a typical firm has short-
interest of less than 1% of the shares outstanding, and since most firms have little or 
no short interest, samples chosen on a random basis lack the statistical power to detect 
a significant association between short-interest and stock returns. 
 
Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002) attempt to correct for these 
concerns by investigating the relationship between the level of short-interest and the 
stock returns in Nasdaq firms using monthly short-interest data for the universe of 
Nasdaq firms from June 1988 to December 1994. The empirical tests strongly support 
the view that short-interest is a bearish signal and that the information content of this 
signal is increasing in the magnitude of short interest. Specifically, heavily shorted 
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firms experience significant negative abnormal returns ranging from 20.76 to 21.13% 
per month after controlling for the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum 
factors. Elfakhani (2000) also investigates the relationship between short-interest and 
subsequent returns. The results support the notion that short-sellers made correct 
predictions of price movements during the sampling period 1986-1990. 
 
Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001) use monthly short-interest to examine 
the trading strategies of short-sellers. The authors document a strong relation between 
the trading strategies of short-sellers and ratios of fundamentals to market prices. 
Firms with low ratios of fundamentals (such as earning and book values) to market 
values are known to have systematically lower future stock returns. The authors find 
that short-sellers position themselves in the stock of such firms, and then cover their 
positions as the ratios mean-revert. They also show that short-sellers refine their 
trading strategies to minimise transactions costs and maximise their investment 
returns. The evidence is consistent with short-sellers using information in these ratios 
to take positions in stocks with lower expected future returns. A possible explanation 
for the results is that short-sellers are sophisticated investors who play an important 
role in keeping the price of stocks in line with fundamentals. Consistently Kot (2007), 
using a sample from 1988-2002 on the Nasdaq, documents that short-sellers prefer 
stocks with low fundamental market ratios, such as book-to-market.  
 
Arnold, Butler, Crack and Zhang (2005) also propose a potential reason for the mixed 
results in the early literature. As mentioned above, the Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA97) 
in the United States eliminated the opportunity to defer capital gains taxes using 
option strategies like shorting against the box. Arnold, Butler, Crack and Zhang 
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(2005) use a large sample of short-interest announcements, and document that an 
increase in the costs of short-selling (TRA97) increases the negative information 
content of short-interest announcements. Particularly for NYSE stocks, short-interest 
announcements after TRA97 convey significantly more negative sentiment than those 
before TRA97. In contrast to the findings of Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and 
Balachandran (2002), it is no longer true that the negative relationship between short-
interest and subsequent stock price performance holds only in the most heavily 
shorted stocks. Rather, after TRA97, short-interest announcements convey negative 
information even for stocks with moderate levels of short interest. The results of this 
study possibly explain the lack of uniform results in the prior literature.  
 
Most recently, Boehmer, Huszár and Bradford (2010) examine monthly short-interest 
data from 1988-2005 for stocks from NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq. Consistent with 
Arnold, Butler, Crack and Zhang (2005), the authors document that stocks with 
relatively high short-interest subsequently experience negative abnormal returns, but 
the effect can be transient and of debatable economic significance. The results also 
show that both positive and negative information apparently known to short-sellers is 
not incorporated in stock prices, casting doubt on the critical asymmetry between the 
way that good and bad news is revealed to market participants. However, they still 
find evidence that short-sellers are able to identify overvalued stocks to sell, and 
appear adept at avoiding undervalued stocks.  
 
Examining monthly short interest, Karpoff and Lou (2010) examine whether short-
sellers detect firms that misrepresent their financial statements, and whether their 
trading conveys external costs or benefits to other investors. The results show that 
63 
 
abnormal short-interest increases steadily in the 19 months before the 
misrepresentation is publicly revealed, particularly when the misconduct is severe. 
Short-selling is associated with a faster time-to-discovery, and it dampens the share 
price inflation that occurs when firms misstate their earnings. These results indicate 
that short-sellers anticipate the eventual discovery and severity of financial 
misconduct. Short-sellers also convey external benefits, helping to uncover 
misconduct and keeping prices closer to fundamental values.  
 
Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) argue that the failure to find a consistent relation 
between short-interest and abnormal returns in the early literature could be due to the 
problematic nature of short interest. For example, a low level of short-interest may not 
indicate low shorting demand. Stocks that are impossible to short could have a huge 
shorting demand, yet the level of short-interest is zero. The weak results could also be 
due to the typical focus on levels of short interest, rather than changes in short 
interest. Further, Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007) find that almost half of the 
securities lending contracts they study are closed out within two weeks. Diether, Lee 
and Werner (2009a) indicate that approximately 40% of trading volume involves a 
short-seller. In contrast, short-interest represents only about 4% of shares outstanding. 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008) suggest that this discrepancy is due to short-sellers 
on average maintaining their positions for a much shorter period of time. This 
suggests that monthly data could be inadequate for understanding the trading practices 
of short-sellers. Until recently, short-selling data was only available with a monthly 
frequency. However, higher-frequency data allows for a greater degree of granularity 
in which to study the information content of short-sellers.  
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Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) provide the first evidence of short-selling at the 
daily level. The authors take a different approach, using a unique data set to explore 
key features of short-sales transactions prior to the earnings announcements of 913 
Nasdaq firms. If short-sellers are primarily informed traders, atypical increases in 
short-selling should occur with some frequency prior to negative earnings surprises, 
and unusual declines in short-selling should appear before favourable announcements. 
The results show that daily flows of short-sales are concentrated prior to disappointing 
earnings announcements, which suggests short-sellers have access to private 
information.  
 
Along the same line, Christophe, Ferri and Hsieh (2010) study short-selling prior to 
the release of analyst downgrades in a sample of 670 downgrades of Nasdaq stocks 
between 2000 and 2001. They find abnormal levels of short-selling in the three days 
before downgrades are publicly announced. Further, the pre-announcement abnormal 
short-selling is significantly related to the subsequent share price reaction to the 
downgrade, and especially so for downgrades that prompt the most substantial price 
declines. Further evidence suggests that tipping, where short-sellers short a firm’s 
stock by taking advantage of the tip they receive from a brokerage firm about a 
forthcoming downgrade, is more consistent with the data than the prediction 
explanation which posits that short-sellers successfully predict downgrades on the 
basis of public information about a firm’s financial health. Downgraded stocks with 
high abnormal short-selling perform poorly over the subsequent six months by 
comparison with those with low abnormal short-selling. Overall, the results support 
the hypothesis that short-sellers are informed traders and exploit profitable 
opportunities provided by downgrade announcements. 
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Using proprietary data, Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008) examine daily short-sale 
flow executed at the NYSE over the period January 2000 through April 2004. They 
find that heavily shorted stocks significantly underperform lightly shorted stocks 
(over a 20-day holding period), and they argue that the difference exceeds trading 
costs. Similarly, Diether, Lee and Werner (2009a) use tick data on all short-sales 
executed in the US during 2005 (these data are available only since January 2, 2005). 
Consistently, they find that portfolios comprising a long position in lightly shorted 
stocks and a short position in heavily shorted stocks have positive abnormal returns, 
though the amount of trading required to capture the returns is considerable. Further 
evidence that short-sellers are informed is provided by Clunie, Moles and 
Pyatigorskaya (2009), who examine how short-sellers react to losses. Using daily data 
on stock lending, they estimate the average price at which short positions were 
initiated, thus permitting a study of short-sellers’ responses to their own book losses. 
Results show that short-sellers close their positions in response to losses and not 
simply in response to rising share prices. Short-sellers do not exhibit an aversion to 
realising losses, but instead accept their losses or ‘mistakes’ systematically. Stocks 
subject to short-covering in this manner do not subsequently underperform the 
market, and so there is no evidence of an investment performance cost (other than 
transaction costs) associated with immediately covering short positions that fall to an 
accounting loss.  
 
The more recent results from studies which examine daily short-sales uniformly 
indicate that short-sellers are informed. Further evidence of this is shown at the 
intraday level by Aitken, Frino, McCorry and Swan (1998). The authors examine 
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short-sale orders placed and trades executed on the ASX. They investigate the market 
reaction to short-sales on an intraday basis in a market setting where short-sales are 
transparent immediately following execution. They document a mean reassessment of 
stock value following short-sales of up to 20.20% with adverse information 
impounded within 15 minutes or 20 trades. Short-sales executed near the end of the 
financial year and those related to arbitrage and hedging activities are associated with 
a smaller price reaction; trades near information events precipitate larger price 
reactions. The evidence is generally weaker for short-sales executed using limit orders 
relative to market orders. Overall the results are consistent with the notion that short-
sellers are informed.  
 
2.3 Impact of short-selling on market quality 
 
The previous section examines the pricing implications of short-selling and the 
evidence largely indicates that short-sale constraints hinder price discovery. Despite 
the almost universal evidence regarding the benefits for asset pricing, short-selling is 
regarded as a controversial technique by many, particularly in times of falling 
markets. Short-selling is often associated with panic selling, high volatility and market 
crashes, which can lead to potential problems such as market abuse, disorderly 
markets and settlement failure. In particular, naked short-selling is often most heavily 
criticised and is outlawed in many markets. This section reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the impact of short-selling on market quality. Market quality is 
not easily defined and can encompass many aspects including market volatility, 
liquidity and pricing efficiency. Given that the previous section examines pricing 
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efficiency, this section focuses on market volatility and liquidity. The section 
concludes by examining the limited literature that focuses on the impact of naked 
short-selling on market quality.   
 
2.3.1 Impact on volatility 
 
The relationship between short-sales and stock return volatility is a contentious issue 
and has received limited academic attention. While theoretical models attempt to 
explain the volatility of stock returns when short-sale constraints are imposed, there is 
no widely accepted theory on how short-sale constraints affect the volatility of market 
returns. Hong and Stein (2003) develop a heterogeneous agent model linking short-
sale constraints to market crashes. In their model, if certain investors are constrained 
from selling short, their accumulated unrevealed negative information will not be 
impounded until the market begins to drop, which further aggravates a market decline 
and leads to a crash. Therefore, their model predicts a higher frequency of extreme 
negative stock returns when short-sale constraints are binding. They motivate the 
model with the observation that the US market displays negative skewness. Hong and 
Stein’s (2003) model is similar to Miller (1977), and they also show how binding 
short-sale constraints can explain various observed features of crashes such as the fact 
that they sometimes occur in the absence of sufficiently significant new public 
information.  
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) develop a behavioural model with heterogeneous 
investors that exhibit overconfidence to private information. Contrary to the common 
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belief that short-sale constraints stabilise the market, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) 
predict a significant decrease in trading volume and price volatility when short-sale 
constraints are lifted. Consistent with Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) document that short-sale constraints can be a direct cause 
of, or at least a necessary condition for, bubbles and excessive volatility. Bai, Chang 
and Wang (2006) consider a fully rational expectations equilibrium model, in which 
investors trade for two reasons,  to share risk and to speculate on private information, 
but face short-sale constraints. Short-sale constraints limit both types of trades, and 
thus reduce the allocation and informational efficiency of the market. Bai, Chang and 
Wang (2006) predict higher price volatility when short-selling is restricted, as better-
informed investors are held out of the market, and less informed investors perceive 
the risk as considerably higher. This is consistent with Diether, Lee and Werner 
(2009a), who document that short-sellers tend to be contrarian traders, with a 
stabilising effect on the market.  
 
Zheng (2008) samples intraday short-sales transaction data from the NYSE to study 
short-selling around company earnings announcements, and documents that when the 
earnings announcement is above expectations, short-sellers act as contrarians.  Ho 
(1996) documents that the daily volatility of stock returns increases when short-sale 
constraints are imposed. Ho (1996) utilises an event where the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore suspended trading for three days from December 2, 1985 to December 4, 
1985. When trading was resumed on December 5, 1985, contracts could only be 
executed on an immediate delivery basis (i.e., delivery and settlement within 24 
hours), which implies that short-selling was severely restricted.  
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Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) examine the effect of market-wide short-sale 
restrictions on skewness, volatility, probability of market crashes, liquidity, and 
expected market returns. They collect data from December 1969 through December 
2002 on the history of short-sale regulation and feasibility from 111 countries that 
have stock markets. They also collect data on the history of put option trading, as 
Figlewski and Webb (1993) show that option trading ameliorates short-sale 
constraints. They consider both the legality and feasibility of short-selling or put 
option trading. They test feasibility because many countries do not have rules 
prohibiting short-selling, yet no short-selling takes place for lack of necessary 
institutions that facilitate stock borrowing across market participants. Conversely, 
some countries officially prohibit short-selling, yet short-selling takes place routinely 
via offshore markets. An indicator that determines whether short-selling is possible is 
constructed using information on the regulation and feasibility of both short-selling 
and put option trading. Using this indicator, the authors conclude that when short-
selling is possible, the aggregate returns are less volatile.  
 
Hueng (2006) examines a sample that fits the Hong and Stein (2003) model 
assumptions to test the model in a time-series setting. The Chinese stock markets are 
young and lack stock lending mechanisms. The index derivatives are still at the early 
stage of development. Therefore, it is very difficult to short-sell Chinese stocks. Using 
daily data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen composite indexes from June 1995 to August 
2001, they find that higher trading volume today predicts a more negatively skewed 
distribution for tomorrow’s stock return. Thus, the Hong and Stein (2003) model is 
supported in the Chinese stock markets. 
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While the above theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that short-sale 
constraints have an adverse effect on volatility, Allen and Gale (1991) provide an 
exception to this view. Allen and Gale (1991) describe a model of general equilibrium 
with incomplete markets in which firms can innovate by issuing arbitrary, costly 
securities. When short-sales are prohibited, firms behave competitively, and 
equilibrium is efficient. However, without the presence of short-sale constraints, 
financial innovation is not necessarily efficient and markets may not be complete. The 
authors highlight that the potential for financial innovation renders short-selling a 
destabilising influence in the economy. This is potentially interesting, given short-
sales tend to be allowed in major markets where financial innovations occur. Bernardo 
and Welch (2004) develop a model that shows how the fear of financial crisis, instead 
of a real liquidity shock, is the true cause of financial crises. One implication of their 
model is that constraints which hinder market participants from front-running other 
investors can effectively prevent financial crises from happening, which is consistent 
with the finding of Allen and Gale (1991) that short-sales can potentially destabilise 
the economy. 
 
Kraus and Rubin (2002) derive a stylised model predicting the impact of index 
options introduction (a form of reduction in short-sale constraints) on the volatility of 
stock returns when short-selling of stocks is prohibited. Their model predicts volatility 
may increase or decline, depending on the model parameter values. As an empirical 
illustration, they study the effect of index option initiation in Israel. Options were 
introduced in Israel at a time when short-sales were prohibited, presenting an 
opportunity to examine the removal of a short-sale constraint. They find that option 
introduction was accompanied by an increase in volatility of the underlying index.  
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Consistently, Henry and McKenzie (2006) find that the Hong Kong market exhibits 
greater volatility following a period of short-selling and that volatility asymmetry is 
exacerbated by short-selling. Henry and McKenzie (2006) consider the relationship 
between traded volume and volatility, allowing for the impact of short-sales. The 
evidence supports a nonlinear, bi-directional relationship between volume and 
volatility. Short-selling has a significant impact on this relationship, and results 
suggest that the Hong Kong market displays greater volatility following a period of 
short-selling, and that asymmetric responses to positive and negative innovations to 
returns appear to be exacerbated by short-selling. 
 
Chang, Chang and Yu (2007), using a direct measure of short-sale constraints, find 
that the volatility of stock returns increases when the constraints are lifted. However, 
the authors note that increasing volatility of individual stocks is not tantamount to 
increasing the volatility of the market as a whole. For this reason, and because of the 
overlapping attributes of the sample, the authors urge caution in inferring the effects 
of short-sales on market stability. However, the results do provide interesting 
evidence that relaxing restrictions on short-sales leads to higher return volatility for 
individual stocks. 
 
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) test whether short-sale constraints stabilise or 
destabilise financial markets by examining the frequency of extreme negative returns 
and the skewness of both individual stock returns and market returns. They find that 
in markets in which short-selling is either prohibited or not practised, stock returns at 
the market level tend to be less, rather than more, negative, which contradicts the 
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prediction of Hong and Stein’s (2003) model. However, Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu 
(2007) fail to identify significant differences in skewness at the individual level, or 
any significant relationship between the frequency of extreme negative returns and 
short-sale restrictions. 
 
Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b) both use Reg 
SHO data to analyse the effects on market quality associated with the temporary 
suspension of price tests (short-sale constraint) on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Diether, 
Lee and Werner (2009b) find evidence of an economically small, but statistically 
significant, increase in volatility using intraday returns on the NYSE. Alexander and 
Peterson (2008) observe an increase in volatility; however, none of the tests indicate 
that the increase is significant. It should be noted that Diether, Lee and Werner 
(2009b) describe their observed increase in volatility as ‘slight’ and conclude that 
their evidence does not suggest an increase in down-side volatility. Further, both 
studies find that the results from the Nasdaq are weak and often insignificant relative 
to those on the NYSE. Overall, Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and 
Werner (2009b) observe insignificant or weak increases in daily and intraday return 
volatility. 
 
Overall, the limited theoretical and empirical evidence presented above provides 
conflicting predictions regarding the impact of short-sales on volatility. Specifically, 
the empirical evidence is quite scarce and requires further investigation.  
2.3.2 Impact on liquidity 
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Evidence regarding the impact of short-sales on liquidity is very limited. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987) is possibly the only theoretical study examining changes in 
short-sale constraints and the effect on liquidity. They examine short-sales 
prohibitions, where no short-sales are allowed, and short-sale constraints, where 
investors do not receive the proceeds from short-sales immediately. Under the short-
sale constraints set-up, uninformed traders are excluded from the market due to the 
institutional constraints. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that a short-
prohibition increases the average bid-ask spread. In their model, when the price is far 
from the true but yet unknown liquidation value, there is more uncertainty in the 
price, and hence the bid-ask spread is wider. The short-sales prohibition reduces the 
speed at which the price converges to the true liquidation value, and therefore reduces 
the speed at which the bid-ask spread narrows over time. This increases the average 
bid-ask spread. On the other hand, the effect of a short-sale constraint on the average 
bid-ask spread is ambiguous. Other models, including Miller (1977), predict short-sale 
constraints restrict pessimistic investors from trading on their beliefs, possibly 
reducing trading activity. Given the significance of short-sellers in today’s markets, it 
seems intuitive that short-sale constraints could worsen market liquidity. 
 
Empirical evidence, while limited, includes Alexander and Peterson (2008) and 
Diether, Lee and Werner (2009b), who use Reg SHO data to show that short-sale 
constraints (price tests) have a limited effect on market liquidity. A reduction in 
constraints increases short-sale activity, but both find that the restriction results in 
only slightly wider spreads. On the NYSE, both studies find an increase in short 
trading volume for pilot stocks. Furthermore, suspension of the up-tick rule is found 
to result in significantly wider spreads and thinner ask depths. Charoenrook and 
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Daouk (2005), in their study of market-wide short-sale restrictions, find that when 
short-selling is possible there is greater liquidity. Given the limited empirical 
literature, further evidence is required regarding the impact of short-selling on market 
liquidity.  
 
2.4 Naked short-selling in equities markets 
 
Despite the apparent assumption that naked short-selling is detrimental, relatively 
little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact of naked short-selling on 
financial markets. The literature discussed in the previous sections examines changes 
in the rules governing either covered short-sales (see inter alia Chang, Chang and Yu, 
2007), or changes to short-sale constraints that affect both naked and covered short-
sales (see inter alia Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu, 2006). None of these studies 
explicitly examine naked short-selling or changes in short-sale constraints related to 
naked short-selling. This section reviews the limited literature which examines the 
impact of naked short-selling in equities markets.  
 
Despite the widespread criticism, not all naked short-selling is abusive. Some naked 
short-selling occurs unintentionally when a short-seller locates shares to borrow (or 
has reasonable belief that shares can be located and borrowed), but subsequently is 
unable to borrow the stock in time for delivery. Further, some naked short-selling is 
due to market making. A fail to deliver (FTD) occurs when the seller of a security 
does not deliver that security to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement 
period (Boni, 2006). Naked short-selling is one way that this can occur. FTDs can also 
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arise from various processing errors, delays in obtaining physical stock certificates or 
human error in entering the incorrect stock symbol. Boni (2006) provides an empirical 
description of delivery failures in US equity markets prior to Regulation SHO. The 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that pre-Regulation SHO, equity and 
options market-makers strategically failed to deliver shares that were expensive or 
impossible to borrow. The findings also support comments of equity and options 
market-makers that the inability to strategically fail to deliver shares post-Regulation 
SHO will reduce liquidity and increase short-sale constraints, particularly for stocks 
that are expensive to borrow. Consistently, Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2009) 
document that the transactions of a major options market-maker reveal that in most 
hard-to-borrow situations, they choose not to borrow, and instead fail to deliver stock 
to its buyers.  
 
Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) look at the effect of the SEC’s temporary restrictions 
on naked short-sales of 19 financial firms in 2008. They find that the restrictions are 
successful in eliminating naked short-sales for the restricted stocks, but naked short-
sales increase dramatically for a closely matched sample of financial firms during the 
restricted period. Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) proxy for naked short-sale activity 
using fail-to-deliver data obtained from the SEC. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) 
overpricing hypothesis, they find evidence of a positive (negative) market reaction to 
the announcement (expiration) of the short-sale restrictions. Further, they document 
that the restrictions negatively impact various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask 
spreads and trading volume. Contrary to the notion that short-sale restrictions reduce 
volatility, they find no evidence of a volatility decrease during the restricted period. In 
fact, consistent with the theoretical models of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) and 
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Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), daily return volatility increased during the restricted 
period, albeit not significantly more than for a matched sample of financial firms. 
 
In effect, Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) provide the first empirical evidence 
regarding the impact of naked short-sale constraints. However, the study is limited to 
a sample of 19 financial firms over a period of only 17 trading days during which the 
market experienced heightened market volatility. Questions must be raised with 
respect to the applicability of the results to ‘normal’ periods of trading and to non-
financial stocks. Further evidence is needed to corroborate the findings.    
 
2.5 CDS markets 
 
The previous sections of this chapter examine issues relating to the impact of short-
selling in equities markets. Chapter 5 of this dissertation examines the impact of 
short-selling on CDS markets. Evidence regarding the relationship between short-
selling and CDS markets is non-existent. Therefore this section surveys the existing 
literature on CDS markets. The CDS market is first described, as is literature relating 
to credit spread pricing, determinants of credit spreads, determinants of CDS spreads 
and other studies relating to CDS markets.  
 
2.5.1 CDS market details 
 
The market for credit derivatives has experienced spectacular growth in the last 
decade. According to the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the 
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notional value of outstanding CDSs increased from one to 62 trillion USD from 2001 
to 2007. Prior to the ‘credit crisis’, the development of the CDS market was widely 
acknowledged as a source of substantial improvements in the financial system and the 
economy. Former US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan observed 
that: 
 
“The new instruments of risk dispersal have enabled the largest and most 
sophisticated banks, in their credit-granting role, to divest themselves of much credit 
risk by passing it to institutions with far less leverage...... These increasingly complex 
financial instruments have contributed to the development of a far more flexible, 
efficient, and hence resilient financial system than the one that existed just a quarter-
century ago.”18  
 
Ironically, CDS markets were a primary cause of the credit crisis and largely 
responsible for the collapse of Bear Stearns, AIG, WaMu and other mammoth 
corporations. According to top experts, CDSs were not only largely responsible for 
bringing down the American (and world) economy, but they still pose a substantial 
systemic risk. For example, Nobel prize-winning economist Myron Scholes said that 
over-the-counter CDSs are so dangerous that they should be “blown up or burned”, 
and we should start afresh. Another Nobel prize-winning economist, George Akerlof, 
predicted in 1993 that CDSs would cause the next meltdown.  
 
                                                 
18
  Comments by Alan Greenspan before the National Italian American Foundation in Washington, 
D.C. on October 12, 2005. 
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Single-name CDSs are the most liquid of the credit derivatives currently traded and 
form the basic building blocks for more complex structured credit products. A CDS is 
a contract between two parties, a protection buyer who makes fixed periodic 
payments, and a protection seller, who collects the premium in exchange for making 
the protection buyer whole in case of default. In general, trades are between 
institutional investors and dealers. CDSs are over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. 
They are similar to buying/selling insurance contracts on a corporation or sovereign 
entity’s debt, without being regulated by insurance regulators (unlike insurance, it is 
not necessary to own the underlying debt to buy protection using CDSs). Before 
trading, institutional investors and dealers enter into an ISDA Master Agreement, 
setting up the legal framework for trading. 
 
The premium paid by the protection buyer to the seller, often called ‘spread’, is 
quoted in basis points per annum of the contract’s notional value and is usually paid 
quarterly. Note that these spreads are not the same type of concept as ‘yield spread’ of 
a corporate bond to a government bond. Rather, CDS spreads are the annual price of 
protection quoted in bps of the notional value, and not based on any risk-free bond or 
any benchmark interest rates. Periodic premium payments allow the protection buyer 
to deliver the defaulted bond at par or to receive the difference of par and the bond’s 
recovery value. Therefore, a CDS is like a put option written on a corporate bond. 
Like a put option, the protection buyer is protected from losses incurred by a decline 
in the value of the bond as a result of a credit event. Accordingly, the CDS spread can 
be viewed as a premium on the put option, where payment of the premium is spread 
over the term of the contract. For example, the five-year CDS for Ford was quoted at 
160 bps on April 27, 2004. Thus, if someone purchases the five-year protection for a 
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$10 million exposure to Ford credit, they would pay 40 bps, or $40,000, every quarter 
as an insurance premium for the protection received.  
 
Each contract involves: a Reference Entity (the underlying entity on which one is 
buying/selling protection); a Reference Obligation (the bond or loan that is being 
‘insured’); a Term/Tenor, usually ranging from one to 10 years, with the five-year 
maturity the most common and liquid contracts; a Notional Principal, while there are 
no limits on the size or maturity of CDS contracts, though most contracts range 
between $10 million to $20 million in notional value; Credit Events (the specific 
events triggering the protection seller to pay the protection buyer – the defined events 
are bankruptcy, failure to pay, debt restructuring, and the rare obligation default, 
obligation acceleration, and repudiation/moratorium). Market participants generally 
view bankruptcy, failure to pay and restructuring as the most common. Bankruptcy, 
the clearest concept of all, is the reference entity’s insolvency or inability to repay its 
debt. Failure-to-pay occurs when the reference entity, after a certain grace period, fails 
to make payment of principal or interest. Restructuring refers to a change in the terms 
of debt obligations that are adverse to the creditors. Restructuring is by far the most 
problematic of these trigger events, because ‘adverse change’ is an ambiguous 
concept. Accordingly, some market participants prefer to exclude the restructuring 
provision from a credit derivative contract altogether, or to restrict the scope of the 
provision. 
 
In the case of a credit event, under physical settlement the protection buyer has to 
deliver a bond of seniority at least equal to that of the reference obligation – if there 
are multiple bonds deliverable, the protection buyer will most likely deliver the 
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cheapest bond to the protection seller. The life of a CDS from initiation of trade to 
maturity can be represented as follows: 
 
Figure 2-1 CDS illustration 
If there is no credit event: 
 
 
 
In the case of a credit event: 
 
 
 
 
 
The first step after a credit event occurs is the delivery of a ‘Credit Event Notice’, 
either by the protection buyer or the seller. Then, the compensation is to be paid by 
the protection seller to the buyer via either (1) physical settlement, or (2) cash 
settlement, as specified in the contract. In a physical settlement, the protection seller 
buys the distressed loan or bond from the protection buyer at par. Here the bond or 
loan purchased by the seller of protection is called the ‘deliverable obligation’. 
Physical settlement is the most common form of settlement in the CDS market, and 
normally occurs within 30 days of the credit event. With cash settlement, the payment 
from the seller of protection to the protection buyer is determined as the difference 
between the notional value of the CDS and the final value of the reference obligation 
for the same notional value. Cash settlement is less common because obtaining quotes 
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for the distressed reference credit is often difficult. A cash settlement typically occurs 
no later than five business days after the credit event. 
 
CDSs can be used for a variety of reasons. Firstly, CDSs allow capital or credit 
exposure constrained businesses (banks for example) to free up capacity to facilitate 
more business. As it is easier to buy credit protection than short bonds, CDSs can be a 
short credit-positioning vehicle. CDSs may allow users to avoid triggering 
tax/accounting implications that arise from the sale of assets. CDSs also allow 
investors to speculate on deterioration or improvement of credit quality of a reference 
credit. CDSs also offer the opportunity to access hard-to-find credit (limited supply of 
bonds, small syndicate). Investors can tailor their credit exposure to maturity 
requirements, as well as desired seniority in capital structure. CDSs require no cash 
outlay and therefore create leverage. The standardised documentation, liquidity, 
ability to customise terms, and pure credit focus makes the CDS market a de facto 
standard for expressing a view on the credit market (either single credits, or baskets 
such as indices). 
 
2.5.2 CDS pricing 
 
Early methods of pricing CDS contracts involved more art than science. Today, 
however, pricing is more quantitatively based, using parameters such as, (1) the 
likelihood of default, (2) the recovery rate when default occurs, and (3) some 
consideration for liquidity, regulatory, and market sentiment about the credit. In 
theory, CDS spreads should be closely related to bond yield spreads, or excess yields 
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to risk-free government bonds. To elaborate, consider two portfolios; the first consists 
of (1) a short position (i.e. selling protection) in the CDS of a company and (2) a long 
position in a risk-free bond; the second consists of an outright long position in the 
company’s corporate bond, all with the same maturity and par and notional values of 
$100. Theoretically, these two investments should provide identical returns, resulting 
in the CDS spread equalling the corporate bond spread (see Duffie, 1999). 
 
If no default occurs, principal payoff at maturity of the portfolio of a CDS and a risk-
free bond will be $100, as no payment is made on the CDS short position and a risk-
free bond pays $100. The corporate bond will also pay $100, if no default occurs. 
However, if default occurs, the portfolio of a CDS and a risk-free bond will pay the 
amount equal to $100 minus the contingent payment on the CDS upon default. This 
payment depends on the recovery rate of the defaulted corporate bond. If it is 
assumed, for example, that the recovery rate is 45%, the protection seller must pay 
$55, or 55%, on $100 notional. Using the same recovery rate, the investment in the 
corporate bond would also result in a payoff value of $55 upon default. These two 
investments have identical payoffs and risk profiles. Accordingly, the CDS and the 
corporate bond should be traded at the same spread level. In pricing a CDS, one must 
know, or make assumptions about, the likelihood of default over the term of the swap, 
the recovery rate, and discount factors (or the yield curve). Given CDS spreads should 
be intricately linked to credit spreads, the pricing models should also be intricately 
linked. This section reviews the literature on the theoretical approaches to pricing 
credit-sensitive instruments.  
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Credit risk models are usually divided into structural and reduced-form models. Under 
structural form models, the liabilities of a firm are seen as a contingent claim on the 
assets of the firm itself and default occurs when the market value of the assets, which 
is modelled as a stochastic process, reaches some limit. This approach, developed by 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), uses structural models to connect the 
price of credit-sensitive instruments directly to the economic determinants of financial 
distress and loss, given default. Structural models imply that the main determinants of 
the likelihood and severity of default are financial leverage, volatility, and the risk-
free term structure.  
 
The reduced-form approach, instead, postulates that default occurs randomly, due to 
some exogenous factor(s) whose probability of occurring, dubbed the ‘intensity’, is 
modelled and calibrated using market data. Models belonging to this latter class are 
also called intensity-based models. Reduced-form models, developed by Litterman 
and Iben (1991), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Jarrow, Landow and Turnbull 
(1997), use market data to recover the parameters needed to value credit-sensitive 
claims. Duffie (1999), Houweling and Vorst (2002), and Hull and White (2000) apply 
reduced-form models to credit derivatives. Reduced-form models are praised by 
practitioners because of their capacity, by construction, to fit market data, but 
structural models are usually viewed by academics as being more appropriate for 
analysing the determinants of credit risk.  
 
The first structural model on credit risk was introduced by Merton (1974). In this 
model, default occurs when the market value of the firm, which is assumed to be 
described by a random process, is below the face value of the outstanding debt at the 
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maturity of the debt itself. In this case, the shareholders give the assets of the firm up 
to the bondholders. Merton's intuition was that a bond subject to credit risk can be 
seen as a combination of a long position in a risk-free bond and short position in a 
European put option sold to the shareholders with a strike price equal to the face value 
of the risky bond. In this setting, the price of the risky bond can be determined 
through standard option pricing methods which link its value to the parameters of the 
stochastic process driving the firm value and to the level of outstanding debt. The 
prediction of the Merton model is that credit spreads should be a function of the risk-
free interest rate, nominal outstanding amount of debt, firm value and asset volatility. 
Hence, structural models generate predictions for what the theoretical determinants of 
credit spread changes should be, and offer a prediction for whether changes in these 
variables should be positively or negatively correlated with changes in credit spreads. 
 
The intuition behind these predictions is as follows. Firstly, the risk-free interest rate 
represents the drift of the process describing the value of the assets of the firm under 
the risk-neutral measure. Higher interest rates increase the future expected value of 
the assets, thus reducing credit spreads. The nominal value of the debt represents the 
threshold at which default is triggered. A higher amount of debt makes default more 
likely, so that higher credit spreads are expected. Higher values for the assets of the 
firm make the regular payment of the debt more likely and credit spreads are expected 
to be lower. Higher asset volatility increases the value of the put option granted to the 
shareholders, thus increasing the compensation required by the bondholders through 
higher credit spreads. 
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2.5.3 Credit spread determinants 
 
The aim of the Merton model and other structural models is to explain the percentage 
of bond spreads which arise from credit risk using a small number of factors, 
including those just described. However, there are other factors not linked to credit 
risk that are shown to be an important component of bond spreads. Empirical 
applications of structural models incorporate the predictions of the models and 
attempt to capture additional explanatory variables which explain credit spreads. 
These studies attempt to explain credit spreads by regressing observed spreads levels 
on factors that theoretical models suggest are relevant in determining both default and 
non-default components of credit spreads.  
 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) initiate this strand of research by using 
the structural approach to identify the theoretical determinants of corporate bond 
credit spreads. These variables are then used as explanatory variables in regressions 
for changes in corporate credit spreads, rather than inputs to a particular structural 
model. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) find that the explanatory power 
of the theoretical variables is modest (regression analysis can only explain about 25% 
of the observed credit spread changes), and that a significant part of the residuals is 
driven by a common systematic factor that is not captured by the theoretical variables. 
They conclude that bond spread changes are mostly driven by supply and demand 
shocks which are specific to the corporate bond market and independent of both 
default and liquidity factors. 
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Campbell and Taksler (2003) extend this analysis using regressions for levels of the 
corporate bond spread, rather than changes in corporate credit spreads. Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) focus on the effect of equity volatility on corporate bond yields and 
document that firm specific equity volatility is an important determinant of credit 
spreads, and that the economic effects of volatility are large. More recently, Avramov, 
Jostova and Philipov (2007) provide new evidence on the empirical success of 
structural models in explaining changes in corporate credit risk. Using a set of 
common factors and company-level fundamentals, inspired by structural models, they 
are able to explain more than 54% (67%) of the variation in credit spread changes for 
medium-grade (low-grade) bonds, with no clearly dominant latent factor left in the 
unexplained variation. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2008) introduce 
measures of volatility and jump risks that are based on individual stock options to 
explain bond spreads. They show that implied volatilities of individual options 
contain useful information for credit spreads, and improve on historical volatilities 
when explaining the cross-sectional and time-series variations in a panel of corporate 
bond spreads. 
 
2.5.4 CDS determinants 
 
The previous literature focuses on corporate bond spreads, i.e., the difference between 
the corporate bond yield and the risk-free rate. However, more recent studies (see 
inter alia Benkert, 2004, Greatrex, 2009, Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo, 2009, and 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009) focus on the relationship between CDS spreads and key 
variables suggested by economic theory. Thus, while the main focus of these more 
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recent papers remains credit risk, an important distinction is the use of CDS spreads 
rather than corporate bond spreads as the variable of interest. 
 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) advocate the use CDS spreads in preference to 
bond spreads for a number of reasons. While economically comparable to bond 
spreads, CDS spreads do not require the specification of a benchmark risk-free yield 
curve, as they are already quoted as spreads. This avoids undue noise which may arise 
from the use of a misspecified model of the risk-free yield curve. The choice of the 
risk-free yield curve includes the choice of a reference risk-free asset, which can be 
problematic (see Houweling and Vorst, 2005), but also the choice of a framework to 
remove coupon effects.  
 
CDS spreads could reflect changes in credit risk more accurately and quickly than 
corporate bond yield spreads. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) show that a change 
in the credit quality of the underlying entity is more likely to be reflected in the CDS 
spread before the bond yield spread. This could be due to important non-default 
components in bond spreads that obscure the impact of changes in credit quality. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) document the existence of an illiquidity component 
in bond yield spreads. Related to this, trading in CDS markets has increased, while 
many corporate bonds are rarely traded. Partly as a result, CDS data is collected at a 
daily frequency, while many studies that use corporate bonds typically use 
observations at a monthly frequency; the greater sampling frequency should allow for 
cleaner tests. 
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The previous literature in this area uses a range of theoretical determinants of default 
risk to model CDS spreads. Skinner and Townsend (2002) present the first empirical 
examination of credit default swaps. Using a limited sample of 43 sovereign USD 
default swap trades from September 1997 to February 1999, they suggest a regression 
model based on the idea that CDSs can be viewed as a put option. By viewing a CDS 
as a put option, they are able to determine the main factors that must be considered in 
valuing credit default swaps. They document that four of the five standard factors that 
are important in pricing exchange traded put options, namely, the risk-free rate, 
volatility, underlying asset, and time to maturity, are statistically significant factors 
for pricing CDSs as well. Importantly, variables that are external to the CDS 
agreement tend to be statistically significant and are of the correct sign. However, the 
variables that are determined by the CDS agreement, namely, the time to maturity and 
the exercise price, are of the ‘‘incorrect’’ sign according to financial theory.  
 
Accordingly, empirical studies examine many factors that are external to the CDS 
agreement. Benkert (2004), using a larger panel data set of CDSs on 120 international 
firms from 1999 to 2002, investigates the effects of historical and option-implied 
equity volatilities on CDS premia, thus extending the idea proposed by Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) in the context of corporate bond yields. Consistent with Campbell and 
Taksler (2003), he documents that option-implied volatility is a more important factor 
in explaining variation in CDS premia than historical volatility.  
 
Abid and Naifar (2006) empirically examine the determinants of CDS rates using 207 
trades during the period from 15 May, 2000 to 15 May, 2001. The trades are 
composed of 73 underlying default swaps listed across 11 European markets. They 
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document that the majority of variables, detected from the credit risk pricing theories, 
explain more than 60% of the total level of CDS spreads. These theoretical variables 
are credit rating, maturity, risk-free interest rate, slope of the yield curve and volatility 
of equities. Importantly, credit rating is the most important determinant of CDS rates. 
Abid and Naifar (2006) argue this result is justified because the rating agencies 
examine many issues in their analysis, including the financial position of the firm, 
firm-specific issues such as the quality of management, the survey of the industry as a 
whole and competition of the firm. Abid and Naifar (2006) highlight that liquidity is 
an important issue in the corporate bond market and suggest using proxies for 
liquidity to explain CDS prices. 
 
Accordingly, Fabozzi, Cheng and Chen (2007) examine the determinants of CDS 
spreads, focusing on the effect of liquidity factors. In the bond market, higher 
liquidity usually requires less compensation, and therefore a lower yield spread 
(Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005). However, a CDS has different economic 
characteristics from a bond in that a swap is a contract in which the value of the 
protection is paid in instalments, while a bond demands the credit risk to be paid up 
front. Due to this contractual difference, the liquidity penalty (premium or discount) 
may be reflected differently in their prices. They examine two liquidity factors (the 
bid–ask spread and the number of transactions) using a sample of CDS spreads from 
1,372 reference entities during the period of February 2000 to April 2003. The results 
support the position that liquidity factors have a very significant effect on CDS 
spreads. The findings suggest that CDSs which trade with greater liquidity have a 
higher CDS spread. This is contrary to the results in the bond market where investors 
require an additional premium as compensation for illiquidity in the CDS market. 
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Fabozzi, Cheng and Chen (2007) attribute the contrasting results to the difference in 
the economic characteristics of a CDS contract versus a bond. 
 
While not examined in their study, Abid and Naifar (2006) also suggest that firm-
specific ratios suggested by structural models, such as profitability and leverage, may 
be significant in exploring the determinants of CDS spreads. Greatrex (2009) is 
among the first studies to incorporate this notion, and examines a CDS data set 
covering 333 firms over a five-year period spanning January 2001 to March 2006. 
Greatrex (2009) examines changes in CDS spreads, as opposed to levels, because 
stationary tests find CDS spreads to be non-stationary, while spread changes are 
stationary. The findings indicate that the variables suggested by structural models are 
able to explain 30% of the variation in CDS spread changes. A rating-based CDS 
index that accounts for both credit risk and overall market conditions is the single best 
predictor of CDS spread changes. Leverage and volatility, however, are also key 
determinants, as these two variables can explain almost half of the explained variation 
in monthly CDS spread changes. 
 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) also estimate linear regressions on the 
relationship between CDS spreads and key variables suggested by economic theory. 
Using a sample period from 1999 to 2002, they conduct both level regressions and 
difference regressions. They find that firm leverage, volatility and the riskless interest 
rate are statistically significant, and that their effect is economically important as well 
as intuitively plausible. The explanatory power of these theoretical variables for 
spread levels is approximately 60%, and the explanatory power for spread differences 
is approximately 23%. Interestingly, a negative correlation between spreads and the 
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risk-free rate is documented which is consistent with the implication of structural 
models that an increase in the risk-free rate will decrease risk-adjusted default 
probabilities 
 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) propose a novel empirical approach to explain credit 
spread variation, using volatility and jump-risk measures constructed from high-
frequency equity return data. The data analysed includes CDS quotes written on 307 
US entities (excluding sovereign entities) over the period January 2001 to December 
2003. They conduct regressions with the jump and volatility measures, and also 
include other control variables including ratings, macro financial variables, and 
balance sheet information as predicted by the structural models (and as evidenced by 
the empirical literature). The empirical findings suggest that long-run historical 
volatility, short-run realised volatility, and various jump-risk measures all have 
statistically significant and economically meaningful effects on credit spreads. 
Realised jump measures explain 19% of total variations in the level of credit spreads, 
while measures of the historical skewness and historical kurtosis of jump risk explain 
only 3%. Notably, volatility and jump risks alone can predict 53% of the CDS spread 
variations. The explanatory power of credit spread changes from various structural 
variables is much lower, confirming the finding in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and 
Martin (2001). Nevertheless, including the short-run realised volatility can lead to a 
significant improvement in the change regressions. 
 
While Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) and Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) 
demonstrate a strong relation between CDS spreads and equity historical volatilities, 
Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) focus on the relation between CDS spreads and options 
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market information and show that option-implied volatility is an even more important 
determinant of CDS spreads than historical volatility. Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) 
investigate whether put option-implied volatility is an important determinant of CDS 
pricing. This is motivated by the view that CDSs are similar to out-of-the-money put 
options in that both offer a low cost and effective protection against downside risk. 
Using a sample of 301 firms with both CDS and options data during the period 
January 2001 to December 2006, they estimate firm-level time-series regressions of 
the CDS spread on implied volatility and historical volatility, controlling for other 
determinants of credit spreads used in the literature. Results indicate that implied 
volatility dominates historical volatility in explaining the time-series variation of CDS 
spreads, and that this result is robust to the horizon of the historical volatility 
estimator.  
 
Overall, the literature documents that individual firm CDS prices are related to risk-
free interest rates, share prices, equity volatility, bond ratings and firm leverage. 
These studies suggest that theoretical determinants of default risk explain a significant 
amount of variation in CDS prices. Other studies incorporate new determinants to 
better explain the variation in CDS spreads. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) use 
theoretical determinants along with volatility and jump risk of individual firms from 
high-frequency equity prices to explain variation in CDS spreads. Cao, Yu and Zhong 
(2010) find that individual firms’ put option-implied volatility is superior to historical 
volatility in explaining variation in CDS spreads. Fabozzi, Cheng and Chen (2007) 
find that measures of CDS liquidity are significant in explaining variation in CDS 
spreads. 
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This dissertation extends this work by proposing a new measure of the likelihood of 
firm default - short-selling. As discussed above, empirical evidence suggests that 
short-sellers are informed traders who take positions by selling a company’s stock in 
the expectation that prices will fall in the near future following the revelation of bad 
news specific to that firm (see inter alia Diether Lee and Werner, 2009a and 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008). As such, the level of short-selling is a direct 
measure of the prospects for a company. High (low) short-selling indicates a more 
(less) pessimistic view of a company and an increased (decreased) likelihood of 
default. Therefore, CDS spreads should exhibit a positive and significant relationship 
to the level of short-selling. By examining the relationship between CDS spreads and 
short-selling, this dissertation adds to the existing literature which examines the 
determinants of CDS spreads and also adds to the existing literature on the 
information content of short-selling.   
 
2.5.5 Other studies using CDS spreads 
 
With the proliferation of CDS markets and the continual improvement in the 
availability of data pertaining to the CDS market, many studies utilise CDS spreads 
for various purposes. Houweling and Vorst (2005) implement a set of simple reduced-
form models on market swap quotes and corporate bond quotes to compare market 
prices of CDSs with model prices. The results show that a simple reduced-form model 
outperforms directly comparing bonds’ credit spreads to default swap premiums. 
Importantly, the model yields unbiased premium estimates for default swaps on 
investment grade issuers, but only if the swap or repo rates are used as a proxy for 
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default-free interest rates. This indicates that the government curve is no longer seen 
as the reference default-free curve. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) document the 
differences between default swap spreads and corporate bond yield spreads, using 
various risk-free benchmarks. Under the assumption that default swap spreads do not 
contain a liquidity component, the differences between the spreads highlight the 
relative importance of default risk and liquidity for corporate bonds. 
 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) utilise the CDS market to test the theoretical 
equivalence of CDS prices and credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999), finding 
support for the parity relation as an equilibrium condition. Their results also suggest 
that CDS spreads contain useful information in that CDS prices lead in the price 
discovery process over credit spreads. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) argue that, 
combined with the fact that CDS spreads are a cleaner indicator than bond spreads, 
the findings suggest that CDS prices are useful indicators for analysts interested in 
measuring credit risk. Credit risk concerns almost all financial activities and, by 
definition, should be reflected in the market prices of different credit-sensitive claims 
including CDS spreads, bonds and stocks. Given these assets are traded in structurally 
different markets, differences may exist in the relative speed with which respective 
markets respond to the changes in credit conditions. Following Blanco, Brennan and 
Marsh (2005), various studies examine the relationship between CDS, stock and bond 
markets to determine where the price discovery of credit risk occurs first.  
 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) consider a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) for explaining changes in bond and CDS spreads. Using a sample of 33 
North American and European firms, they conclude that the CDS market leads the 
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bond market. In a similar vein, Zhu (2004, 2006) studies an international sample of 24 
issuers. Using a Granger causality test, the results indicate that the CDS market and 
the bond market are equally important in the incorporation of new information about 
the credit risk of companies. However, when a VECM is used to examine the price 
discovery process, results change, supporting the leading role of the CDS market. 
Norden and Weber (2004) apply traditional event study methodology to examine 
whether (and how) stock and CDS markets respond to ratings announcements during 
the years 2000 to 2002. The findings reveal that both markets anticipate not only 
rating downgrades, but also reviews for downgrade by all agencies if taken separately. 
Further, both markets do not exhibit any significant response to positive ratings 
events. Norden and Weber (2004) examine only CDS and stock markets, and 
conclude that neither market leads in the price discovery process.  
 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) use a Vector Auto-Regressive model (VAR) to 
investigate the lead-lag relationships between changes in CDS spreads, changes in 
bond spreads, and stock returns. Using a sample of 68 North American companies, 
they conclude that information flows first into the CDS and stock markets, and then 
into the bond market. Norden and Weber (2005) use the same VAR representation to 
analyse the co-movement of CDS, bond and stock markets, considering an 
international sample of 58 companies. For the specific case of CDS and bond markets, 
they also perform a price discovery analysis using a VECM, consistent with Blanco, 
Brennan and Marsh (2005) and with Zhu (2004, 2006). Norden and Weber’s (2005) 
results support the idea that the stock market leads the CDS and bond markets. Their 
evidence also supports the leading role of the CDS market with respect to the bond 
market. Forte and Peña (2009), on the basis of VECM framework and stock market 
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implied credit spreads, corroborate the finding that the stock market leads the CDS 
and bond market more frequently than vice versa. They also confirm the leading role 
of the CDS market with respect to the bond market. 
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3 Chapter 3: Short-sale constraints and market quality: 
Evidence from the 2008 short-sale bans 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The literature review examining the impact of short-selling in Chapter 2 highlights a 
dearth of empirical research in several areas of the literature. While short-selling has 
long been a contentious issue, relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on 
the impact of short-sale restrictions on market quality. The 2008 short-sale bans 
provide an ideal setting for these tests because it provides a binding constraint.
 
Thus, 
it is not necessary to rely on proxies for short-sale constraints, as in previous research. 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically examine the impact of the 2008 short-
selling bans on the market quality of stocks subject to the bans. Thus, in doing so this 
chapter also examines whether the short-selling bans achieved their desired outcome. 
Data from 14 equity markets around the world is employed to examine market quality 
in terms of abnormal returns, stock price volatility, bid-ask spreads and trading 
volume.  
 
The relationship between short-sales and stock return volatility is a contentious issue 
and has received limited academic attention. Further, evidence on short-sale 
constraints and liquidity is relatively limited. This chapter adds to the limited evidence 
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of the impact of short-sale constraints on liquidity, in addition to examining the 
impact of short-sale constraints on returns and volatility. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 uses the literature on short-sale constraints 
to develop a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 provides a review of the short-sale 
bans and Section 3.4 describes the data and methodology used in this chapter. Section 
3.5 reports the empirical analysis of the impact of the bans on returns, liquidity and 
stock price volatility. Section 3.6 provides a summary of the main results and 
concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
 
This section uses the literature reviewed in Section 2 to develop several hypotheses 
that are tested in this chapter. The disagreement models (e.g., Miller 1977) predict that 
short-selling bans prevent at least some pessimists from taking a bearish position in a 
financial stock. Thus, short-selling bans should cause prices of affected stocks to rise, 
leading to overvaluation relative to fundamentals. Empirical evidence is consistent 
with this notion and suggests a high level of short-selling is followed by negative 
abnormal returns and short-selling restrictions are related to positive abnormal returns 
(see inter alia Chang, Chang and Yu 2007). However, while the empirical evidence is 
unambiguous, there are various conflicting factors that could affect the magnitude of 
the results surrounding the 2008 short-selling bans. Therefore the following 
hypothesis is tested:  
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Hypothesis3,1: Stocks experience positive abnormal returns when the short-selling 
ban is imposed.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the relationship between short-sales and stock return 
volatility is a contentious issue and has received limited academic attention. While 
theoretical models attempt to explain the volatility of stock returns when short-sale 
constraints are imposed, the theory is divided on how short-sale constraints affect the 
volatility of market returns.  
 
Hong and Stein (2003) develop a heterogeneous agent model linking short-sale 
constraints to market crashes. In their model, if certain investors are constrained from 
selling short, their accumulated unrevealed negative information will not be 
impounded until the market begins to fall, which further aggravates a market decline 
and leads to a crash. Therefore, their model predicts a higher frequency of extreme 
negative stock returns when short-sale constraints are binding. Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003) predict a significant decrease in trading volume and price volatility when 
short-sale constraints are lifted. Consistent with Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) document that short-sale constraints can be a direct 
cause of, or at least a necessary condition for, bubbles and excessive volatility. Bai, 
Chang and Wang (2006) predict higher price volatility when short-selling is restricted, 
as better informed investors are held out of the market, and less informed investors 
perceive the risk as considerably higher.  
 
While the above theoretical evidence suggests that short-sale constraints have an 
adverse effect on volatility, Allen and Gale (1991) provide an exception to this view. 
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Allen and Gale (1991) predict that without the presence of short-sale constraints, 
financial innovation is not necessarily efficient and renders short-selling a 
destabilising influence in the economy. Bernardo and Welch (2004) develop a model 
that shows how the fear of financial crisis, instead of a real liquidity shock, is the true 
cause of financial crises. One implication of their model is that constraints which 
hinder market participants from front-running other investors can effectively prevent 
financial crises from happening, which is consistent with the finding of Allen and 
Gale (1991) that short-sales can potentially destabilise the economy.  
 
Overall, the theoretical evidence provides conflicting predictions regarding the impact 
of short-sales on volatility. Thus the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis3,2: Stock price volatility increases in the banned stocks when the short-
selling ban is imposed. 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict wider bid-ask spreads when short-selling is 
restricted. This is due to the exclusion of traders that are willing to trade on their 
negative views but are prevented due to short-selling constraints. Other models 
including Miller (1977) predict short-sale constraints restrict pessimistic investors 
from trading on their beliefs, possibly reducing trading activity. Given the extent of 
short-selling, this suggests that a short-selling ban could worsen market liquidity in 
terms of both trading activity and bid-ask spreads. Given the limited empirical 
literature, further evidence is required regarding the impact of short-selling on market 
liquidity. Therefore the following two hypotheses are tested: 
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Hypothesis3,3: Bid-ask spreads widen in the banned stocks when the short-selling ban 
is imposed. 
 
Hypothesis3,4: Trading volume decreases in the banned stocks when the short-selling 
ban is imposed. 
3.3 Review of short-sale bans 
 
This section provides a brief review of regulations implemented by regulators in 
response to the actions of the UK FSA and US SEC. On September 18, 2008, the FSA 
banned short-selling (naked and covered) in financial stocks in response to the 
financial turmoil of the global economy. The temporary ban, effective from 
September 19, 2008 to January 16, 2009, covered the creation and increase of net 
short positions in 29 financial stocks on the London Stock Exchange. Later that day, 
the SEC imposed a similar ban on more than 800 financial stocks in the US market 
which was later amended on 21 September, 2008 and was set to expire at 23:59 ET on 
2 October, 2008.19 This was followed in Canada by the Ontario Securities 
Commission (OSC) prohibiting the short-selling of specified financial issuers listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) that are also interlisted in the US. In 
Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), SWX and SWX 
Europe placed prohibitions on short-selling, coming into effect on 19 September, 
2008. The SFBC and SWX prohibition applied to naked short-selling in all securities, 
                                                 
19
  The ban included exemptions for options market makers when selling short as part of bona fide 
market making and hedging activities.  
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while the SWX Europe prohibition applied to covered short-sales in certain financial 
stocks.  
 
Overnight and over the weekend many other markets worldwide announced bans 
which came into effect 22 September, 2008 including: Australia, where the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) banned all forms of short-selling in 
all stocks; and Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and 
Germany prohibiting naked short-selling for specified financial institutions. The next 
day, 23 September, 2008, the Italian regulator, Commissione Nazionale per le Società 
e la Borsa (CONSOB), placed a similar ban on naked short-selling of shares issued by 
banks and insurance companies. Over the next few days no further bans were 
enforced but many regulators clarified and adjusted their stance on short-selling. 
Russia and Korea were the next markets to make changes, both placing a prohibition 
on the short-selling of all securities, effective 30 September, 2008 and 1 October, 
2008, respectively.  
 
On October 2, 2008, the SEC extended the U.S ban to the earlier of October 17, 2008 
or three business days following enactment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP, formally known as HR 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008). TARP was subsequently enacted on October 3, 2008 and the SEC announced 
that the ban would expire at 11:59pm ET on October 8, 2008. As of October 9, short-
selling was again permitted in all stocks, provided market participants complied with 
the requirement to borrow shares in advance, as mandated by the naked short-selling 
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ban (which continued).20 The Canadian regulators also removed short-selling 
prohibitions on 8 October, 2008.  
 
While some bans were being lifted other markets were still to enforce bans, including: 
the Financial Supervisory Authority of Iceland prohibiting the short-selling of 
financial instruments in six banks and insurers on 6 October, 2008; the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway, Kredittilsynet, banning short-selling in financial 
equities on 8 October, 2008; the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority prohibiting 
short-selling in all Danish banks with effect from 13 October, 2008; and in Greece, 
the Capital Markets Commission banning short-sales in all stocks on 10 October, 
2008.  
 
Other markets began revising bans, including Australia, where ASIC announced on 21 
October, 2008 that it expected to lift the ban on covered short-selling of non-financial 
stocks from 19 November, 2008. This was followed by further prohibitions, 
including: Austria, where the FMA prohibited naked short-selling of four financial 
companies with effect from 28 October, 2008; Italy where on 10 October, 2008, the 
Italian regulator (CONSOB) extended its ban on short-selling to cover all stocks; 
Japan where on 27 October, 2008, the Financial Services Agency of Japan (FSA) 
announced a ban on naked short-selling of all stocks effective from 29 October, 2008. 
In Italy, the short-selling prohibition was lifted for non-financials on 30 December, 
2008 and remained in place for financials along with the ban on naked short-selling 
on all stocks.  
                                                 
20
  The SEC naked short-selling ban was introduced on 17 September, 2008, and restricted the naked 
short-selling of all US stocks, effective 18 September, 2008. 
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As markets worldwide began to stabilise, other markets started to lift existing bans, 
including: the UK, which lifted its ban on the short-selling of financial stocks on 16 
January, 2009; SWX Europe on 16 January, 2009;  Australia, where ASIC announced 
the expiry of its ban on covered short-selling of financial securities as of 25 May, 
2009; Italy, where on 31 May, 2009 the prohibition was amended to allow covered 
short-selling in banks and insurance companies; Greece, where the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission announced that short-selling of stocks listed on the Athens 
Exchange was permitted again from 1 June, 2009; the Netherlands, which also lifted 
its  prohibition on short-selling, as of 1 June, 2009, and South Korea, which lifted its 
ban on short-selling of non-financial company stocks on 1 June, 2009.  
 
3.4 Data and method 
 
Reuters data provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific 
(SIRCA) is obtained to examine the impact of the 2008 short-selling bans on the 
market quality of banned stocks. The data is sampled at a daily level over the period 
January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Table 3-1 documents 25 markets that 
experienced some form of short-selling ban during 2008. Due to data limitations, 
certain markets are excluded from the analysis, including Austria, Denmark, Iceland, 
Ireland and Luxembourg. Other markets are removed because short-selling bans 
applied to all listed stocks, leaving no suitable control sample (Australia, Greece, 
Russia, Korea, Pakistan and Switzerland (SWX and SFBC)). This left 11 markets that 
imposed a ban on the short-selling of a restricted group of stocks (usually financial 
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stocks). Of these 11 markets, five imposed a covered short-selling ban (US, UK, 
Canada, Switzerland (SWX Europe) and Norway) and the remaining six markets 
imposed a ban on naked short-selling (The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy and Portugal).  
 
For robustness, data from Japan, Sweden and Hong Kong is collected. These markets 
are used as there were no bans placed on stocks over the same period as the US short-
selling bans. Financial stocks in these markets are employed as a treatment sample 
over the same period as the US ban to provide an indication of changes in market 
quality in markets with no bans imposed. Therefore there are three distinct groups 
representing different levels of short-selling constraints. The first group with tight 
restrictions imposed (short-selling ban on financials), the second group with less 
restrictive bans imposed (naked short-selling ban on financials) and the third group 
with no bans imposed. 
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Table 3-1 Short-sale bans around the world 
 
For each market the table describes whether the short-sale ban applied to all forms of 
short-sales (covered and naked) or naked short-sales only, the stocks to which the ban 
applied and the date when the ban was imposed and lifted (if applicable). ALL 
indicates the ban applies to all stocks listed. FINS indicates the ban applies to 
securities issued by financial institutions. 
 
  Short-Sale ban  Naked short-sale ban 
Market  Covers Start date End date  Covers Start date End date 
Australia  ALL 22/09/08 19/11/08  ALL 22/09/08 Indefinite 
Australia  FINS 22/09/08 25/05/09     
United States  FINS 19/09/08 08/10/08  ALL 18/07/08 Indefinite 
United Kingdom  FINS 19/09/08 16/01/09     
Canada  FINS 19/09/08 08/10/08     
Ireland  FINS 19/09/08 Indefinite     
Greece  ALL 10/10/08 31/05/09     
Switzerland (SWX 
Europe)  FINS 19/09/08 16/01/09     
Norway  FINS 08/10/08 Indefinite      
Denmark  FINS 13/10/08 Indefinite     
Korea  ALL 01/10/08 01/06/09     
Korea  FINS 01/10/08 Indefinite     
Russia  ALL 30/09/08 Indefinite     
Pakistan  ALL 24/09/08 Indefinite     
Netherlands      FINS 22/09/08 01/06/09 
Iceland      FINS 06/10/08 Indefinite 
Germany      FINS 20/09/08 01/01/10 
Austria      FINS 28/10/08 30/09/09 
Portugal      FINS 22/09/08 Indefinite 
Italy      FINS 23/09/08 31/07/09 
Netherlands      FINS 22/09/08 05/10/08 
France      FINS 22/09/08 Indefinite 
Belgium      FINS 22/09/08 21/09/09 
Switzerland (SWX 
& SFBC)      ALL 19/09/08 Indefinite 
Japan      ALL 28/10/08 Indefinite 
Luxembourg      FINS 22/09/08 Indefinite 
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To test for changes in abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns for each market 
around their respective event dates are calculated. Brown and Warner (1985) find that 
the market model and market-adjusted model perform well under a number of 
circumstances and perform better than more complex methods. Thus, cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated using the market-adjusted model and the 
market model, defined as: 
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where Rit is stock i’s return on day t, and RMt is the equal weighted return on a 
portfolio of stocks in the control sample (described below) from the corresponding 
market on day t (see Table 3-2 for a list of control samples). The coefficients 
 
ˆ
ˆ and i iα β  are estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients in the OLS market 
model when Rit is regressed on RMt in the pre-event estimation window. The 
estimation window begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008. To test for 
significance, both a parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test is 
employed.  
 
To examine changes in market quality measures before and during the short-selling 
ban, 30 trading days prior (subsequent) to the short-selling ban is selected as the pre-
event period (post-event period). If the ban was in place for less than 30 trading days 
the duration of the ban is used as the post-event window. Any changes documented 
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could be driven by market-wide factors or different shocks affecting the market. To 
control for these potential effects, a control sample is constructed which includes 
stocks from a major index in the corresponding market not affected by the short-
selling restrictions. Table 3-2 lists each market and the corresponding control sample 
used. For example, in the US, the NYSE composite index, which covers all stocks 
listed on the NYSE, is used. From the NYSE composite index, stocks subject to the 
ban are removed and the 300 largest remaining stocks (by market capitalisation) are 
used as the control sample.  
 
To examine whether market quality measures change for treatment stocks relative to 
control stocks, summary statistics of the pre- and post-event averages for each 
variable are examined. The percentage difference between the pre- and post-event 
averages for each variable (labelled Difference) in both the treatment and control 
sample is then calculated. Next, the difference of the difference between the treatment 
and control sample (labelled Difference-in-difference) is calculated. To test for 
statistical significance and to control for other possible confounding factors, the 
treatment and control samples are pooled together to estimate the following cross-
sectional regressions for each market for each day in the pre- and post-event period 
surrounding each event: 
 
0 1  2  3  it t t i t i t i itY Period Sample Banβ β β β ε= + + + +
                                               (3.3) 
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where Yit is the average measure of interest for stock i during interval t.21 Bani is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the stocks are subject to a short-selling ban, and zero 
otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy variable equal to one if the observation lies in 
the post-event period, and zero otherwise. Samplei is a control dummy variable equal 
to one if the observation belongs to the treatment sample, and zero otherwise. To 
control for variation between stocks and dates, calendar day-fixed effects and stock-
fixed effects are included in the pooled regressions (Diether, Lee and Werner, 2009a). 
To address concerns over serial correlation and cross-correlation, standard errors are 
calculated that cluster by both calendar date and stock (Thompson, 2009). 
 
To test the impact of the short-selling bans on market quality, volatility and liquidity 
measures are examined. Volatility is examined using a price volatility and return 
volatility measure. Price volatility is measured as the ln (daily high / daily low). 
Return volatility is measured as [ln (closing price on day t / closing price on day t-1)] 
2
. To examine the impact on liquidity, three measures are examined. The first is the 
relative bid-ask spread, calculated as the quoted closing bid-ask spread (difference 
between prevailing best bid and ask quotes), divided by the prevailing quoted closing 
midpoint. Relative bid-ask spreads are used, as they control for stock price variation, 
both over time and across stocks. Trading volume and Turnover value are also 
examined, measured as total daily volume traded and the currency value of traded 
daily volume, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
21
  Initial tests on the dependent variables indicate the variables are not normally distributed. To 
address this concern, the natural logarithm of each variable is used as the dependent variable. 
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Although the focus of this chapter is on the effect of short-sale constraints, it is well 
known that a short position can be replicated using derivatives such as exchange 
traded options.22 Even though it is debatable whether derivatives reduce short-sale 
constraints in an economically meaningful way,23 it is important to note that stocks in 
this sample may have options listed. However, the effect of listed options on sample 
stocks is likely to minimise the impact of the short-sales bans, thereby reducing the 
magnitude of the results. 
 
                                                 
22
  Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that constrained investors will buy puts and write calls as a 
substitute for short-selling. 
23
  Mayhew and Mihov (2005) is part of an emerging wave of studies which document options do not 
reduce short-sale constraints. Other studies include: Mayhew and Mihov (2004), Ofek, Richardson 
and Whitelaw (2004), Lakonishok, Lee and Poteshman (2004), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), 
Lamont and Stein (2004), Battalio and Schultz (2006), Danielsen, Van Ness and Warr (2007) and 
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007). 
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Table 3-2 Control sample selection 
For each market this table lists the main market index used to select control stocks. The description of each index is provided and 
whether any adjustments are made to the index to select the control sample. If not stated in the description, all stocks in the treatment 
sample (stocks subject to the short-selling bans) are removed from the control sample.  
 
Market Index Index description and control sample definition 
United States NYSE Composite All common stocks listed on NYSE. Use the largest 300 stocks based on market-capitalisation  
United Kingdom FTSE 100 Largest 100 stocks on the London Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation 
Canada S&P/TSX 60 Largest 60 stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation 
Switzerland (SWX Europe) Swiss market  Largest 30 stocks on SWX Europe based on market capitalisation 
Norway OBX Index 25 most liquid stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange based on six-month turnover 
Netherlands AEX index 25 most actively traded (Euro Turnover) stocks in the Euronext Amsterdam 
Germany DAX 30 largest stocks on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation and volume 
Portugal PSI-20 20 largest stocks on the Euronext Lisbon based on market capitalisation and volume 
Italy FTSE MIB 40 largest stocks on the Borsa Italiana based on market capitalisation and volume 
France CAC 40   40 stocks among the 100 largest stocks on Euronext Paris based on market capitalisation and volume  
Belgium BEL20 20 largest stocks on Euronext Brussels based on market capitalisation and volume 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 30 most liquid stocks on Stockholm Stock Exchange based on six-month turnover 
Japan S&P/TOPIX 150 150 of the largest stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation and Turnover value 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index 42 stocks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation and turnover 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Abnormal returns 
 
Table 3-3 reports ARs and CARs, calculated using the market model and market-
adjusted model, around the event date (denoted day 1) for various windows before 
and after all events. Figures 3-1 to 3-6 represent the results graphically and separated 
by the level of short-selling constraint imposed (based on the market model).24 Figure 
3-1 presents daily ARs for the markets subject to a covered short-selling ban. During 
the pre-event period (10 trading days), abnormal returns are mixed with several strong 
negative abnormal returns leading into the restrictions. Surprisingly, on the day 
preceding the bans (-1) there are positive abnormal returns in Canada and the US, 
which are significant at the 5% level. This could be attributable to the market-wide 
naked short-selling ban which was announced and implemented on this day in the 
US.25  
 
On the event day, prices impound the implementation of the short-selling bans, with 
the US, Canada, UK and Switzerland all experiencing positive abnormal returns of at 
least 2%. On the following days, the majority of abnormal returns are positive for all 
markets. This is highlighted in Figure 3-2, which plots the CARs. Table 3-3 
documents that four of the five markets subject to the covered ban experience positive 
abnormal returns over the post-event (10 trading days) period. Over this period, 
                                                 
24
  The results from the market-adjusted model are qualitatively similar to the market model; thus only 
the results of the market model are discussed and presented in Figures 3-1 to 3-6. 
25
  The SEC naked short-selling ban was implemented 17 September, 2008, and restricted naked short-
selling of all US stocks, effective 18 September, 2008. 
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abnormal returns are 5.43%, 9.37%, -2.28%, 12.71% and 11.33% respectively in the 
UK, US, Norway, Canada and Switzerland. These returns are significantly different 
from zero, at the 5% level using a t-test, and 10% level using a sign-rank test, in all 
markets except Norway. The positive abnormal returns when covered short-selling is 
restricted are consistent with the disagreement models and the first hypothesis (H3,1). 
 
Figure 3-3 presents the daily ARs for the markets subject to a naked short-selling ban. 
Miller (1977) suggests that the magnitude of abnormal returns could be affected by 
the level of short-selling constraint. If restricting naked short-selling is not an 
economically meaningful constraint then abnormal returns would not be expected. 
Similar to stocks subject to the covered short-selling ban, Figure 3-3 shows that the 
pre-event period is dominated by negative abnormal returns. However, on the two 
trading days preceding the bans there are positive abnormal returns in the majority of 
markets. These returns can be attributable to the timing of the naked short-selling 
bans. The naked bans were enforced on 22 and 23 September, 2008, while the covered 
bans in the UK and US were enforced on 19 September, 2008. The positive abnormal 
returns can be attributed to the expectation of a similar ban being enforced or the 
strong correlation between the returns of global financial markets. Similar to the 
covered ban sample, all six markets experience positive abnormal returns in the post-
event period (four are significant at the 10% level). While not as significant as for 
covered short-selling bans, naked short-selling bans exhibit similar stock price 
reactions to covered short-selling bans. 
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Table 3-3 Abnormal returns around 2008 short-selling bans 
This table reports abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns based on the 
market model (Panel A) and market-adjusted model (Panel B) around short-selling 
bans. The event date, the day the short-selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The 
estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 
2008. Results are separated by the type of short-selling ban imposed. Covered ban 
indicates the market had a ban on covered short-selling. Naked ban indicates the 
market had a ban on naked short-selling. No ban indicates the market had no ban on 
short-selling imposed over the same period as the US ban. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a parametric t-test. +, 
++
, and +++ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test. 
 
Panel A: Market Model 
 CAR AR AR CAR CAR 
Market (-10,-1) (-1) (1) (-1,10) (1,10) 
Covered Ban      
UK -0.0304 -0.0190++ 0.0267***+++ 0.0353+ 0.0543**+++ 
US 0.0607***+++ 0.0357***+++ 0.0278***+++ 0.1313***+++ 0.0937***+++ 
Norway -0.0348 -0.0382 0.0034 -0.0610 -0.0228 
Canada -0.0170 0.0436**++ 0.0214***++ 0.1707***+++ 0.1271***+++ 
Switzerland -0.0775* 0.0018 0.0507 0.1151*+ 0.1133**+ 
Naked Ban      
Netherlands -0.0439 0.0512 -0.0099 0.0866 0.0354 
Belgium -0.0153 0.0845*** -0.0521 0.1497***+ 0.0653*+ 
Germany -0.0028 0.0459***+++ -0.0021 0.1230**++ 0.0771*+ 
Portugal 0.0747**++ 0.0289 -0.0034 0.1134**++ 0.0845**++ 
Italy 0.0241* 0.0125***+++ -0.0027 0.0234 0.0109 
France 0.0164 0.0482***+++ 0.0038 0.1329***+++ 0.0847***+++ 
No Ban      
Hong Kong -0.0018 -0.0035 0.0387***++ 0.0255 0.0254 
Sweden 0.0124 0.0130 0.0616*** 0.1332*** 0.1201*** 
Japan 0.0168 -0.0207***+++ 0.0302***+++ 0.0969***+++ 0.1177***+++ 
115 
 
Table 3-3 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Market-adjusted 
 CAR AR AR CAR CAR 
Market (-10,-1) (-1) (1) (-1,10) (1,10) 
Covered ban      
UK -0.0516* -0.0200*++ 0.0334**+++ 0.0193+ 0.0393+++ 
US 0.0329***+++ 0.0331***+++ 0.0264***+++ 0.1011***+++ 0.0656***+++ 
Norway 0.0506 -0.0299 -0.0054 -0.1149 -0.0850 
Canada -0.0281 0.0413**++ 0.0081 0.1648***+++ 0.1235***+++ 
Switzerland -0.0964**+ 0.0005 0.0603***++ 0.0963*+ 0.0957**+ 
Naked Ban      
Netherlands -0.0532 0.0425 -0.0083 0.0880 0.0455 
Belgium -0.0208 0.1013*** -0.0549* 0.1309*** 0.0296 
Germany -0.0192 0.0423***++ -0.0012 0.1236***+++ 0.0813***+++ 
Portugal 0.0718**++ 0.0141 -0.0055 0.1048**++ 0.0906**++ 
Italy 0.0216* 0.0137***+++ -0.0006 0.0366***+++ 0.0228+ 
France 0.0110 0.0457***+++ 0.0040 0.1288***+++ 0.0831***+++ 
No Ban      
Hong Kong 0.0169 -0.0015 0.0328**+ 0.0341 0.0328 
Sweden 0.0104 0.0124 0.0570*** 0.1269*** 0.1145*** 
Japan -0.0210 -0.0273***+++ 0.0442***+++ 0.0606**++ 0.0879***+++ 
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Figure 3-1 Abnormal returns: Covered bans  
This figure reports abnormal returns based on the market model around covered short-selling bans. The event date, the day the short-selling ban 
is imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008.  
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Figure 3-2 Cumulative abnormal returns: Covered bans 
This figure reports cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model around covered short-selling bans. The event date, the day the short-
selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008.  
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Figure 3-3 Abnormal returns: Naked bans  
This figure reports abnormal returns based on the market model around naked short-selling bans. The event date, the day the short-selling ban is 
imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008. 
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Figure 3-4 Cumulative abnormal returns: Naked bans 
This figure reports cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model around naked short-selling bans. The event date, the day the short-
selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008.   
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The results in Table 3-3 provide support for the first hypothesis (H3,1) with positive 
abnormal returns when short-selling is restricted. To provide further evidence, 
markets where no short-selling bans were announced over the same period as the US 
ban are examined. Figure 3-5 presents ARs for markets without short-selling bans. In 
the pre-event period, stocks experience a mixture of returns similar to the covered 
sample. On the event date, stocks experience positive abnormal returns which persist 
over the post-event window. Figure 3-6 highlights the magnitude of these results and 
Table 3-3 documents that Sweden, Japan and Hong Kong experience abnormal 
returns of 12.01%, 11.77% and 2.54% in the post-event period, respectively. 
 
The similar returns on markets with no bans and covered bans indicate that either the 
results are not directly attributable to the short-selling restrictions or the short-selling 
restrictions in major markets (i.e., US) affect global markets. Evidence in Table 3-3 
suggests the latter is more likely. All three markets not subject to a ban experience 
positive abnormal returns on the same day as the US bans. If the result was 
attributable to other factors (e.g., various government stimulus packages), it is 
unlikely that all three markets would react on the same day as the US bans. Further 
evidence exists in markets where naked short-selling is prohibited. In these markets, 
strong positive abnormal returns occur on the two trading days preceding the bans, 
coinciding with the UK and US bans. The notion of interdependence between global 
stock price movements is extensively documented (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), 
and appears to be the most likely explanation of the results. 
 
Overall, the results in Table 3-3 support the first hypothesis (H3,1) with positive 
abnormal returns when short-selling is restricted. This is expected, given the theory 
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(Miller, 1977) and previous studies that document positive abnormal returns when 
short-sales are constrained. It appears that the regulations were successful, given the 
unofficial purpose of the bans was to sustain the prices of struggling financial stocks. 
The bans have successfully, albeit possibly temporarily, inflated the prices of financial 
companies. 
 
3.5.2 Market quality: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3-4 provides descriptive statistics for the control and treatment sample in the 
pre- and post-event windows for each of the markets subject to a covered short-selling 
ban. Difference captures the percentage change in each sample when the short-selling 
restrictions are enforced. Diff-diff captures the difference in the percentage change 
between the stocks affected by the ban and the stocks not affected. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that trading volume and value are reduced, controlling for market-
wide changes in trading activity, when covered short-selling is restricted. Across all 
five markets, with the exception of turnover value in Canada, the Diff-diff results are 
homogenous, with both volume and value reduced by a minimum of 11.6%. Relative 
bid-ask spreads widen by a minimum of 18.1% during the bans, after controlling for 
market-wide changes. At the same time both stock price and return volatility increase 
in the US, UK and Norway, while falling in Switzerland. Overall the descriptive 
statistics suggest that market quality deteriorates when covered short-selling is 
restricted. 
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Figure 3-5 Abnormal returns: No bans  
This figure reports cumulative abnormal returns based on the market model around markets with no short-selling bans. The event date, the day 
the short-selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 2008.  
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Figure 3-6 Cumulative abnormal returns: No bans 
This figure reports abnormal returns based on the market model around markets with no short-selling bans. The event date, the day the 
short-selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The estimation window for the market model begins 1 July, 2007 and ends 31 August, 
2008. 
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Table 3-4 Descriptive statistics: Covered bans 
This table reports descriptive statistics for markets with a ban on covered short-selling. The treatment sample includes stocks subject 
to the short-selling ban. The control sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market not affected by the short-
selling restrictions (see Table 3-2). Variables include: Spread (Relative bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return 
volat. (Daily return volatility), Value (Daily turnover value) and Volume (Daily traded volume). The event date, the day the short-
selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- 
(30 trading days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading days subsequent to event) period. If the ban was in place for less than 30 
trading days, the duration of the ban is used as the post-event window. The Change (%) column reports the percentage difference 
between the Pre and Post averages for each variable in both the treatment and control samples. The Diff-diff column reports the 
difference of the difference between the treatment and control samples. 
 
   Treatment  Control  
 Measure Pre Post Change (%)  Pre Post Change (%)  Diff-Diff 
Canada Spread 0.0110 0.0199 81.07  0.0037 0.0051 40.94 40.94 
 Price volat. 0.0464 0.0776 67.10  0.0470 0.0708 50.75 16.36 
 Return volat 0.0019 0.0041 117.43  0.0013 0.0028 110.21 7.22 
 Value 94,616,460 115,534,207 22.11  89,120,115 106,352,900 19.34 2.77 
 Volume 2,138,664 2,495,069 16.66  2,150,575 2,809,973 30.66 -14.00 
Norway Spread 0.0070 0.0155 122.74  0.0036 0.0045 25.23 97.51 
 Price volat. 0.0686 0.1004 103.57  0.0911 0.1175 28.97 17.31 
 Return volat 0.0037 0.0076 46.28  0.0048 0.0087 80.27 23.29 
 Value 202,238,369 131,412,381 -35.02  395,076,587 302,640,008 -23.40 -11.62 
 Volume 10,553,764 8,791,287 -16.70  6,271,125 7,070,656 12.75 -29.45 
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Table 3-4 – Continued 
Switzerland Spread 0.0017 0.0032 83.47  0.0017 0.0028 65.31 18.16 
 Price volat. 0.0438 0.0811 85.25  0.0291 0.0552 89.69 -4.44 
 Return volat 0.0013 0.0058 340.26  0.0004 0.0020 355.13 -14.87 
 Value 323,866,683 353,580,886 9.17  206,561,724 308,806,204 49.50 -40.32 
 Volume 8,296,163 9,530,835 14.88  3,693,960 5,990,106 62.16 -47.28 
UK Spread 0.0023 0.0053 128.91  0.0017 0.0019 10.82 118.09 
 Price volat. 0.0451 0.1152 155.16  0.0415 0.0724 74.48 80.68 
 Return volat 0.0022 0.0084 283.46  0.0011 0.0034 207.70 75.77 
 Value 180,374,676 149,439,043 -17.15  48,689,542 50,933,474 4.61 -21.76 
 Volume 13,542,515 16,171,673 19.41  3,192,122 4,257,075 33.36 -13.95 
US Spread 0.0043 0.0150 249.47  0.0017 0.0032 92.54 156.93. 
 Price volat. 0.0568 0.0928 63.44  0.0356 0.0561 57.51 5.93 
 Return volat 0.0025 0.0062 150.31  0.0011 0.0026 149.08 1.23 
 Value 35,868,769 34,865,404 -2.80  66,214,144 77,925,182 17.69 -20.48 
 Volume 1,247,519 1,147,591 -8.01  1,451,731 1,850,830 27.49 -35.50 
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Table 3-5 provides descriptive statistics for the control and treatment samples in the 
pre- and post-event windows for each of the markets subject to a naked short-selling 
ban. The descriptive statistics suggest that trading volume and turnover value are 
reduced, controlling for market-wide changes in trading activity, when naked short-
selling is restricted. Across five of the six markets, the Diff-diff results show both 
volume and value are reduced, consistent with the covered short-selling ban results. 
However, the effect on bid-ask spreads and stock price and return volatility is mixed 
across markets. For example, Portugal and Italy experience a reduction in spreads, 
while the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany experience an increase. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide inconclusive evidence of the impact of the 
naked short-selling ban on market quality.  
 
Table 3-6 provides descriptive statistics for the control (non-financial stocks) and 
treatment (financial stocks) samples in the pre- and post-event windows for the three 
markets not subject to a short-selling ban. Similar to the naked ban sample, the 
descriptive statistics provide mixed results, with no consistent result across markets. 
The only measure which changes in the same direction across the three markets is 
turnover value (which increases). 
 
3.5.3 Market quality: Pooled cross-sectional regressions 
 
The descriptive statistics provide an indication of the impact of the short-selling bans 
on market quality. To provide formal statistical testing and to control for other factors, 
the results of the cross-sectional pooled regressions are presented in Tables 3-7, 3-8 
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and 3-9. The key variable, Bani, captures the marginal impact of the short-selling ban 
on the market quality variable of interest.  
 
Table 3-7 presents the results for the markets where a covered ban was imposed. The 
results are similar to the descriptive statistics across the five markets. Consistent with 
the second hypothesis (H3,2), stock price and return volatility measures increase 
significantly in four of the five markets with the coefficient, Bani, positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the third hypothesis (H3,3), 
relative bid-ask spreads increase in four of the five markets with the coefficient, Bani, 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the fourth 
hypothesis (H3,4), volume and value decrease significantly in four of the five markets 
with the coefficient, Bani, negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Consistent with the univariate results, banning covered short-sales has a negative 
impact on market quality.  
 
Table 3-8 presents the results from the six markets where a naked ban was imposed. 
The results are similar to the descriptive statistics, with inconsistent results across the 
six markets. Unlike markets where a covered ban was in place, no clear pattern exists 
across the markets subject to a naked ban. This suggests that the naked ban does not 
significantly impact on market quality.  
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Table 3-5 Descriptive statistics: Naked bans 
This table reports descriptive statistics for markets with a ban on naked short-selling. The treatment sample includes stocks subject to the short-
selling ban. The control sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market not affected by the short-selling restrictions (see 
Table 3-2). Variables include: Spread (Relative bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return volat. (Daily return volatility), Value 
(Daily turnover value) and Volume (Daily traded volume). The event date, the day the short-selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The Pre 
and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (30 trading days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading 
days subsequent to event) period. If the ban was in place for less than 30 trading days, the duration of the ban is used as the post-event window. 
The Change (%) column reports the percentage difference between the Pre and Post averages for each variable in both the treatment and control 
samples. The Diff-diff column reports the difference of the difference between the treatment and control samples. 
 
    Treatment  Control  
 Measure Pre Post Change (%)  Pre Post Change (%)  Diff-Diff 
Netherlands Spread 0.0023 0.0053 128.91  0.0017 0.0019 10.82 118.09 
 Price volat. 0.0451 0.1152 155.16  0.0415 0.0724 74.48 80.68 
 Return volat 0.0022 0.0084 283.46  0.0011 0.0034 207.70 75.77 
 Value 180,374,676 149,439,043 -17.15  48,689,542 50,933,474 4.61 -21.76 
 Volume 13,542,515 16,171,673 19.41  3,192,122 4,257,075 33.36 -13.95 
Belgium Spread 0.0022 0.0047 112.33  0.0051 0.0063 22.01 90.32 
 Price volat. 0.0553 0.1206 118.10  0.0328 0.0588 79.18 38.92 
 Return volat 0.0038 0.0091 137.66  0.0007 0.0015 117.79 19.87 
 Value 58,258,378 49,153,465 -15.63  12,433,809 14,616,580 17.56 -33.18 
 Volume 4,474,789 5,475,175 22.36  253,584 362,267 42.86 -20.50 
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Table 3-5 – Continued 
Germany Spread 0.0038 0.0070 84.55  0.0032 0.0042 32.16 52.39 
 Price volat. 0.0374 0.0879 135.14  0.0305 0.0639 109.44 25.71 
 Return volat 0.0012 0.0045 280.48  0.0008 0.0022 180.63 99.85 
 Value 12,618,064 27,678,527 119.36  12,589,129 19,660,480 56.17 63.19 
 Volume 426,177 1,528,809 258.73  218,740 387,072 76.96 181.77 
Portugal Spread 0.0200 0.0204 1.85  0.0042 0.0065 55.67 -53.82 
 Price volat. 0.0329 0.0554 68.27  0.0371 0.0661 78.08 -9.81 
 Return volat 0.0009 0.0015 71.08  0.0010 0.0026 152.32 -81.24 
 Value 2,724,731 2,845,976 4.45  9,664,562 10,522,949 8.88 -4.43 
 Volume 611,871 703,314 14.94  1,977,560 2,431,432 22.95 -8.01 
Italy Spread 0.0064 0.0090 40.49  0.0017 0.0028 59.16 -18.67 
 Price volat. 0.0349 0.0562 61.01  0.0366 0.0632 72.65 -11.64 
 Return volat 0.0009 0.0024 178.35  0.0008 0.0024 209.87 -31.52 
 Value 58,645,381 50,389,008 -14.08  83,991,619 74,807,017 -10.94 -3.14 
 Volume 16,061,754 17,207,044 7.13  12,939,133 14,471,229 11.84 -4.71 
France Spread 0.0048 0.0099 107.89  0.0008 0.0008 2.87 105.02 
 Price volat. 0.0474 0.0742 56.49  0.0376 0.0671 78.63 -22.13 
 Return volat 0.0025 0.0030 18.72  0.0010 0.0033 239.45 -220.73 
 Value 122,691,686 105,670,112 -13.87  122,509,660 148,606,834 21.30 -35.18 
 Volume 5,634,349 4,914,412 -12.78  4,201,602 5,628,709 33.97 -46.74 
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Table 3-6 Descriptive statistics: No bans 
This table reports descriptive statistics for markets with no ban on short-selling. The treatment sample includes financial stocks. The control 
sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market, excluding stocks in the treatment sample (see Table 3-2). Variables 
include: Spread (Relative bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return volat. (Daily return volatility), Value (Daily turnover 
value) and Volume (Daily traded volume). The event date, the day the short-selling ban is imposed, is denoted day 1. The Pre and Post columns 
represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (30 trading days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading days subsequent to 
event) period. If the ban was in place for less than 30 trading days, the duration of the ban is used as the post-event window. The Change (%) 
column reports the percentage difference between the Pre and Post averages for each variable in both the treatment and control samples. The 
Diff-diff column reports the difference of the difference between the treatment and control samples. 
    Treatment  Control  
 Measure Pre Post Change (%)  Pre Post Change (%)  Diff-Diff 
Hong Kong Spread 0.0038 0.0068 76.85  0.0025 0.0036 41.65 35.20 
 Price volat. 0.0412 0.0536 30.17  0.0461 0.0637 38.20 -8.03 
 Return volat 0.0011 0.0019 73.34  0.0014 0.0025 74.60 -1.27 
 Value 1,260,957,391 1,418,314,229 12.48  503,558,295 529,395,175 5.13 7.35 
 Volume 120,725,912 124,808,746 3.38  28,952,215 33,680,747 16.33 -12.95 
Japan Spread 0.0030 0.0036 19.02  0.0030 0.0036 18.10 0.92 
 Price volat. 0.0397 0.0530 33.58  0.0292 0.0438 50.02 -16.44 
 Return volat 0.0019 0.0020 6.73  0.0008 0.0015 90.63 -83.90 
 Value 16,726,433,719 21,566,516,226 28.94  7,748,624,072 8,720,299,346 12.54 16.40 
 Volume 8,087,073 11,522,280 42.48  5,788,440 7,236,714 25.02 17.46 
Sweden Spread 0.0022 0.0025 12.02  0.0028 0.0032 14.87 -2.85 
 Price volat. 0.0411 0.0691 68.26  0.0380 0.0532 39.96 28.29 
 Return volat 0.0012 0.0048 305.92  0.0009 0.0020 129.42 176.50 
 Value 817,957,682 1,083,384,174 32.45  445,342,584 533,260,198 19.74 12.71 
 Volume 7,652,489 10,635,257 38.98  5,106,250 6,253,921 22.48 16.50 
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Table 3-7 Pooled cross-sectional regressions: Covered bans 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression results from markets with a ban on 
covered short-selling for the following regression: 
0 1  2  3  it t t i t i t i itY Period Sample Banβ β β β ε= + + + +  
The pooled data include: both the treatment and control samples over the pre- (30 trading 
days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading days subsequent to event) period. If the 
ban was in place for less than 30 trading days, the duration of the ban is used as the post-
event window. The treatment sample includes stocks subject to the short-selling ban. The 
control sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market not 
affected by the short-selling restrictions (see Table 3-2). Yit is the market quality measure 
of interest for stock i during interval t. Market quality measures include: Spread (Relative 
bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return volat. (Daily return 
volatility), Value (Daily turnover value) and Volume (Daily traded volume). Bani is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the stocks are subject to a short-selling ban, and zero 
otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy variable equal to one if the observation lies in the 
post-event period, and zero otherwise. Samplei is a control dummy variable equal to one 
if the observation belongs to the treatment sample, and zero otherwise. The regressions 
include calendar-day dummy variables and stock dummy variables, and the standard 
errors take into account clustering by calendar date and clustering by stock (Thompson, 
2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Market Measure Intercept Period Sample Ban R2 
UK Spread -7.126*** 0.243*** 4.106*** 0.301*** 0.60 
 Price volat. 0.121*** 0.052*** -0.094*** 0.018*** 0.62 
 Return volat. -6.387*** 0.820*** -0.695 0.172*** 0.60 
 Value 24.121*** 0.453*** -10.784*** -0.303*** 0.95 
 Volume 16.544*** 0.599*** -7.537*** -0.329*** 0.95 
US Spread -6.611*** 0.628*** 1.113*** 0.783*** 0.59 
 Price volat. 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.012** 0.017*** 0.66 
 Return volat. -8.102*** 1.821*** -0.465 0.127*** 0.65 
 Value 17.632*** 0.476*** -2.055*** -0.440*** 0.96 
 Volume 13.479*** 0.619*** -1.447*** -0.510*** 0.95 
Norway Spread -5.669*** 0.716*** 0.455*** 0.332*** 0.40 
 Price volat. 0.118*** -0.016 0.010 0.009 0.53 
 Return volat. -5.704*** 0.273 -0.099 -0.026 0.60 
 Value 20.591*** -0.530*** -2.623*** -0.246*** 0.91 
 Volume 15.704*** -0.134 -0.679*** -0.284*** 0.88 
Canada Spread -5.513*** -0.117 -1.179*** 0.438*** 0.43 
 Price volat. 0.096*** 0.039*** -0.043*** 0.007*** 0.64 
 Return volat. -5.687*** 2.742*** -1.279** 0.266*** 0.63 
 Value 18.384*** 0.643*** -0.070 0.094* 0.94 
 Volume 16.179*** 0.801*** -1.426*** 0.018 0.91 
Switzerland Spread -5.550*** 0.703*** -0.590*** 0.001 0.38 
 Price volat. 0.068*** 0.035*** -0.016*** 0.011*** 0.64 
 Return volat. -8.182*** 1.026* -0.087 0.216*** 0.59 
 Value 18.230*** 0.214* 1.501*** -0.437*** 0.88 
 Volume 13.123*** 0.603*** 1.368*** -0.366*** 0.96 
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Table 3-8 Pooled cross-sectional regressions: Naked bans 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression results from markets with a ban on 
naked short-selling for the following regression: 
0 1  2  3  it t t i t i t i itY Period Sample Banβ β β β ε= + + + +  
The pooled data includes: both the treatment and control samples over the pre- (30 
trading days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading days subsequent to event) period. 
If the ban was in place for less than 30 trading days the duration of the ban is used as the 
post-event window. The treatment sample includes stocks subject to the short-selling ban. 
The control sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market not 
affected by the short-selling restrictions (see Table 3-2). Yit is the market quality measure 
of interest for stock i during interval t. Market quality measures include: Spread (Relative 
bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return volat. (Daily return 
volatility), Value (Daily turnover value) and Volume (Daily traded volume). Bani is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the stocks are subject to a short-selling ban, and zero 
otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy variable equal to one if the observation lies in the 
post-event period, and zero otherwise. Samplei is a control dummy variable equal to one 
if the observation belongs to the treatment sample, and zero otherwise. The regressions 
include calendar-day dummy variables and stock dummy variables, and the standard 
errors take into account clustering by calendar date and clustering by stock (Thompson, 
2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Market Measure Intercept Period Sample Ban R2 
Netherlands Spread -6.397*** -0.249 0.445** 0.561*** 0.42 
 Price volat. 0.100*** 0.089*** 0.014** 0.045*** 0.69 
 Return volat. -7.277*** 0.697 0.451 0.798*** 0.68 
 Value 16.710*** 0.530*** -0.421*** -0.095 0.95 
 Volume 11.824*** 0.739*** 2.240*** 0.128** 0.97 
Belgium Spread -6.157*** 0.740** 0.592** 0.493** 0.44 
 Price volat. 0.110*** 0.070*** -0.005 0.045*** 0.64 
 Return volat. -6.649*** 1.777*** 0.701* 0.077*** 0.65 
 Value 17.360*** 0.598*** -0.925*** -0.340*** 0.91 
 Volume 14.251*** 0.692*** -1.687*** -0.042 0.95 
Germany Spread -6.784*** 0.078 0.372*** 0.200*** 0.76 
 Price volat. 0.093*** 0.055*** -0.032*** 0.018*** 0.64 
 Return volat. -7.731*** 2.147*** -1.246*** 0.379*** 0.65 
 Value 17.576*** 0.606** -2.151*** 0.215* 0.73 
 Volume 12.135*** 0.780*** -1.338*** 0.347*** 0.73 
Portugal Spread -5.226*** 0.320 1.934*** -0.005 0.47 
 Price volat. 0.081*** 0.050*** -0.001 -0.006** 0.59 
 Return volat. -8.841*** 1.484*** 0.295 0.025 0.68 
 Value 15.645*** 0.383** -3.523*** 0.033 0.91 
 Volume 14.040*** 0.484** -4.235*** -0.063 0.91 
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Table 3-8 – Continued 
 
Italy Spread -6.558*** 0.604*** 2.035*** -0.088 0.63 
 Price volat. 0.067*** 0.046*** -0.002 -0.005*** 0.60 
 Return volat. -8.314*** 1.504*** -1.088** -0.069* 0.68 
 Value 17.786*** 0.512*** -6.341*** 0.026 0.97 
 Volume 15.125*** 0.640*** -5.958*** -0.013 0.97 
France Spread -7.639*** 0.175 -0.383* 0.577*** 0.60 
 Price volat. 0.086*** 0.042*** 0.009* -0.002 0.62 
 Return volat. -7.021*** 0.035 -0.054 -0.870 0.61 
 Value 18.842*** 0.595*** 1.359*** -0.285*** 0.97 
 Volume 13.896*** 0.756*** 2.266*** -0.337*** 0.97 
 
Table 3-9 presents the results from the three markets without short-selling bans. Results 
documented are similar to the descriptive statistics, with largely insignificant and 
inconsistent results. Trading volume, turnover value and relative bid-ask spreads do not 
change significantly, with the coefficient, Bani, statistically insignificant. Price and return 
volatility results are mixed across markets and suggest no clear impact from the US short-
selling bans. These results suggest the US bans had no significant impact on market 
quality measures in markets without short-selling bans. 
 
Overall, results indicate that market quality is markedly worse for markets with more 
stringent short-selling restrictions. Markets with covered short-selling bans on financial 
stocks experience a significant decline in market quality (for stocks subject to the ban). 
This is possibly driven by the temporary exclusion of certain market participants, 
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including hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, which typically provide substantial 
amounts of liquidity via short-selling. This result does not extend to markets with less 
stringent (or no) restrictions in place for financial stocks. While regulators have been 
successful in temporarily inflating prices, there is evidence that this has come at the cost 
of increased volatility and reduced liquidity. 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
While short-selling has long been a contentious issue, relatively little or no empirical 
evidence is available on the impact of short-sale restrictions on market quality. The 2008 
short-sale bans provide an ideal setting for these tests because it provides a binding 
constraint.
 
Thus, it is not necessary to rely on proxies for short-sale constraints, as in 
previous research. This chapter empirically examines the impact of the 2008 short-selling 
bans on the market quality of stocks subject to the bans. Thus, in doing so it examines 
whether the short-selling bans have achieved their desired outcomes. Using data from 14 
equity markets, the market quality of financial stocks subject to the bans is examined by 
comparing to stocks not subject to the bans. Evidence indicates that restrictions on short-
selling lead to artificially inflated prices, indicated by positive abnormal returns. This is 
consistent with Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory and suggests the bans have been 
effective in temporarily stabilising prices in struggling financial stocks. Market quality is 
reduced during the restrictions, as evidenced by wider bid-ask spreads, increased price 
volatility and reduced trading activity. 
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Table 3-9 Pooled cross-sectional regressions: No bans 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression results from markets with no ban 
on short-selling for the following regression: 
0 1  2  3  it t t i t i t i itY Period Sample Banβ β β β ε= + + + +  
The pooled data include: both the treatment and control samples over the pre- (30 
trading days prior to event) and post-event (30 trading days subsequent to event) 
period. If the ban was in place for less than 30 trading days, the duration of the ban is 
used as the post-event window. The treatment sample includes financial stocks. The 
control sample includes stocks from a major index in the corresponding market, 
excluding stocks in the treatment sample (see Table 3-2). Yit is the market quality 
measure of interest for stock i during interval t. Market quality measures include: 
Spread (Relative bid-ask spread), Price volat. (Daily price volatility), Return volat. 
(Daily return volatility), Value (Daily turnover value) and Volume (Daily traded 
volume). Bani is a dummy variable equal to one if the stocks are subject to a short-
selling ban, and zero otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy variable equal to one if 
the observation lies in the post-event period, and zero otherwise. Samplei is a control 
dummy variable equal to one if the observation belongs to the treatment sample, and 
zero otherwise. The regressions include calendar-day dummy variables and stock 
dummy variables, and the standard errors take into account clustering by calendar date 
and clustering by stock (Thompson, 2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Market Measure Intercept Period Sample Ban R2 
Hong Kong Spread -5.962*** 0.469*** 0.609*** -0.073 0.51 
 Price volat. 0.118*** 0.069*** -0.022*** -0.006** 0.59 
 Return volat. -6.927*** -0.367 -1.454*** -0.317* 0.61 
 Value 19.755*** 0.131* 1.331*** 0.100** 0.96 
 Volume 18.164*** 0.400*** 1.921*** 0.066 0.95 
Sweden Spread -5.495*** 0.180*** -0.405*** -0.018 0.61 
 Price volat. 0.077*** 0.048*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.59 
 Return volat. -7.546*** 1.044** 0.272 0.787*** 0.60 
 Value 20.842*** 0.497*** 0.159** 0.183*** 0.89 
 Volume 16.714*** 0.654*** -0.276*** 0.131** 0.92 
Japan Spread -5.481*** 0.664*** 0.484*** -0.028 0.39 
 Price volat. 0.048*** 0.024*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.50 
 Return volat. -6.800*** 0.511** 0.483 -0.614 0.61 
 Value 23.468*** 0.011 0.148* 0.089*** 0.92 
 Volume 16.162*** 0.159*** -0.168** 0.038 0.98 
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4 Chapter 4: The impact of naked short-selling on the 
securities lending and equity market 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The literature review examining the impact of short-selling in Chapter 2 shows that 
the existing literature investigates changes in the rules governing either covered short-
sales (see Chang, Chang and Yu, 2007), or changes to short-sale constraints that affect 
both naked and covered short-sales (see Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu, 2006). This 
is interesting as, despite the apparent assumption that naked short-selling is 
detrimental, relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact that 
naked short-selling has on financial markets. The purpose of this chapter is to bridge 
this gap in the literature by directly examining the impact of allowing naked short-
selling on returns, volatility and liquidity. This opportunity is provided by a unique 
feature of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) which allows naked short-sales 
for certain securities on an approved short-sale list that is revised over time.26 The 
addition of a security to the designated list of eligible stocks represents a shift from 
only allowing covered short-sales to allowing both covered and naked short-sales, 
                                                 
26
  Securities are added or removed from the list based on market capitalisation, shares issued and 
liquidity. See Section 4.3.1 for further detail.  
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thus allowing an isolation of the impact of permitting naked short-sales on financial 
markets. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 uses the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2 to develop several hypotheses that are tested in this chapter. 
Section 4.3 describes the institutional details for short-sales on the ASX. Section 4.4 
reports the data, sample selection and the empirical analysis of the impact of naked 
short-selling on returns, liquidity and volatility. Section 4.5 provides a summary of 
the main results and concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
 
This section uses the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to develop several hypotheses 
that are tested in this chapter. As discussed in Section 3.2, the disagreement models 
(e.g., Miller, 1977) predict that short-sale constraints prevent pessimists from taking 
bearish positions in constrained stocks. The addition of a security to the designated 
list of eligible stocks represents a shift from only allowing covered short-sales to 
allowing both covered and naked short-sales. This shift to naked short-selling may 
circumvent the fee charged by the stock lender, which represents a significant cost 
associated with covered short-selling.27 In addition to this direct cost, there are several 
risks associated with covered short-selling, including the risk of a short squeeze due to 
                                                 
27
  Naked short-sellers at the time of sale have not borrowed or entered into an agreement to borrow 
the stock and may repurchase the stock without incurring the borrowing fee. The Australian 
Securities Lending Association Limited estimates that these costs can range between 25 and 400 
basis points, representing a significant barrier to covered short-sales. See Section 4.3.1 for further 
detail. 
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an involuntarily closure of the stock loan (the short-seller is unable to find an 
alternative supply of stock in the event that the loan is closed). Further, naked short-
selling circumvents search costs associated with locating and negotiating securities for 
lending. Together, these costs and risks represent a short-sale constraint which could 
be removed when naked short-sales are permitted.  
 
Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory predicts positive abnormal returns when short-
sale constraints are imposed. Conversely, when short-sale constraints are lifted, (i.e., 
addition of a security to the designated list of eligible stocks), it could be expected 
that any overvaluation would be reversed through the presence of negative abnormal 
returns. Therefore the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis4,1: Securities added to the designated list of eligible stocks experience 
negative abnormal returns.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the theoretical evidence provides conflicting predictions 
regarding the impact of short-sales on volatility. The same arguments apply here, 
except that this chapter specifically examines the impact of naked short-sales. 
Differences between the behaviour of naked and covered short-sellers may lead to the 
impact of allowing naked short-sales on returns and volatility to differ from that of 
covered short-sales. While not academically documented, naked short-sales are often 
associated with market manipulation.28 To the extent that naked short-sellers may 
                                                 
28
  Naked short-selling is often associated with market manipulation in the financial press. Examples 
include articles published in the Wall Street Journal and Financial Times (see Crittenden and 
Scannell, 2009 and Shapiro, 2008). 
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engage in the downward manipulation of stock prices,  one could expect their trades 
to increase stock price volatility. Given the impact of allowing naked short-selling is 
yet to be examined, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis4,2: Securities added to the designated list of eligible stocks experience 
increases in stock price/return volatility. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the limited theory suggests that short-sale constraints 
could worsen market liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987). Conversely, one 
could expect that the removal of a short-sale constraint would lead to an increase in 
liquidity. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is little empirical or theoretical evidence on 
how short-sale constraints affect liquidity. Given the limited empirical literature, 
further evidence is required regarding the impact of short-selling on market liquidity. 
Further, naked short-sale constraints could affect the mix of passive and active 
strategies of short-sellers, which could in turn affect liquidity measures such as bid-
ask spreads and order-depth. Therefore the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis4,3: Securities added to the designated list of eligible stocks experience an 
increase in liquidity. 
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4.3 Institutional settings 
4.3.1 Short-selling regulation on the ASX 
 
Short-sales in Australia are governed by both Section 1020b of the Corporations Act 
2001 and Section 19 of the ASX Market Rules. Section 19.3 of the market rules 
restricts naked short-sales to a group of securities listed on the approved short-sale 
products.29 The ASX market rules require that securities meet the following minimum 
requirements to be included in the designated list of eligible stocks: market 
capitalisation of $100 million; 50 million shares on issue; and possess ‘sufficient 
liquidity’. The ASX considers 7.5% volume-based liquidity in the preceding three 
months as ‘sufficient liquidity’ for the purposes of these rules.30 Based on discussions 
with exchange officials, the requirement of a minimum market capitalisation of $100 
million is strictly adhered to.31 However, while the minimum requirements for market 
capitalisation are followed, the ASX does exercise discretion with regard to ‘sufficient 
liquidity’ and may form the opinion that a lower or higher level of volume-based 
liquidity is sufficient in a particular circumstance. Therefore the process of being 
added to the list is primarily driven by market capitalisation and the ASX does not 
exercise discretion unless stocks meet this minimum market capitalisation. 
 
The designated list of eligible stocks is maintained by the ASX and is ‘usually’ 
revised on a monthly basis. However, there is not always an addition event that occurs 
                                                 
29
  On September 22, 2008, the ASX imposed a ban on naked short-sales concurrent with the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission ban on covered short-sales.  
30
  Volume-based liquidity is measured as the total volume traded as a percentage of the total amount 
of shares on issue. To be considered ‘sufficient liquidity’ the stock must have traded 7.5% of the 
total shares on issue in the preceding three months.  
31
 This is confirmed in the sample, with all stocks meeting this minimum requirement. 
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every month and there may not be any changes to the list when it is revised. Similar to 
additions to the list, the ASX may also delete stocks from the list if they no longer 
meet its minimum requirements or the ASX exercises discretion with respect to the 
sufficient liquidity requirement. While access to these deletion events is available, 
only additions are examined because deletion events are often associated with 
negative news regarding the deleted stocks. Discussions with exchange officials 
reveal deletion events are less frequent and are often associated with securities that are 
delisted or in extreme financial distress. The announcement and implementation of 
additions to the list are made simultaneously in most cases or on the previous trading 
day. 
 
4.3.2 Mechanics of short-selling on the ASX 
 
On the ASX, when a covered short-sale occurs, the trader borrows securities from a 
securities lender and enters into an agreement to return them on demand. At the time 
of sale, arrangements are in place for delivery of the securities and the trader then 
sells the stock and delivers the shares to a buyer on settlement (T+3). While the 
position is open the lender requires collateral and no separate fee is payable for the 
loan.32 This collateral (usually the proceeds from the sale) earns interest payable to the 
borrower at less than a normal market rate (rebate rate). The spread between the 
                                                 
32  According to the Australian Securities Lending Association Limited, current market practice in 
Australia generally is that the collateral should be maintained within the range of at least 102-105% 
for equities secured by cash collateral, 110%-130% in the case of non-cash collateral and 0-2% for 
debt securities such as Government and semi-government bonds and inscribed stock. The value of 
the borrowed securities is marked to market daily. Collateral is commonly in the form of cash but 
may also be in the form of securities or occasionally irrevocable standby letters of credit. For 
further detail on securities lending in Australia see ‘An Introduction to Securities Lending 
(Australia)’ available at www.asla.com.au.  
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normal market rate and the rebate rate is the ‘lending fee’ which the lender earns and 
the borrower pays. When closing a position the trader buys back equivalent shares in 
the market and returns them to the stock lender. The collateral is then returned to the 
borrower plus interest earned at the rebate rate. There is no set time frame on how 
long a covered short position can be held, provided the lender does not recall the stock 
and the trader can meet the margin requirements.  
 
A naked short-sale is where the participant, either proprietary or on behalf of a client, 
enters an order in the market and does not have in place arrangements for delivery of 
the securities. This differs slightly from the US where naked short-sales generally 
imply selling a stock short without borrowing it and subsequently failing to deliver 
the stock at settlement (Putniņš, 2009). When conducting a naked short-sale on the 
ASX, the trader must either buy back the stock within a short time frame (usually on 
the same day), or arrange to borrow the stock before settlement (T+3). If the stock is 
bought back on the same day then naked short-sellers can avoid the cost of borrowing 
the stock (‘lending fee’) which is incurred by covered short-sellers. When this occurs 
the traders’ broker will net off the sell and buy order in the same stock and the trader 
will only pay/receive the difference upon settlement. However, if the naked short-
seller does not buy back the stock on the same trading day, they must borrow the 
stock and deposit the sale proceeds as collateral, thus incurring a lending fee.  
 
If the trader does not meet settlement their broker will incur fail fees (for each day 
they fail to meet settlement), which are then passed onto the client (brokers may also 
add administration fees). The fail fee charged to the broker is calculated as 0.10% of 
the value of the shortfall subject to a minimum fail fee of $50 and a maximum fail fee 
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of $2,000.33 For example, a naked short-sale worth $100,000 would incur a fail fee of 
$100 for each day the seller fails to deliver. However, more serious cases of 
settlement delays may also result in referral to the ASX disciplinary tribunal, which 
has the power to impose further fines. For example, the disciplinary tribunal recently 
fined Findlay & Co Stockbrokers Limited $30,000 for a failure to settle (i.e. by T+3) 
nine trades with a combined value of $391,953.00, between 8 October, 2007 and 19 
October, 2007. The duration of the nine trades ranged from one to ten days past the 
T+3 obligation. However the ASX has no set guidelines on what constitutes a 
settlement delay that warrants further action.  
 
While there is no minimum timeframe that a securities lender will lend stocks for 
covered short-selling, the fail fees and potential further fines limit the duration of 
naked short-sales such that a naked short-seller, on average, could have a shorter term 
horizon compared to a covered short-seller. This suggests that the strategies of naked 
short-sellers may be designed to take advantage of short term periods of market 
volatility, while covered short-sales could be used for longer term market corrections. 
The decision to employ naked or covered short-selling could also be a function of the 
relative cost of either strategy. Naked short-selling provides the opportunity to 
mitigate search costs and lending fees, however fail fees and potential fines can be 
incurred. Depending on the expected duration of the trade, short-sellers must 
determine if the lending costs are greater than the potential fail fees.  
                                                 
33
  With effect from 1 September, 2008, the minimum and maximum fees applied in respect of fails are 
set at $100 and $5,000, respectively (with an ad valorem fee of 0.1 per cent). With effect from end-
March 2009, participants are also required to close out any positions remaining unsettled on the 
fifth day after the trade date (i.e., T+5). 
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For example, if a short-seller expects to close out a trade within seven trading days 
they have two basic options. If a naked short-sale is placed, the trader does not incur 
any upfront costs (ignoring brokerage costs) but will incur fail fees for each day 
settlement is not met. In addition, the trader also risks further fines if the position is 
left open. In contrast, if a covered short-sale is placed the trader incurs the lending fee 
for the duration of the trade. If the lending fees are higher than the fail fees, naked 
short-selling may be more attractive, provided they expect to meet settlement shortly 
after T+3 and avoid any further fines. Alternatively if the lending fees are lower than 
the fail fees, covered short-selling may be preferred due to the lower costs. The 
expected duration of the short-sale, stock lending fees, fail fees and fines all influence 
the relative attractiveness of naked and covered short-selling.             
 
4.4 Empirical analysis 
 
Historical versions of the designated list of eligible stocks are obtained from the ASX 
to compile a sample of 317 additions over the period January 1, 2000 to December 31, 
2007.34 The final sample of 317 excludes events where either return and/or turnover 
data are not available for at least 180 trading days in the pre- and post-event periods, 
or there was a reversal of the short-sale constraint in the post-event period.35 Reuters 
intraday data, provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific 
(SIRCA), are also used. The original data consist of trade level variables for all stocks 
                                                 
34
  Prior to September 22, 2008, the ASX reported the designated list of eligible stocks, containing all 
securities approved for naked short-sales, on its website daily. The approved list comprised 444 
securities as at December 31, 2007. 
35
  Fourteen events were excluded where there was a reversal of the short-sale constraint in the post-
event period. 
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listed on the ASX from January 1, 2000 to September 28, 2008. Each transaction is 
matched with its corresponding liquidity-related variables such as prevailing bid-ask 
quotes and quoted depth. The sample includes 317 events, which are clustered around 
32 event dates. The spread of 32 event dates (clusters) over the sample period 
minimises potential confounding effects of other concurrent events. 
 
4.4.1 Impact on stock returns 
 
Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory suggests that when short-sale constraints are 
removed (a stock is added to the designated list of eligible stocks) any overvaluation 
should be reversed, as demonstrated by negative abnormal returns. If restricting naked 
short-sales is a short-sale constraint, then lifting naked short-sale constraints should be 
associated with negative abnormal returns. This theory is outlined by hypothesis one 
(H4,1). To test the first hypothesis, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are examined 
around the effective date for additions to the designated list of eligible stocks. 
Consistent with previous literature (Danielson and Sorescu, 2001, and Chang, Chang 
and Yu, 2007), effective dates rather than announcement dates are used as they 
represent the actual removal of short-sale constraints. Further, announcement dates 
are not available and discussions with exchange officials indicate changes are 
announced either on the effective date or one to two trading days in advance.  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated using the market-adjusted model 
defined as: 
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where Rit is stock i’s return in interval t, and RMt is the return on the S&P/ASX All 
Ordinaries index in interval t.36 While many studies use the market model (based on a 
pre-event back window), market-adjusted returns are used as they do not rely on a 
pre-event window to estimate abnormal returns. Using the market model, CARs 
observed in the post-event period (when naked short-sales are allowed) may occur 
because stocks added to the designated list of eligible stocks experience strong 
positive returns in the pre-estimation period (i.e., -280, -61), which ultimately lead to 
their addition to the designated list of eligible stocks. Therefore, the market model 
may generate misleading CARs in the post-event period due to the positive intercept 
term. The market-adjusted model does not suffer from this bias, performing well 
under a number of circumstances and better than more complex methods (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). 
 
Following Chang, Chang and Yu (2007), significance testing of the CARs is 
conducted using a bootstrap procedure. This method is preferred over the usual event 
study t-tests as the stocks added to the designated list of eligible stocks tend to be of 
similar market capitalisation and liquidity. Thus, returns could have common 
components that are not considered under the market-adjusted model. These 
conditions may induce cross-sectional correlations among the CARs of individual 
stocks. To ensure that significance tests are not influenced by these potential 
                                                 
36
  S&P/ASX All Ordinaries index represents the 500 largest companies in the Australian equities 
market. 
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misspecifications, bootstrap tests are performed with actual security returns data to 
generate empirical distributions for various CARs under the null hypothesis specific 
to the model. These empirical distributions are used to gauge the significance of the 
respective CARs. The procedure is as follows: 
 
1. Identify the number of clusters and number of stocks in each cluster. 
2. Assign each cluster a random event date during the sample period January 1, 
2000 to September 28, 2008. 
3. On this date, form the ‘pool’ of eligible stocks (size and turnover).37 
4. Randomly select from the pool the exact number of stocks in the cluster. 
5. Combine clusters together to form a simulated sample. 
6. Calculate CARs for the simulated sample. 
7. Repeat for 1,000 samples, to generate empirical approximation of distribution 
of CARs. 
8. Generate one-tailed empirical p-value by calculating the percentage of CARs 
observed in the empirical distribution based on 1,000 runs that is less than the 
average CAR values observed for the actual sample. 
 
Table 4-1 reports CARs calculated using the market-adjusted model around the event 
date (the effective date is denoted day 0) for various windows before and after all 
events. The pre-event period is not associated with any significant abnormal returns 
                                                 
37
  Specifically, the largest and smallest size percentiles and the highest and lowest annual turnover of 
the actual firms in the cluster are used as the upper and lower bounds. All the listed stocks whose 
size and annual turnover at that time fall between the bounds in the pool are then included. Chang, 
Chang and Yu (2007) highlight that because the chosen stocks for each cluster share a common 
event date, and because they are similar in terms of size and turnover to the stocks in the actual 
cluster, the abnormal returns, if any, of the chosen stocks would preserve the cross-sectional 
correlation as it exists in the actual cluster. 
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with the exception of the day preceding the event date (-1). As mentioned previously, 
announcements are made on the effective day or the previous trading day. The 
average abnormal return on day -1 is negative (-0.0674%) and significant at the 10% 
level using the bootstrapped p-values. While not strong in economic and statistical 
significance, this may suggest that some announcements occur prior to the effective 
date and that the market reacts to these announcements. The average abnormal return 
on the effective date (day 0) is -0.1856%, which is significant at the 5% level. While 
consistent with hypothesis one (H4,1) and Miller’s (1977) theory and suggesting some 
overvaluation is reversed when naked short-sales are allowed; this result is minor in 
terms of economic significance. Further, the result is restricted to the event date and 
does not persist with positive and insignificant CARs following the event date. For 
example, the CAR from day 0 through day 10 (0.7447%) is positive and insignificant 
(p-value=0.61).  
 
The insignificant results may be driven a lack of short-sale constraints or dispersion of 
opinions in stocks added to the list. Miller’s (1977) overvaluation argument is 
contingent on two necessary conditions: (1) presence of a short-sale constraint, and 
(2) a dispersion of investor opinions about the security’s value. To test this, proxies 
for dispersion of investor opinion are required along with a measure of the short-sale 
constraint present in these stocks. Following Chang, Chang and Yu (2007), dispersion 
of investor opinion is measured using SIGMA, computed as the standard deviation of 
the daily raw returns in the pre-event window (-280, -61).38 Jones and Lamont (2002) 
                                                 
38
  TURNOVER, computed as daily trading volume, scaled by shares outstanding, averaged over the 
pre-event window (-280, -61), is also used as a proxy for dispersion of opinion.  Results are 
presented in the additional test in Table 4-8 in Section 4.4.1. 
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suggest that the securities lending fee (rebate rate) is the most appropriate variable for 
measuring the level of short-sale constraints. Data Explorers proprietary database is 
utilised to captures the lending fee on the Australian securities lending market.39  
 
The data contain information from a significant number of the largest custodians in 
the industry and, by their own estimates, capture approximately 80% of the market for 
equity lending. This data contains lending information at a daily frequency over the 
period July 3, 2006 to May 27, 2008. While this does not cover the entire sample (317 
events), it encompasses 87% (277 events) of the sample. The lending fee is expressed 
in undisclosed fee buckets ranging from 0-5, with 0 the cheapest to borrow and 5 the 
most expensive. The average fee for the 10 trading days leading into the event (-10,-1) 
is calculated to provide a measure of the level of short-sale constraint present in each 
stock before naked short-sales are allowed.  
 
Using the lending fee, stocks are grouped into quartiles based on the level of short-
sale constraint. Quartile one contains stocks that are least constrained (lowest lending 
fees) and quartile four contains stocks most heavily constrained (highest lending fees). 
The average of the lending fee bucket in quartile one to quartile four is 0.86, 1.22, 
1.91 and 3.01, respectively. The median of the lending fee bucket in quartile one to 
quartile four is 0.70, 1.06, 1.97 and 3.10, respectively. The standard deviation of the 
lending fee bucket in quartile one to quartile four is 0.75, 0.54, 0.53 and 0.97, 
respectively. While specific information on the actual lending fees is not available, the 
                                                 
39
  http://dataexplorers.com 
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summary statistics demonstrate there is variation across the lending fee buckets and 
stocks in quartile four are more constrained than stocks in quartile one. 
 
Similarly, using SIGMA
 
as a proxy for dispersion of opinion, stocks are grouped into 
quartiles of dispersion of opinion. Quartile one contains stocks with the lowest 
dispersion of opinion, and quartile four contains stocks with the highest dispersion of 
opinion. Miller’s (1977) model implies that there should only be negative abnormal 
returns on stocks added to the short-sale list which have a high dispersion of investor 
opinion and a significant short-sale constraint. To test this, Table 4-1 reports CARs 
for the following categories of stocks: highest constraint and dispersion quartile (High 
constraint and high dispersion); highest constraint and lowest dispersion quartile 
(High constraint and low Dispersion); lowest constraint and dispersion quartile (Low 
constraint and low dispersion); and lowest constraint and highest dispersion quartile 
(Low constraint and high dispersion). 
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Table 4-1 Cumulative abnormal returns around additions 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns based on the market-adjusted model around additions. An addition event is defined as one 
in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. Using the 
lending fee, stocks are grouped into quartiles based on the level of short-sale constraint. Quartile one contains stocks that are least 
constrained (lowest lending fees) and quartile four contains stocks most heavily constrained (highest lending fees). Similarly, using 
SIGMA
 
as a proxy for dispersion of opinion, stocks are grouped into quartiles of dispersion of opinion. Quartile one contains stocks with 
the lowest dispersion of opinion, and quartile four contains stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion. The one-tailed p-value is 
obtained by calculating the percentage of the mean abnormal returns observed in the bootstrapped empirical distribution, based on 1,000 
runs, that is less than the average cumulative abnormal return values observed for the actual sample. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Full sample  High constraint and high dispersion   
High constraint and low 
dispersion  
Low constraint and low 
dispersion  
Low constraint and high 
dispersion  
Event 
window 
(days) 
 Mean (%) One-tailed  p-value  Mean (%) 
One-tailed      
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed     
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed         
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed          
p-value 
(-10,-1)  0.9479 0.51  2.1690 0.83 0.6729 0.64 0.0140 0.92 3.1948 0.90 
(-5,-1)  0.5904 0.90  0.6361 0.76 0.9489 0.20 -1.1758 0.23 1.4972 0.90 
(-2,-1)  -0.0513 0.29  -0.4508 0.82 0.3491 0.44 -0.6503 0.27 -1.0307 0.42 
-1  -0.0674* 0.10  -1.9531** 0.02 -0.0966 0.81 -0.5519 0.28 1.0011 0.73 
0  -0.1856** 0.04  -3.4148*** 0.00 -0.9419 0.20 0.3684 0.32 -1.7660* 0.08 
(0,1)  0.1121 0.79  -1.4343 0.50 -1.0733 0.20 0.0725 0.91 -2.4190 0.30 
(0,5)  0.4772 0.42  -0.4352 0.95 -1.3128 0.44 0.2123 0.84 0.5038 0.30 
(0,10)  0.7447 0.61  -3.1976* 0.10 -4.6953 0.25 -0.0921 0.90 0.4304 0.95 
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Consistent with Miller (1977), stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion and 
highest short-sale constraint are the only stocks to exhibit significant and negative 
abnormal returns in the post-event period. These stocks experience a -3.4148% 
abnormal return on the event date, significant at the 1% level. Similar to the entire 
sample, the average abnormal return on the day preceding the event (-1) is negative (-
1.9531%) and significant at the 5% level. This provides further evidence that the 
announcement of a change in short-sale constraints could lead to a price reaction prior 
to the event date. For the other categories in Table 4-1, the results are all insignificant 
except the highest dispersion and lowest constraint category where the abnormal 
return on the event date (-1.7660%) is negative and marginally significant at the 10% 
level. This result demonstrates that the impact of naked short-selling is limited to 
stocks that are the most constrained and have the highest dispersion of opinion. 
Together, the results in Table 4-1 provide support for hypothesis one (H4,1), as shown 
by negative abnormal returns when naked short-sale constraints are lifted. This result 
is further confirmed by the increase in the magnitude (and significance) of the 
abnormal returns when stocks are most constrained and have the highest dispersion of 
opinion. 
  
4.4.2 Impact on volatility and liquidity  
 
To examine changes in volatility and liquidity, 60 trading days prior (subsequent) to 
the addition of a stock to the designated list of eligible stocks is selected as the pre-
event period (post-event period). The decision to include stocks on the designated list 
of eligible stocks which are relatively large and actively traded reflects the ASX’s 
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attempt to avoid the claimed adverse influence of naked short-sales on smaller and 
less liquid stocks. However, this may result in a certain degree of endogeneity in the 
analysis as the addition of a security stems from past performance. In an attempt to 
address this concern and to control for market-wide changes in trading activity and 
liquidity, both matching and regression discontinuity design methodologies are 
employed. 
 
4.4.2.1 Matching  
 
A market capitalisation and dollar volume matched sample is constructed from control 
stocks that are not on the designated list of eligible stocks. The control sample is 
constructed by first creating a pool of stocks which are not on the designated list of 
eligible stocks. From this pool, a control stock for each treatment stock is selected on 
the same date by requiring the market capitalisation of the control stock to be within 
10% of the treatment stock and then finding the stock which minimises the difference 
between the trading value ($) of the treatment and control stock on the last trading day 
before the event.40 Previous studies that match based on size and trading activity 
include Mayhew, Sarin and Shastri (1995) and Bennet and Wei (2006). 
 
To test whether volatility and liquidity measures change significantly for treatment 
stocks relative to control stocks, the difference between the pre- and post-averages for 
each variable (labelled Difference) in both the treatment and control samples is 
                                                 
40
 This matching is also conducted using average trading value ($) of the treatment and control stock 
on the last 20 trading days before the event. The results are presented in the additional tests in 
Tables 4-11 and Table 4-12. 
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calculated. The difference of the difference between the treatment and control samples 
(labelled Difference-in-difference) is then estimated. Statistical significance of both 
measures is determined using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. To minimise the possibility 
of cross correlation due to clustering, the cross-sectional average of all events in each 
cluster is examined. 
 
4.4.2.2 Regression discontinuity design 
  
While the matching methodology attempts to control for market-wide changes, the 
control stocks by definition will be smaller in size (market capitalisation) than the 
treatment sample. Further, the matching method may not control for possible reversals 
in liquidity/volatility. For example, any post-event reduction observed in 
volatility/liquidity may result from a reversal of abnormally high volatility/liquidity in 
the pre-event period. Thus, a regression discontinuity (RD) design is employed to 
estimate the impact of allowing naked short-selling on equity markets. The main idea 
of this method is to exploit a unique feature of the ASX (naked short-sales are allowed 
on stocks exceeding 100 million in market capitalisation) to obtain a reliable estimate 
of the effect of allowing naked short-selling on volatility and liquidity. For stocks on 
the opposite side of the discontinuity point (100 million in market capitalisation), their 
underlying characteristics should be very similar, yet they have differing short-sale 
constraints. Thus the difference in volatility/liquidity should be driven predominantly 
by the difference in short-sale constraints.  
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The program evaluation literature documents that RD design is used to obtain reliable 
estimates of causal effects (Hahn, Todd and Van Der Klaauw, 2001, and Imbens and 
Lemieux, 2008). Recently, several studies in economics apply and extend RD design 
methods, including Black (1999), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van Der Klaauw (2002), 
DiNardo and Lee (2004), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Chay, McEwan, Urquiola 
(2005) and Lee (2008). For example, Angrist and Lavy (1999) examine the effect of 
class size on students’ performance and Van Der Klaauw (2002) analyses the effects 
of financial aid on college enrolment. RD design is increasing in use as it can identify 
the causal effects under much weaker assumptions, while standard methods that deal 
with an endogeneity problem usually rely on assumptions of exclusion restrictions, 
distribution of error terms, or a conditional independence assumption (Lee and 
Lemieux, 2009). The key feature of the RD design is that treatment is given to 
individuals only if an observed covariate crosses a known threshold. Thus under weak 
smoothness conditions, the probability of receiving treatment near the cut-off behaves 
as if random. This feature helps to identify the causal effect without imposing 
arbitrary exclusion restrictions, functional forms, or distributional assumptions on 
error terms.  
 
RD design is used where assignment to the treatment D (equal to 1 if naked short-
selling is allowed and 0 otherwise) is determined by the value of a covariate, Xi 
(market capitalisation), being on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million 
in market capitalisation). Local linear regressions provide a non-parametric way of 
consistently estimating the treatment effect in an RD design (Hahn, Todd and Van 
Der Klaauw, 2001). Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), a rectangular kernel is 
used which amounts to estimating a standard regression, where Yi is the outcome 
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variable from the treatment, over a window of width h on both sides of the 
discontinuity value (100 million in market capitalisation). Further, the discontinuity 
value c is subtracted from the covariate Xi (market capitalisation), i.e., transform Xi to 
Xi−c. The outcome variable, Yi, is calculated as the change in the measure of interest 
(i.e., volatility or liquidity) 
 
(0, 60) ( 60, 1)
( 60, 1)
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=                                                                                    (4.2) 
 
where Ypost(0,60) and Ypre(-60,-1) represent the average measure of interest in the post- and 
pre-event period surrounding each event.41 This measure is used as the outcome 
variable as it captures the average change in liquidity/volatility when naked short-
sales are allowed. Rather than estimating two separate regressions on either side of the 
discontinuity point, Imbens and Lemieux (2008) document that the average treatment 
effect (τ) can be estimated directly in a single pooled regression of both sides of the 
discontinuity point by solving: 
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The advantage of the pooled approach is that it directly yields estimates and standard 
errors of the treatment effect τ. Standard errors are adjusted using a 
variance/covariance matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to the event date 
(Petersen, 2009). The interaction term between D and X is included to allow the 
                                                 
41
  Consistent with the matching analysis, the pre- and post-event windows are 60 trading days. 
157 
 
regression function to differ on both sides of the discontinuity point (Imbens and 
Lemieux, 2008). To address the potential concern of a temporary effect or reversal in 
liquidity/volatility, an additional variable is incorporated. The additional variable, 
denoted Zi, is the change in the measure of interest (i.e., volatility or liquidity) 
calculated as 
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where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days leading into 
an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days prior 
to the pre-event window. Zi captures the average change in liquidity/volatility over the 
pre-event period. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the additional variable is 
incorporated and the average treatment effect is estimated by solving: 
 
{ }min
, , ,
1
' 2
1 ( ( )
             ( ) ) .
N
i i iy
i
i i c i
c h X c h Y X c
D y X D Z
α β τ α β
τ δ
=
− −
− ≤ ≤ + ⋅ − − ⋅ −
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
∑
                                         (4.5) 
 
An important issue when implementing the RD design is the choice of window width 
h around the discontinuity point (i.e., the choice of bandwidth). This determines how 
many stocks will be included in the regressions based on their market capitalisation. 
For example, a bandwidth of 0.20 would equate to a window width, h, of $20 million 
($100 million*0.20) and would restrict the analysis to stocks with a market 
capitalisation between $80 million and $120 million. A larger bandwidth yields more 
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precise estimates as more observations are available to estimate the regression. 
However, the linear specification is less likely to be accurate when a larger bandwidth 
is used, which can bias the estimate of the treatment effect. The rule-of-thumb (ROT) 
and cross-validation methods are two common approaches for estimating bandwidths 
(Lee and Lemieux, 2009).42  
 
The bandwidth is estimated using both procedures, with both yielding similar results. 
The ROT procedure suggests an optimal bandwidth of 0.45, while the cross-validation 
procedure suggests an optimal bandwidth of 0.53. Based on these results, analysis is 
conducted using a 0.50 bandwidth. Therefore the RD analysis is conducted on stocks 
in the matched sample with a market capitalisation between $50 and $150 million.43 
 
4.4.2.3 Variable measurement 
 
To examine the impact of naked short-sales on volatility, a variety of trade-by-trade, 
15-minute interval and daily volatility measures are estimated. Daily measures 
include: (i) Classic = [ln (closing price on day t / closing price on day t-1)] 2; (ii) G-K 
estimator;44 and (iii) H-L, calculated as ln (daily high / daily low). Interval (15-
minute) measures include: (i) Sum Ret2, calculated as the sum of the squared interval 
returns; and (ii) H-L, calculated as ln (interval high / interval low). Trade-by-trade 
                                                 
42
  For detailed explanation of the rule-of-thumb (ROT) and cross-validation procedures see Fan and 
Gijbels (1996) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008), respectively. 
43
  Further analysis is conducted using various bandwidths ranging from 0.25 to 0.75. The results using 
a bandwidth of 0.25 are presented in the additional tests in Section 4.4.3. 
44
  ( )2 2G - K  e s t i m a t o r 0 . 5 1 1 ( ) 0 . 0 1 9 2 0 . 3 8 3a b x a b a b x= − − + − −   , where x 
= ln (Daily close price / Daily open price), a = ln (Daily high price / Daily open price) and   b = ln 
(Daily low price / Daily open price). G-K estimator was developed by Garman and Klass (1980), 
and takes into account the joint effects of the opening and closing price. 
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volatility, denoted Trade-Volatility, is calculated as the standard deviation of trade-to-
trade returns. 
 
To examine the impact on liquidity of the change in naked short-sale constraints, five 
measures of liquidity are examined. The first is the relative bid-ask spread, calculated 
as the quoted bid-ask spread (difference between prevailing best bid and ask quotes), 
divided by the prevailing quote midpoint. Relative bid-ask spreads are used as they 
control for stock price variation, both over time and across stocks. Harris (1994) 
suggests order depth is a vital component of liquidity not captured by bid-ask spreads. 
Subsequently limit order depth is measured as the combined dollar value of orders at 
the prevailing best bid and ask quotes.  
 
To provide a more comprehensive measure of liquidity, the effective spread is 
calculated by firstly classifying each trade as either buyer- or seller-initiated using the 
method described in Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000). Consistent with Goldstein 
and Kavajecz (2000) and Jones and Lipson (2001), the midpoint of the prevailing 
quotes immediately prior to each trade is used as the pre-trade benchmark.  The 
effective spread is calculated as the percentage return from the pre-trade benchmark to 
the trade price. As part of the analysis of liquidity, trading activity is also examined by 
calculating Turnover (%), measured as daily trading volume divided by shares 
outstanding, and Turnover value, measured as the dollar value of daily trading 
volume. 
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4.4.2.4 Return volatility 
 
Table 4-2 reports statistics for pre- and post-event return volatility for both treatment 
and control samples. Across all measures, volatility increases for the treatment sample 
in the post-event period, represented by the positive values in the treatment Difference 
column. Over the same period, volatility for control stocks either decreases or is 
insignificant across all measures. Most importantly, the Difference-in-difference 
column, which reports the Difference between the ‘Difference’ for the treatment and 
control samples, is positive and significant across all measures at the 5% level. This is 
consistent with the second hypothesis (H4,2) and suggests that allowing naked short-
selling leads to elevated levels of stock price/return volatility at both the intraday and 
daily levels. 
 
The magnitude of these results varies across the different volatility measures. At the 
daily level, the Classic and G-K measures of volatility experience an increase of 
0.0106 and 0.0026, respectively, over the event period. While the difference may 
seem minor, this represents a 12.31% and 4.94% increase in the Classic and G-K 
measures of volatility, respectively. After controlling for the changes in the control 
sample, the difference-in-difference changes are 14.51% and 2.28%, respectively. 
Consistently, the intraday (Sum return2) and Trade-volatility measures experience 
4.67% and 6.16% increases, respectively.  
 
The two price range volatility measures, Daily H-L and 15-minute H-L, both 
experience smaller increases over the event period. After controlling for the changes 
in the control sample, the difference-in-difference changes are 1.82% and 1.01%, 
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respectively. The magnitude of these changes can be quantified for any given stock 
price. The daily H-L measure in the pre-event period is 2.8751%; this implies that the 
log of daily high over daily low equals 0.028751. Therefore the high/low price ratio is 
1.02916, and for a stock with a $20 daily low, this would represent an average price 
range of 58.33 cents in a trading day. Given the measure increases by 1.82%, this 
represents a 1.06 cent increase in the daily price range. This interpretation suggests 
that the price range measures experience slight increases in volatility when naked 
short-sales are allowed. However, the remaining measures experience a minimum of 
2.28%, and up to 12.31%, increase in volatility.       
 
Table 4-3 reports estimates of the average treatment effect, from the RD analysis, for 
various volatility measures. The key variable, D, captures the marginal impact of 
allowing naked short-selling on stock return volatility. Results are homogenous across 
all volatility measures, with the coefficient, D, positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Consistent with the matching analysis and the second hypothesis (H4,2), 
using a more robust method (RD design) and controlling for a potential temporary 
effect or reversal in volatility, allowing naked short-sales increases volatility which is 
consistent with the introduction of covered short-sales (see Chang, Chang and Yu, 
2007).  
 
The magnitude of these results appears to differ from the results of the matching in 
Table 4-2. For example, the 15‐minute H‐L treatment effect (Difference-in-difference) 
is 0.0015 in Table 4-2, which differs from the treatment effect (τ) of 0.4913 in Table 
3. The differences arise due to the following reasons. Firstly, the dependent variables 
in the regressions are a percentage increase in the variable of interest. This measure is 
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calculated for both the treatment and control samples and pooled regressions are 
conducted where the average treatment effect (τ) is captured by the coefficient of the 
dummy variable (D, 1 if naked short-selling is allowed and 0 otherwise). The average 
treatment effect (τ) captures the difference between percentage changes in the 
treatment and control samples in percentage terms, rather than difference changes. 
Further, the regressions control for other factors not taken into account in Table 4-2, 
such as the pre-event changes in the variable of interest and market capitalisation.  
 
4.4.2.5 Liquidity 
 
Table 4-4 reports statistics for pre- and post-event trading activity and liquidity 
measures for both the treatment and control samples. The impact of naked short-sales 
on trading activity differs in direction between the two measures. Turnover (%) is 
positive and insignificant when naked short-sales are allowed (difference-in-
difference, 0.0005), while Turnover value is negative and insignificant when naked 
short-sales are allowed (difference-in-difference, -231.41). The result of the matching 
suggests that trading-based liquidity, as measured by Turnover value and Turnover 
(%), is not significantly altered by changes in naked short-selling constraints.  
 
Relative bid-ask spreads increase significantly in the post-event period for the 
treatment sample, and the Difference-in-difference is positive and significant at the 
1% level. Economically, relative bid-ask spreads increase from an average of 80.61 
basis points in the pre-event period to 87.01 basis points when naked short-sales are 
allowed. After controlling for changes in the control sample, relative bid-ask spreads 
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increase by an average of 3.91 basis points, which represents a 4.85% increase. This 
represents a one cent increase in the spread for a stock trading at $25 (equivalent to 
the minimum tick).  
 
While relative bid-ask spreads suggest that execution costs increased, order depth 
difference-in-difference is positive and significant (at the 5% level), suggesting 
execution costs decrease when naked short-sales are allowed. However, the increase 
in order depth does not always signify a decrease in liquidity or transaction costs 
when the bid-ask spread has widened. The impact on execution costs is generally 
unclear when there is an increase in both bid-ask spreads and quoted depth. If the 
increase in bid-ask spreads dominates, then execution costs are likely to rise. If the 
increase in quoted depth is more significant, then execution costs could decrease. 
 
The effective spread is a more robust measure of execution costs that takes into 
account both order depth and bid-ask spreads. The effective spread results from Table 
4-4 document a significant increase in the treatment sample, while the change in the 
control sample is insignificant. The increase in the effective spread indicates that 
execution costs are higher after naked short-selling is allowed, suggesting that the 
increase in bid-ask spreads dominates the increase in quoted depth. Together, the 
results of the matching analysis suggest that allowing naked short-sales impairs 
market liquidity via an increase in transaction costs. This is inconsistent with 
hypothesis three (H4,3);  however, in terms of magnitude, caution is urged in 
interpreting these results, as this represents an increase of 0.17% after controlling for 
changes in the control sample. 
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Table 4-2 Matching statistics: Volatility 
This table reports various volatility measures for both the treatment and control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition 
event occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked short-sales from the 
event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market capitalisation and trading 
value. Volatility variables include: daily measures (Classic, G-K estimator and H-L); Intraday 15-minute interval measures (Sum Ret2 and H-L); 
and Trade-by-trade measures (Trade-Volatility). The Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (60 
trading days prior to event) and post-event (60 trading days subsequent to event) period. The Difference column reports the difference between 
the Pre and Post averages for each variable in both the treatment and control samples. The Difference-in-difference column reports the difference 
of the difference between the treatment and control samples. Statistical significance of the differences (Difference and Difference-in-difference) 
is conducted using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
Interval Volatility  
measure 
Pre Post Difference  Pre Post Difference  Difference-in-difference 
Daily Classic 0.0861 0.0967 0.0106***  0.0828 0.0809 -0.0019*  0.0125*** 
 G-K 0.0526 0.0552 0.0026*  0.0482 0.0496 0.0014  0.0012** 
 H-L 2.8751 2.9443 0.0692***  2.6319 2.6487 0.0168  0.0524** 
15-minute Sum return2 0.0557 0.0590 0.0033**  0.0555 0.0563 0.0007  0.0026*** 
 H-L  0.1487 0.1533 0.0045**  0.1427 0.1457 0.0030  0.0015** 
Trade Trade-volatility 0.4367 0.4517 0.0150***  0.4977 0.4858 -0.0119*  0.0269** 
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Table 4-3 Regression discontinuity design statistics: Volatility 
This table reports regression discontinuity results, calculated by solving 
{ }m i n ' 2
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using local linear regressions where Yi is the outcome variable from the treatment, 
over a window of width h on both sides of the discontinuity value (100 million in 
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where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days leading into 
an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days prior 
to the pre-event window. D (equal to 1 if naked short-selling is allowed, and 0 
otherwise) is determined by the value of a covariate, Xi (market capitalisation), being 
on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million in market capitalisation). τ 
represents the average treatment effect. Pooled data includes both the treatment and 
control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event occurs. 
An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list 
and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control 
sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. A bandwidth of 0.50 is applied which restricts the 
analysis to stocks in the matched sample with a market capitalisation between $50 and 
$150 million. Volatility variables include: daily measures (Classic, G-K estimator and 
H-L); intraday 15-minute interval measures (Sum Ret2 and H-L); and trade-by-trade 
measures (Trade-Volatility). Standard errors are adjusted using a variance/covariance 
matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to event date (Petersen, 2009). *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistics presented in parentheses.  
 
 
 Dependent variable: Yi 
 
 Daily  15-minute  Trade 
Independent  
variables 
 
Classic G-K H-L  Sum return2 H-L  Trade-volatility 
α   -0.3288** -0.3925*** -0.3019***  -0.3795*** -0.3779*  -0.0185 
 
 (-1.84) (-4.53) (-3.18)  (-2.38) (-1.78)  (-0.21) 
τ  
 0.4432** 0.3251*** 0.3172***  0.4045** 0.4913**  0.1446** 
 
 (2.25) (4.18) (3.20)  (2.27) (2.34)  (1.91) 
β   <0.0001* <0.0001*** <0.0001**  <0.0001 <0.0001*  <0.0001 
 
 (-1.74) (-3.68) (-1.85)  (-1.47) (-1.67)  (-0.53) 
y   <0.0001* <0.0001*** <0.0001**  <0.0001 <0.0001*  <0.0001 
 
 (-1.74) (-3.68) (-1.85)  (-1.47) (-1.67)  (-0.53) 
'δ   0.0488 0.1897*** 0.1683***  0.1731** 0.0222  0.1276** 
 
 (0.63) (3.22) (3.67)  (2.06) (0.28)  (2.03) 
Adjusted R2  0.08 0.10 0.13  0.07 0.08  0.16 
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Table 4-4 Matching statistics: Trading activity and liquidity 
This table reports various trading activity and liquidity measures for both the treatment and control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks 
where an addition event occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked 
short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. Liquidity variables include: Turnover, measured as total volume traded divided by total number of shares on 
issue; Turnover value, measured as the dollar value of traded volume; Effective spread, measured as the percentage return from the pre-trade 
benchmark to the trade price; Relative bid-ask spread, calculated as the quoted bid-ask spread (difference between prevailing best bid and ask 
quotes), divided by the prevailing quote midpoint; and Order depth, calculated as the dollar volume at the prevailing best bid and ask quotes. The 
Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (60 trading days prior to event) and post-event (60 
trading days subsequent to event) period. The Difference column reports the difference between the Pre and Post averages for each variable in 
both the treatment and control samples. The Difference-in-difference column reports the difference of the difference between the treatment and 
control samples. Statistical significance of the differences (Difference and Difference-in-difference) is conducted using the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
Measure Pre Post Difference  Pre Post Difference  Difference-in-difference 
Turnover (%) 0.3095 0.2693 -0.0402***  0.2582 0.2174 -0.0407***  0.0005 
Turnover value ($’000) 3,890.27 3,624.27 -266.00  3,126.02 3,091.42 -34.59  -231.41 
Relative bid-ask spreads (%) 0.8061 0.8701 0.0640***  0.8915 0.9164 0.0249*  0.0391*** 
Order depth ($’000) 342.39 366.54 24.15*  314.13 289.57 -24.57*  48.72** 
Effective spread (%) 0.4048 0.4062 0.0014***  0.4568 0.4564 -0.0003  0.0017*** 
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Table 4-5 reports estimates of the average treatment effect, from the RD analysis, on 
various trading activity and liquidity measures. Results for both trading activity 
measures document an increase in trading activity, with the coefficient, D, positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results, contrary to the matching 
analysis, suggest that allowing naked short-selling significantly increases trade-based 
liquidity. Consistent with the matching analysis, allowing naked short-sales results in 
increased relative bid-ask spreads, order depth and effective spreads. This again 
suggests that the increase in bid-ask spreads dominates the increase in quoted depth. 
Therefore, using a more robust method (RD design) and controlling for a potential 
temporary effect or reversal in liquidity, liquidity is impaired (execution costs 
increase) when naked short-selling is allowed.  
 
4.4.2.6 Components of the bid-ask spread 
 
The previous section highlights a significant reduction in the level of liquidity when 
naked short-sale constraints are removed. There are several explanations why 
allowing naked short-sales could impair liquidity. It can be argued that naked short-
sellers, like all short-sellers, are on average informed traders (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1987, and Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008). Allowing naked short-sales 
will lead to increased information asymmetry and an increase in the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread. To examine whether this is consistent with an 
increase in the adverse selection component of the spread, the adverse selection cost 
component of the bid-ask spread is estimated using the method developed in Lin, 
Sanger and Booth (1995) and subsequently applied to an electronic limit order market 
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in Brockman and Chung (1999). The adverse selection component is calculated by 
estimating the following regression for each event over both the pre- and post-event 
periods: 
 
t+1 t+1tQ z eλ∆ = +
                                                                                             (4.6) 
 
where Q is the natural log of the bid-ask spread midpoint, z is the natural log of the 
difference between the transaction price and the bid-ask spread midpoint and e is a 
normally distributed error term. The coefficient of z, λ, measures the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread. Table 4-6 presents summary statistics of the adverse 
selection cost component, before and after naked short-sales are allowed. Results 
indicate that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread increases by 
6.70% when naked short-sale constraints are removed. This result is significant at the 
1% level when assessed using both a two-sample t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 
To control for market-wide changes that may be driving the increase in the adverse 
selection component of the spread, the adverse selection component of the spread is 
estimated for the control sample. The results, also in Table 4-6, document that the 
adverse selection component of the spread falls by 1.35%, statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This suggests that the increase in adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread cannot be attributed to a market-wide increase. These results are 
consistent with the theory that naked short-sellers, on average, are informed or price 
destabilisers and subsequently, when naked short-sales are allowed, the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread increases. 
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Table 4-5 Regression discontinuity design statistics: Trading activity and liquidity 
This table reports regression discontinuity results, calculated by solving 
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 using local linear regressions where Yi is the outcome variable from the treatment, over a 
window of width h on both sides of the discontinuity value (100 million in market 
capitalisation). The outcome variable, Yi, is calculated as the change in the volatility measure 
of interest (0, 60) ( 60, 1)
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 where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure 
of interest in the five trading days leading into an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average measure 
of interest in the five trading days prior to the pre-event window. D (equal to 1 if naked short-
selling is allowed, and 0 otherwise) is determined by the value of a covariate, Xi (market 
capitalisation), being on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million in market 
capitalisation). τ represents the average treatment effect. Pooled data includes both the 
treatment and control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event 
occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list 
and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample 
includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market capitalisation and trading 
value. A bandwidth of 0.50 is applied which restricts the analysis to stocks in the matched 
sample with a market capitalisation between $50 and $150 million. Liquidity variables 
include: Turnover, measured as total volume traded divided by total number of shares on 
issue; Turnover value, measured as the dollar value of traded volume; Effective spread, 
measured as the percentage return from the pre-trade benchmark to the trade price; Relative 
bid-ask spread, calculated as the quoted bid-ask spread (difference between prevailing best 
bid and ask quotes), divided by the prevailing quote midpoint; and Order depth, calculated as 
the dollar volume at the prevailing best bid and ask quotes. Standard errors are adjusted using 
a variance/covariance matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to event date (Petersen, 
2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistics presented in parentheses.  
  Dependent variable: Yi 
Independent 
variables 
 Turnover Turnover value Relative       bid-ask spreads Order depth 
Effective 
spread 
α  
 -0.6618*** -0.5594*** -0.0885 -0.2302*** -0.1022 
  (-4.24) (-5.03) (-0.91) (-2.53) (-1.08) 
τ  
 0.5184*** 0.3716*** 0.1801** 0.1558** 0.1936** 
  (3.61) (3.01) (1.99) (1.89) (2.17) 
β   <0.0001*** <0.0001** <0.0001 <0.0001*** <0.0001 
  (-2.62) (-2.18) (-1.35) (-2.62) (-1.45) 
y  
 <0.0001*** <0.0001** <0.0001 <0.0001*** <0.0001 
  (-2.62) (-2.18) (-1.35) (-2.62) (-1.45) 
'δ   0.2214*** 0.1827*** 0.1892*** 0.1826*** 0.1973*** 
  (3.12) (2.54) (3.27) (9.82) (3.38) 
Adjusted R2  0.10 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.17 
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Table 4-6 Adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread 
This table reports the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, calculated 
following Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), for both the treatment and control sample. 
The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event occurs. An addition 
event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible 
for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample 
includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market capitalisation and 
trading value. The Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each 
variable for the pre- (60 trading days prior to event) and post-event (60 trading days 
subsequent to event) periods. Mean change represents the increase in the adverse 
selection cost from the pre- to the post-event period. Mean change (%) represents the 
percentage increase in the adverse selection cost from the pre- to the post-event 
period. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, using a two-sample t-test. +, ++, and +++ denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
 
  Treatment sample  Control sample 
  Pre  Post  Pre  Post 
        
Mean 0.335  0.357  0.358  0.353 
        
Mean change  0.022***+++    -0.005**++  
        
Mean change (%)  6.70***+++    -1.35**++  
 
4.4.3 Additional tests 
4.4.3.1 Presence of options 
Although the focus of this chapter is on the effect of short-sale constraints, it is well 
known that a short position can be replicated using derivatives such as exchange 
traded options.45 Even though it is debatable whether derivatives reduce short-sale 
constraints in an economically meaningful way,46 it is important to note that stocks in 
                                                 
45
  Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that constrained investors will buy puts and write calls as a 
substitute for short-selling. 
46
  Mayhew and Mihov (2005) is part of an emerging wave of studies which document options do not 
reduce short-sale constraints. Other studies include: Mayhew and Mihov (2004), Ofek, Richardson 
and Whitelaw (2004), Lakonishok, Lee and Poteshman (2004), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), 
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this sample may have options listed. However, further investigation reveals that less 
than 2% of stocks in the sample have options listed (during the sample period). 
Further, it is important to note that the effect of listed options on sample stocks is 
likely to minimise the impact of changes to the designated list of eligible stocks, 
thereby reducing the magnitude of the results. 
4.4.3.2 Securities lending market 
A potential concern of this chapter is that the results are not attributable to the 
introduction of naked short-sales, but rather some other unobservable factor. Ideally, 
data on short-selling could be used to demonstrate short-sellers move from covered to 
naked short-selling, or that traders who previously did not trade begin naked short-
selling when stocks are added to the designated list of eligible stocks. However, naked 
short-sales are not reported on the ASX and therefore data is impossible to collect. To 
examine this, a proprietary database provided by Data Explorers, which captures 
information on the Australian securities lending market, is further employed. From 
Data Explorers, information is obtained on the total value of borrowed securities 
(denoted as Borrowed value hereafter– a measure of the value of the securities that are 
currently borrowed), the total value of lendable assets (denoted as Inventory value 
hereafter– a measure of the value of the securities that custodians currently have 
available for lending), the percentage utilisation (denoted as Utl hereafter– the 
fraction of total lendable assets that are currently on loan) and the securities lending 
fee (denoted as Fee hereafter – the weighted average loan fee expressed in 
                                                                                                                                            
Lamont and Stein (2004), Battalio and Schultz (2006), Danielsen, Van Ness and Warr (2007) and 
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007). 
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undisclosed fee buckets ranging from 0-5, with 0 the cheapest to borrow and 5 the 
most expensive). 
 
Changes in securities lending data are examined around changes to the designated list 
of eligible stocks. If there is a change in the short-selling market around the 
introduction of naked short-sales, a reduction in the demand for securities lending 
could be expected. To control for market-wide changes, the treatment and control 
samples are pooled together to estimate the following cross-sectional regressions for 
each day in the pre- and post-event periods surrounding each event:47 
 
0 1  2  3  4it t t i t i t i t it itLendingVariable Period Group Shortable Volumeβ β β β β ε= + + + + +
     (4.7) 
 
In the above model, LendingVariableit is the securities lending measure of interest for 
stock i during interval t. Shortablei is a dummy variable equal to one if stock i is 
eligible for naked short-sales, and zero otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy variable 
equal to one if the observation lies in the post-event period, and zero otherwise. 
Groupi is a control dummy variable equal to one if the observation belongs to the 
treatment sample, and zero otherwise. Volumeit, represents trading volume for stock i 
during interval t, and controls for changes in trading activity which may affect short-
sales activity. Standard errors are adjusted using a variance/covariance matrix that is 
robust to clustering with respect to both firm and event date (Thompson, 2009). 
 
                                                 
47
  Consistent with the RD regressions, the regressions are conducted using 60 trading days as the pre- 
(and post-) period interval. 
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Table 4-7 presents results for the regressions using Borrowed value, Inventory value, 
Utl and Fee as the dependent variable. The key variable Shortablei, which captures the 
marginal impact of allowing naked short-sales on the securities lending variables, is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level for both Borrowed value and 
Utl. This suggests there is a significant reduction in both the value and percentage of 
securities borrowed. Over the same period there is a significant reduction in the cost 
of borrowing securities (Fee) and no significant change in the value of inventory 
available for lending (Inventory value). The reduction in the average cost of 
borrowing is consistent with a decrease in demand for securities lending. 
 
Together these results suggest that allowing naked short-sales leads to a significant 
reduction in the demand for securities lending. Given securities lending is a 
commonly used proxy for the level of covered short-sales (see D’Avolio, 2002), this 
implies that there is a significant reduction in the level of covered short-selling for 
stocks added to the designated list of eligible stocks. While the evidence is not 
conclusive, naked short-selling appears to occur once stocks are added to the list. 
Therefore, having controlled for exogenous factors, the results in this chapter can be 
attributed (at least in part) to the introduction of naked short-sales. 
4.4.3.3 Dispersion of opinions 
The results in Table 4-1 utilise SIGMA as a proxy for dispersion of opinion. Other 
studies utilise various measures for dispersion of opinion, including Boehme, 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2006), who utilise three measures of dispersion of opinions. 
The first uses analyst forecasts, the second volatility of stock returns and the third uses 
turnover. A measure based on analyst forecasts is intuitively appealing but suffers 
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from limitations due to the need for at least two analysts to compute a value. The 
stocks in the sample typically have low coverage, with only one or two analysts 
covering these stocks. While a measure based on analyst forecasts could not be used, 
TURNOVER, computed as daily trading volume, scaled by shares outstanding, 
averaged over the pre-event window (-280, -61), is also used as a proxy for dispersion 
of opinion. Chang, Chang and Yu (2007) also use three measures which include two 
measures almost identical to the two measures used in this chapter. The first measure 
is a pre-event estimation period standard deviation of returns, the second is the 
standard deviation of the error terms from a market model in the estimation period 
and the third is a turnover measure in the estimation period. The second measure is 
not used due to the reliance on the market model, which, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, 
may lead to misleading results.  
 
The results of the abnormal returns analysis conducted using TURNOVER as a proxy 
for dispersion of opinions are presented in Table 4-8. The results in Table 4-8 show 
that the conclusions drawn in Table 4-1 remain unchanged when using an alternative 
measure for dispersion of opinions.  The results support identical conclusions, and 
support the first hypothesis.  
4.4.3.4 RD analysis  
A further potential concern with the results relates to the Regression Discontinuity 
(RD) design and the size of the bandwidth. Specifically, issues could arise due to the 
concern about comparing stocks with market capitalisation between 50 and 150 
million. Therefore the analysis is conducted using a tighter bandwidth of 0.25 which 
examines stocks with market capitalisation between 75 and 125 million. The results of 
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this analysis are presented in Table 4-9 and Table 4-10 and effectively replicate 
Tables 4-3 and 4-5 using a smaller bandwidth. The results remain qualitatively 
consistent with small changes in the magnitude and significance across different 
measures. Specifically, the results remain almost unchanged for the volatility and 
trading activity regressions. The reduction in bandwidth does however lead to a 
reduction in the magnitude and significance of the liquidity regressions. The 
coefficients remain significant at the 10% level but highlight that the changes in 
liquidity are smaller and less robust than the volatility and trading activity results. 
4.4.3.5 Matching analysis 
 A further potential concern relates to the matching analysis based on the trading 
volume on the day prior to the addition event. If there is any leakage or 
mismeasurement of the announcement, this day could be problematic. To address this 
concern, the analysis is reconducted using the average dollar trading volume over 20 
trading days rather than one day. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4-
11 and Table 4-12 and replicate Table 4-2 and Table 4-4. The results show that the 
results remain effectively similar, and do not alter any conclusions of the chapter.  
4.4.3.6 Impact on volatility and liquidity: By lending fee quartile 
To provide further evidence that the results in this study are related to naked short-
selling, the impact of naked short-sales on volatility and liquidity is re-examined. 
Using the lending fee, stocks are grouped into quartiles based on the level of short-
sale constraint. Quartile one contains stocks that are least constrained (lowest lending 
fees) and quartile four contains stocks most heavily constrained (highest lending fees). 
The RD regressions in Tables 4-3 and 4-5 are re-conducted by splitting the results into 
lending fee quartiles. As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the lending fee, along with the 
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expected time frame of the short-sale, is a vital determinant in the decision to use 
naked or covered short-selling. Stocks in the lowest lending fee quartile should 
experience relatively little naked short-selling since covered short-selling is relatively 
less costly. If the results are related to naked short-selling, then the results should be 
concentrated in the high loan fee stocks.  
 
Table 4-13 reports the average treatment effect (τ ) from the RD regressions on the 
impact of naked short-selling on liquidity and volatility. For the purposes of brevity, 
the treatment effect is only reported for the highest fee quartile (highest constraint) 
and lowest fee quartile (lowest constraint). The results in Table 4-13 demonstrate that 
the direction of the results in both the low and high fee quartiles is consistent with the 
results in Tables 4-3 and 4-5. However, the magnitude and significance of the average 
treatment effect differs largely between the two groups. The low fee quartile results, 
while in the same direction, are smaller in magnitude and largely insignificant. In 
contrast, the high fee quartile results are larger in magnitude and more significant than 
the results in Tables 4-3 and 4-5. This suggests that the impact of naked short-selling 
is greater, both in magnitude and significance, for stocks with higher lending fees 
(more short-sale constrained). Stocks with relatively low lending fees experience 
smaller or no significant change from the introduction of naked short-sales. This is 
consistent with the notion that stocks with lower lending fees experience relatively 
little naked short-selling since covered short-selling is less expensive. Further, Table 
4-13 also demonstrates that the results in this chapter appear to be related (at least in 
part) to the introduction of naked short-sales. 
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Table 4-7 Security lending around changes 
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression results of the following 
regressions: 
0 1  2  3  4it t t i t i t i t it itLendingVariable Period Group Shortable Volumeβ β β β β ε= + + + + +  
The pooled data include: both the treatment and control samples over the pre- (60 
trading days prior to event) and post-event periods (60 trading days subsequent to 
event). The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event occurs. An 
addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is 
eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control 
sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. LendingVariableit is the securities lending measure of 
interest for stock i during interval t. Lending variables include: Borrowed value, a 
measure of the value of the securities that are currently borrowed; Inventory value, a 
measure of the value of the securities that custodians currently have available for 
lending; Utl, the fraction of total lendable assets that are currently on loan; and Fee, 
expressed in undisclosed fee buckets ranging from 0-5, with 0 the cheapest to borrow 
and 5 the most expensive. Volumeit is a control variable representing trading volume 
for stock i during the interval t. Shortablei is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
stock is eligible for naked short-sales, and zero otherwise. Periodi is a control dummy 
variable equal to one if the observation lies in the post-event period, and zero 
otherwise. Groupi is a control dummy variable equal to one if the observation belongs 
to the treatment sample, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are adjusted using a 
variance/covariance matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to both firm and 
event date (Thompson, 2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively, with t-statistics presented in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent variable: LendingVariableit 
Independent variables Borrowed value Inventory value Utl Fee 
Intercept 12.1910*** 19.5780*** 24.2910*** 2.0690*** 
 (35.83) (38.38) (77.19) (120.91) 
Volume <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 
 (13.49) (9.24) (8.87) (-12.59) 
Period -0.1967 2.1254 -2.3537 0.0522 
 (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.43) 
Group 0.5891 0.5891*** 0.5891* 0.5891*** 
 (1.30) (5.24) (-1.82) (-6.92) 
Shortable -1.0501* 0.6927 -0.9012 -0.0754** 
 (-1.71) (0.75) (-1.58) (-2.42) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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Table 4-8 Cumulative abnormal returns around additions (alternate measure of dispersion of investor opinions)  
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns based on the market-adjusted model around additions. An addition event is defined as one in 
which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. Using the lending fee, 
stocks are grouped into quartiles based on the level of short-sale constraint. Quartile one contains stocks that are least constrained (lowest 
lending fees) and quartile four contains stocks most heavily constrained (highest lending fees). Similarly, using TURNOVER
 
as a proxy for 
dispersion of opinion, stocks are grouped into quartiles of dispersion of opinion. Quartile one contains stocks with the lowest dispersion of 
opinion, and quartile four contains stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion. The one-tailed p-value is obtained by calculating the percentage 
of the mean abnormal returns observed in the bootstrapped empirical distribution, based on 1,000 runs, that is less than the average cumulative 
abnormal return values observed for the actual sample. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Full sample  High constraint and high  dispersion  
High constraint and low 
dispersion  
Low constraint and low 
dispersion  
Low constraint and high 
dispersion 
Event 
window 
(days) 
 Mean (%) One-tailed    p-value  Mean (%) 
One-tailed        
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed       
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed          
p-value Mean (%) 
One-tailed          
p-value 
(-10,-1)  0.9479 0.51  2.6214 0.85 0.6866 0.65 0.0143 0.94 3.2600 0.92 
(-5,-1)  0.5904 0.90  0.6558 0.78 0.9782 0.21 -1.2122 0.24 1.5435 0.93 
(-2,-1)  -0.0513 0.29  -0.4463 0.81 0.3456 0.44 -0.6439 0.27 -1.0205 0.42 
-1  -0.0674* 0.10  -1.9726** 0.02 -0.0976 0.82 -0.5574 0.28 1.0111 0.74 
0  -0.1856** 0.04  -3.5204*** 0.00 -0.9710 0.21 0.3798 0.33 -1.8206* 0.08 
(0,1)  0.1121 0.79  -1.4201 0.50 -1.0627 0.20 0.0718 0.90 -2.3950 0.30 
(0,5)  0.4772 0.42  -0.4441 0.97 -1.3396 0.45 0.2166 0.86 0.5141 0.31 
(0,10)  0.7447 0.61  -3.2965* 0.10 -4.8405 0.26 -0.0949 0.93 0.4437 0.98 
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Table 4-9 Regression discontinuity design statistics: Volatility (additional test) 
This table reports regression discontinuity results, calculated by solving 
{ }m i n ' 2
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 using local linear regressions where Yi is the outcome variable from the treatment, 
over a window of width h on both sides of the discontinuity value (100 million in 
market capitalisation). The outcome variable, Yi, is calculated as the change in the 
volatility measure of interest (0, 60) ( 60, 1)
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where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days leading into 
an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days prior 
to the pre-event window. D (equal to 1 if naked short-selling is allowed, and 0 
otherwise) is determined by the value of a covariate, Xi (market capitalisation), being 
on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million in market capitalisation). τ 
represents the average treatment effect. Pooled data includes both the treatment and 
control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event occurs. 
An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list 
and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control 
sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. A bandwidth of 0.25 is applied which restricts the 
analysis to stocks in the matched sample with a market capitalisation between $75 and 
$125 million. Volatility variables include: daily measures (Classic, G-K estimator and 
H-L); intraday 15-minute interval measures (Sum Ret2 and H-L); and trade-by-trade 
measures (Trade-Volatility). Standard errors are adjusted using a variance/covariance 
matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to event date (Petersen, 2009). *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistics presented in parentheses.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Yi 
 
 Daily  15-minute  Trade 
Independent  
variables 
 
Classic G-K H-L  Sum return2 H-L  Trade-volatility 
α   -0.5094*** -0.5661*** -0.3959***  -0.4939*** -0.5377***  0.0186 
 
 (-2.35) (-3.73) (-4.03)  (-2.51) (-2.53)  (-0.18) 
τ   0.5873*** 0.4598*** 0.3915***  0.5557*** 0.6267***  0.1112* 
 
 (-2.39) (-3.05) (-3.58)  (-2.55) (-2.72)  (-1.73) 
β   <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001***  <0.0001** <0.0001***  <0.0001 
 
 (-2.87) (-2.67) (-3.61)  (-2.06) (-2.48)  (-0.08) 
y   <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001***  <0.0001** <0.0001***  <0.0001 
 
 (-3.29) (-2.81) (-3.93)  (-1.96) (-2.55)  (-0.32) 
'δ   0.0252 0.2042*** 0.1468***  0.1410** 0.0490  0.1479*** 
 
 (-0.43) (-2.41) (-5.05)  (-2.13) (-0.65)  (-2.39) 
Adjusted R2  0.10 0.12 0.19  0.11 0.08  0.10 
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Table 4-10 Regression discontinuity design statistics: Trading activity and 
liquidity (additional test) 
This table reports regression discontinuity results, calculated by solving 
{ }m i n ' 2
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 using local linear regressions where Yi is the outcome variable from the treatment, 
over a window of width h on both sides of the discontinuity value (100 million in 
market capitalisation). The outcome variable, Yi, is calculated as the change in the 
volatility measure of interest (0, 60) ( 60, 1)
( 60, 1)
,
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i
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Y YY
Y
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=
 where Ypost(0,60) and Ypre(-60,-1) represent 
the average measure of interest in the post- and pre-event period surrounding each 
event. Zi is the change in the measure of volatility calculated as ( 5, 0) ( 65, 60)
( 65, 60)
,
pre pre
i
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Z
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−
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where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days leading into 
an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days prior 
to the pre-event window. D (equal to 1 if naked short-selling is allowed, and 0 
otherwise) is determined by the value of a covariate, Xi (market capitalisation), being 
on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million in market capitalisation). τ 
represents the average treatment effect. Pooled data includes both the treatment and 
control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event occurs. 
An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list 
and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control 
sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. A bandwidth of 0.25 is applied which restricts the 
analysis to stocks in the matched sample with a market capitalisation between $75 and 
$125 million. Liquidity variables include: Turnover, measured as total volume traded 
divided by total number of shares on issue; Turnover value, measured as the dollar 
value of traded volume; Effective spread, measured as the percentage return from the 
pre-trade benchmark to the trade price; Relative bid-ask spread, calculated as the 
quoted bid-ask spread (difference between prevailing best bid and ask quotes), 
divided by the prevailing quote midpoint; and Order depth, calculated as the dollar 
volume at the prevailing best bid and ask quotes. Standard errors are adjusted using a 
variance/covariance matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to event date 
(Petersen, 2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, with t-statistics presented in parentheses.  
 
 Dependent variable: Yi 
Independent 
variables 
 
Turnover Turnover value Relative bid-ask spreads Order depth Effective spread 
α  
 -0.7133*** -0.9423*** -0.0429 -0.2110** -0.0549 
  (-5.85) (-5.21) (-0.43) (-2.03) (-0.57) 
τ  
 0.5306*** 0.8110*** 0.1451** 0.1330** 0.1524** 
  (-3.57) (-3.81) (-1.79) (-1.68) (-1.72) 
β  
 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
  (-3.78) (-4.01) (-0.64) (-1.42) (-0.71) 
y  
 <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
  (-4.01) (-4.18) (-0.35) (-1.49) (-0.44) 
'δ   0.1751*** 0.2576*** 0.2103*** 0.1982*** 0.2219*** 
  (-2.85) (-3.09) (-3.37) (-8.32) (-3.49) 
Adjusted R2  0.15 0.23 0.10 0.21 0.10 
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Table 4-11 Matching statistics: Volatility (additional test) 
This table reports various volatility measures for both the treatment and control samples. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition 
event occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked short-sales from the 
event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market capitalisation and trading 
value. Volatility variables include: daily measures (Classic, G-K estimator and H-L); Intraday 15-minute interval measures (Sum Ret2 and H-L); 
and Trade-by-trade measures (Trade-Volatility). The Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (60 
trading days prior to event) and post-event (60 trading days subsequent to event) period. The Difference column reports the difference between 
the Pre and Post averages for each variable in both the treatment and control samples. The Difference-in-difference column reports the difference 
of the difference between the treatment and control samples. Statistical significance of the differences (Difference and Difference-in-difference) 
is conducted using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
Interval Volatility  
measure 
Pre Post Difference  Pre Post Difference  Difference-in-difference 
Daily Classic 0.0901 0.1035 0.0134***  0.0812 0.0792 -0.0020*  0.0154*** 
 G-K 0.0526 0.0550 0.0024*  0.0497 0.0513 0.0016  0.0008** 
 H-L 2.7351 2.8062 0.0711***  2.6371 2.6542 0.0171*  0.0540*** 
15-minute Sum return2 0.0562 0.0603 0.0041**  0.0578 0.0584 0.0006  0.0035** 
 H-L  0.1511 0.1560 0.0049**  0.1433 0.1462 0.0029  0.0020** 
Trade Trade-volatility 0.4462 0.4624 0.0162***  0.5011 0.4890 -0.0121*  0.0283*** 
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Table 4-12 Matching statistics: Trading activity and liquidity (additional test) 
This table reports various trading activity and liquidity measures for both the treatment and control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks 
where an addition event occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked 
short-sales from the event day, denoted as day 0. The control sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market 
capitalisation and trading value. Liquidity variables include: Turnover, measured as total volume traded divided by total number of shares on 
issue; Turnover value, measured as the dollar value of traded volume; Effective spread, measured as the percentage return from the pre-trade 
benchmark to the trade price; Relative bid-ask spread, calculated as the quoted bid-ask spread (difference between prevailing best bid and ask 
quotes), divided by the prevailing quote midpoint; and Order depth, calculated as the dollar volume at the prevailing best bid and ask quotes. The 
Pre and Post columns represent the cross-sectional average of each variable for the pre- (60 trading days prior to event) and post-event (60 
trading days subsequent to event) period. The Difference column reports the difference between the Pre and Post averages for each variable in 
both the treatment and control samples. The Difference-in-difference column reports the difference of the difference between the treatment and 
control samples. Statistical significance of the differences (Difference and Difference-in-difference) is conducted using the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Treatment 
 
Control 
 
 
Measure Pre Post Difference  Pre Post Difference  Difference-in-difference 
Turnover (%) 0.3121 0.2706 -0.0415***  0.2633 0.2223 -0.0410***  -0.0005 
Turnover value ($’000) 3,780.37 3515.25 -265.12  3,133.14 3099.52 -33.62  -231.50 
Relative bid-ask spreads (%) 0.8164 0.8839 0.0675***  0.8988 0.9221 0.0233*  0.0442*** 
Order depth ($’000) 343.52 367.48 23.96*  315.21 290.55 -24.66*  48.62** 
Effective spread (%) 0.4011 0.4027 0.0016***  0.4678 0.4675 -0.0003  0.0019*** 
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Table 4-13 Regression discontinuity design statistics by lending fee (additional test) 
This table reports the average treatment effect (τ) from the regression discontinuity analysis calculated by solving 
{ }m i n ' 2
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 using local linear regressions where Yi is the outcome variable 
from the treatment, over a window of width h on both sides of the discontinuity value (100 million in market capitalization). The outcome 
variable, Yi, is calculated as the change in the volatility measure of interest (0, 60) ( 60, 1)
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 where Zpre(-5,0) is the average measure of interest in the five trading days leading into an event and Zpre(-65,60) is the average 
measure of interest in the five trading days prior to the pre-event window. D (equal to 1 if naked short-selling is allowed and 0 otherwise) is 
determined by the value of a covariate, Xi (market capitalization), being on either side of the discontinuity point, c (100 million in market 
capitalization). Pooled data includes both the treatment and control sample. The treatment sample includes stocks where an addition event 
occurs. An addition event is defined as one in which an individual stock is added to the list and is eligible for naked short-sales from the event 
day, denoted as day 0. The control sample includes stocks matched to the treatment sample based on market capitalization and trading value. We 
apply a bandwidth of 0.50 which restricts our analysis to stocks in our matched sample with a market capitalization between $50 and $150 
million. Using the lending fee, stocks are grouped into quartiles based on the level of short-sale constraint. Quartile one contains stocks that are 
least constrained (low fee) and quartile four contains stocks most heavily constrained (high fee). Only the Low fee (low constraint) and high fee 
(high constraint) quartiles are reported. Standard errors are adjusted using a variance/covariance matrix that is robust to clustering with respect to 
event date (Petersen, 2009). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively with t-statistics presented in 
parentheses.  
                                                         Dependent Variable: Yi 
   Volatility Measures  Liquidity Measures 
Treatment 
effect (τ ) 
 
Classic G-K Daily        H-L Sum Return
2
 
15-Min         
H-L 
 Trade 
Volatility Turnover 
Turnover  
Value 
Relative 
Bid-ask  
spreads 
Order 
Depth 
Effective  
spread 
Low fee  0.3132 0.2131* 0.2532** 0.2451 0.3032  0.1164 0.4145* 0.3121** 0.1423* 0.1256 0.1559* 
  (1.49) (1.78) (1.95) (1.59) (1.38)  (1.55) (1.75) (2.01) (1.69) (1.39) (1.71) 
High fee  0.6431*** 0.4551*** 0.4497*** 0.4955*** 0.5486**  0.2164*** 0.7422*** 0.5162*** 0.2316*** 0.1911** 0.2644*** 
  (4.11) (6.82) (4.99) (3.81) (1.98)  (2.55) (5.19) (4.36) (4.59) (1.99) (4.71) 
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4.5 Summary 
 
The existing literature on the impact of short-selling examines changes in the rules 
governing either covered short-sales, or changes to short-sale constraints that affect 
both naked and covered short-sales. This chapter examines the impact of allowing 
naked short-selling on the securities lending and equity market in a unique market 
setting where naked short-sales are restricted to certain securities on an approved list. 
Consistent with Miller (1977), stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion and 
highest short-sale constraint are the only stocks to exhibit significant and negative 
abnormal returns in the post event period. These stocks experience a -3.4148% 
abnormal return on the event date, significant at the 1% level. 
 
The impact of allowing naked short-selling on volatility and liquidity is examined 
using both a matching and regression discontinuity design. The results, consistent 
across both methods, reveal a small increase in the daily and intraday volatility of 
individual stock returns. Further, allowing naked short-selling leads to a small 
reduction in liquidity via increased transaction costs (wider bid-ask spreads and 
effective spreads). Further testing reveals that the impact of naked short-selling on 
market quality variables is greater, both in magnitude and significance, in stocks with 
higher short-sale constraints (higher lending fees). Stocks with relatively low short-
sale constraints experience smaller or no significant change from the introduction of 
naked short-sales.  
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The increase in the bid-ask spread is attributed to an increase in the adverse selection 
component. This is consistent with the notion that short-sellers are likely to be 
informed traders. Analysis of the securities lending market reveals that the demand for 
securities lending is reduced following the introduction of naked short-selling. While 
the evidence is not conclusive, naked short-selling appears to occur once stocks are 
added to the designated list of eligible stocks. 
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5 Chapter 5: An empirical analysis of the relationship 
between credit default swap spreads and short-selling 
activity 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The literature examined in Section 2.4.4 uses a range of theoretical determinants of 
default risk to model CDS spreads. Benkert (2004), Greatrex (2009) and Ericsson, 
Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) document that individual firm CDS prices are related to 
risk-free interest rates, share prices, equity volatility, bond ratings and firm leverage. 
These studies suggest that theoretical determinants of default risk explain a significant 
amount of variation in CDS prices. Other studies incorporate new determinants to 
better explain the variation in CDS spreads. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) use 
theoretical determinants along with volatility and jump risk of individual firms from 
high-frequency equity prices to explain variation in CDS spreads. Cao, Yu and Zhong 
(2010) find that individual firms’ put option-implied volatility is superior to historical 
volatility in explaining variation in CDS spreads. Tang and Yan (2007) find that 
measures of CDS liquidity are significant in explaining variation in CDS spreads. 
 
This chapter extends this work by proposing a new measure of the likelihood of firm 
default - short-selling. By examining the relationship between CDS spreads and short-
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selling, this chapter adds to the existing literature which examines the determinants of 
CDS spreads and also adds to the existing literature on the information content of 
short-selling.  The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 uses 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to develop the main hypothesis tested in this 
chapter. Section 5.3 describes the data and determinants of CDS spreads. Section 5.4 
describes the model specification and results of the empirical analysis. Section 5.5 
provides a summary of the main results and concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
 
This section uses the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to develop the main hypothesis 
tested in this chapter. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that, since short-sellers 
do not have the use of sale proceeds, market participants never short-sell for liquidity 
reasons, which ceteris paribus implies relatively few uninformed short-sellers. 
Empirical studies confirm that heavily shorted stocks underperform, implying short-
sellers are informed (see inter alia Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran, 
2002, Jones and Lamont, 2002, Boehme, Danielson and Sorescu, 2006, Boehmer, 
Jones and Zhang, 2008, and Diether Lee and Werner, 2009a). Therefore short-sellers 
are informed traders who take positions by selling a company’s stock in the 
expectation that prices will fall in the near future following the revelation of bad news 
specific to that firm. As such, the level of short-selling is a direct measure of the 
prospects for a company. High (low) short-selling indicates a more (less) pessimistic 
view of a company and an increased (decreased) likelihood of default. Therefore, 
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CDS spreads should exhibit a positive and significant relationship to the level of 
short-selling. Thus, the main hypothesis tested in this chapter is: 
 
Hypothesis5,1: CDS spreads are positively related to the level of short-selling 
 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 CDS 
 
As CDSs for individual firms are traded over-the-counter, there is no central 
clearinghouse from which market activity is observed. Thus, early research typically 
uses limited samples of data, normally sourced from a sole market-maker. For 
example, Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko and Huang (2002) use CDS data from ‘a 
major London interdealer broker’, Benkert (2004) uses data from German bank 
WestLB and Hull, Predescu and White (2004) use data from derivatives broker, GFI. 
The use of data that captures only a subset of the market poses a problem as there is 
always a certain element of uncertainty as to how representative the research findings 
are. The availability of reliable data has improved with the emergence of Markit, a 
commercial data vendor that specialises in the CDS market. Markit currently collects 
price data from 40 of the major CDS price makers to create a comprehensive dataset 
that covers more than 3,000 corporate bond issuers. While this data is typically used 
by corporate clients to mark-to-market open CDS positions as well as to identify 
profitable capital structure arbitrage opportunities, a select number of researchers have 
been granted access to Markit data for the purposes of academic research (see inter 
alia Tang and Yan, 2007, Greatrex, 2009, Cao, Yu and Zhong, 2010, and Zhang, 
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Zhou and Zhu, 2009). 
 
In this chapter, information on CDSs is sourced from Markit. This proprietary 
database contains information on the CDS composite spread, the seniority of the 
underlying debt obligation, the currency and maturity of the contract and the average 
recovery rates used by data contributors in pricing each CDS contract. Following 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009), only US dollar-denominated five-year CDS contracts 
with modified restructuring (MR) clauses written on senior unsecured debt of US 
obligors are examined. While the contract maturity can range from six months to 30 
years, the five-year maturity is the most commonly traded and is typically the focus of 
academic studies on CDS pricing (see inter alia Cao, Yu and Zhong, 2010). Rather 
than consider all CDSs, the subordinated class of contracts is eliminated as they 
represent only a small component of the database, with the majority of contracts 
written over senior unsecured obligations. Obligors in the financial, utility, and 
government sectors are also removed because of the difficulty in interpreting their 
capital structure variables. After examining the CDS spread data for outliers, 
observations are removed where large differences (above 20%) exist between the 
CDS spreads with MR clauses and those with full restricting clauses. Further, any 
observations with a CDS spread greater than 20% are removed. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu 
(2009) note that these observations are often associated with the absence of trading or 
a bilateral arrangement for upfront payment.     
 
For each entity, the weekly CDS spread is sampled and the weekly recovery rates 
linked to end-of-week CDS spreads. After matching the CDS data with other 
information, such as short-selling, equity prices and balance sheet information (all 
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discussed later), the final sample includes 330 firms. The sample period start date of 1 
July, 2006 coincides with the beginning of the stock lending database. The sample 
period end date is set at 1 September, 2008, which is the beginning of the period of 
short-selling restrictions in the US. While the Markit database has CDS spreads data 
on a daily basis, weekly data is examined to avoid the use of stale CDS spreads and to 
minimise the effects of noise in the data. This still leaves sufficient observations to 
analyse data at the firm level (approximately 110 observations per firm in total). 
 
5.3.2 Short-selling  
 
As discussed in Section 5.2, short-sellers are informed traders who take positions by 
selling a company’s stock in the expectation that prices will fall in the near future 
following the revelation of bad news specific to that firm. As such, the level of short-
selling is a direct measure of the prospects for a company. High (low) short-selling 
indicates a more (less) pessimistic view of a company and an increased (decreased) 
likelihood of default. Therefore, CDS spreads should exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship to the level of short-selling.  
 
Securities lending data is commonly used as a proxy for the level of short-sales (see 
D’Avolio, 2002),48 and evidence suggests that it is closely correlated with actual 
                                                 
48
  The use of securities lending market data is a new innovation in the literature, with only a few 
papers with access to this type of data, including D’Avolio (2002) and Diether, Lee and Werner 
(2008). 
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short-sales data.49 Further, lending data allows for a more detailed examination of 
short-selling since it not only provides information on the demand for short-selling 
but also the supply. To this end, stock lending data is used as a proxy for short-selling. 
This data is sourced from the Data Explorers proprietary database, which captures 
information on the global securities lending market. The data contain information 
from a significant number of the largest custodians in the industry, and Data Explorers 
report that they capture approximately 80% of the market for stock lending.  
 
The database provides daily security-level information on the supply-side (quantity of 
shares available for lending) and demand-side (volume information for loan 
transactions) of the lending market. Three measures related to short-selling that 
capture the demand and supply for short-selling are examined. The first measure, 
institutional ownership, captures the supply-side of the lending market and is 
measured as the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding. The second measure, short interest, captures the 
demand-side of the lending market and is measured as the total number of shares lent, 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. The third measure, utilisation, 
incorporates the demand- and supply-side of the lending market and is measured as 
the amount of stock that is lent out for short-selling as a percentage of the total 
amount available for stock lending. 
  
                                                 
49
  Data Explorers data includes lending for short-selling as well as borrowing for dividend arbitrage 
(typically to extract tax benefits through deals with foreign parties) and for settlement reasons 
(where a fund is unable to buy or sell a stock immediately, it must borrow the security). The 
majority of lending is for the purpose of short-selling, however, and Data Explorers reports that the 
correlation between the publicly reported level of short-interest in the US market and the Data 
Explorers estimate is almost 0.90. Berkman and McKenzie (2010) validate this finding. 
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5.3.3 Explanatory variables 
 
To examine the effect of short-selling on CDS spreads, several explanatory variables 
are included to control for the fundamental determinants of credit risk. Following the 
previous literature, standard structural factors are incorporated, including firm-
specific balance sheet information and macroeconomic variables, along with 
individual equity, rating and CDS contract information. These variables’ hypothesised 
relationship and empirical specifications are outlined below. 
 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) specify the following firm-specific variables: leverage 
ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio: 
 
Current debt + Long-term debtLeverage ratio ,
Total equity + Current debt + Long-term debt
=
         (5.1) 
Pretax incomeRe turn on equity ,
Total equity
=
                                                      (5.2) 
Dividend payout per shareDividend payout ratio ,
Equity price
=
                             (5.3) 
 
The total equity and equity price are obtained from Datastream, with total equity 
measured using the number of shares outstanding and weekly share prices. Since other 
measures (i.e., Current Debt), obtained from Compustat, are only available at a 
quarterly level, the last available quarterly observation is collected and linear 
interpolation is used to obtain weekly estimates as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and 
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Martin (2001). The use of weekly equity prices in the denominator of each measure 
also ensures variation on a weekly basis.  
 
A firm’s leverage ratio, which is central to all the structural form models, is expected 
to have a positive relationship with CDS spreads. The more levered the firm, the 
higher the probability of default. A firm’s return on equity is expected to have a 
negative relationship with CDS spreads, as the probability of default is lower when 
the firm’s profitability improves. A firm’s dividend payout ratio is expected to have a 
positive relationship with CDS spreads, as a higher dividend payout ratio indicates a 
decrease in asset value; therefore, default is more likely to occur. Recovery rate is also 
included as an explanatory variable due to its effect on the present value of protection 
payments. For example, higher recovery rates reduce the present value of protection 
payments in the CDS contract. 
 
Four macro-financial variables are also used: (1) the S&P 500 index average daily 
return (past six months), (2) the S&P 500 implied volatility index (VIX) from the 
option market, (3) the spot rate (average three-month Treasury rate), and (4) the slope 
of the yield curve (the 10-year rate minus the three-month rate). The S&P 500 index 
proxies for the overall state of the economy and improving market conditions should 
improve individual CDS spreads. Given individual firm value is a function of its 
business risk, which is, in turn, dependent on overall market conditions, a positive 
relationship is expected between the index level and individual spread levels.  
 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) note that the static effect of a higher spot rate is to 
increase the risk-neutral drift of the firm value process. Given a higher drift reduces 
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the probability of default, an increase in the spot rate (three-month Treasury rate) is 
expected to reduce credit spreads. Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001) note that 
although the spot rate is the only interest-rate-sensitive factor that appears in the firm 
value process, the spot rate process itself may depend upon the slope of the Treasury 
curve. If an increase in the slope of the Treasury curve increases the expected future 
short-term rate, then by the same argument as above, it should also lead to a decrease 
in credit spreads. Further, a steeper slope of the term structure is an indicator of 
improving economic activity in the future; it can also forecast an economic 
environment with a rising inflation rate and a tightening of monetary policy. Thus, 
CDS spreads should be inversely related to the slope of the yield curve (the 10-year 
rate minus the three-month rate). 
 
In Merton’s (1974) structural framework, equity is a call option on the underlying 
firm, while debt is similar to a put option. An increase in volatility should decrease the 
value of risky debt and increase CDS spreads. Intuitively, higher equity volatility 
often implies higher asset volatility; therefore, the firm value is more likely to hit 
below the default boundary. Using data from DataStream, historical volatility is 
estimated as the 250-day rolling variance of individual stock returns. The S&P 500 
implied volatility (VIX) from the option market is also examined, as it captures the 
markets expectation of volatility.  
 
Credit rating is shown to have explanatory power for credit spreads, even after 
controlling for the economic determinants of spreads (Fabozzi, Cheng and Chen, 
2007). Credit rating is an opinion of the general creditworthiness of an obligor and its 
ability in the future to make timely payments on a specific fixed income security. 
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Therefore, the rating should directly reflect the probability of default and is expected 
to have a significant impact on CDS spreads. Ratings are reported using Standard and 
Poor’s notation and reflect the average of the respective Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s ratings, or whichever rating was available if the company was not rated by 
both organisations. An inverse relationship between the quality of the respective 
borrower and the CDS spreads is expected. Dummy variables are included for all 
rating classes below AAA that are represented in the sample. The effect of the 
respective rating class is measured relative to a rating of AAA. There are no CDSs in 
the sample for firms rated worse than B. 
  
5.4 Model specification and empirical results 
 
The benchmark model is a pooled ordinary least-squares regression that estimates the 
average relationship between the dependent and independent variables across the 
entire database as: 
 
 CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi,,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 + βr Ratingi,,t-1 + βm Macroi,,t-1               
  
                 + βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t                                                                               (5.4) 
 
where CDSi,t is the spread for stock i at time t, the explanatory variables are the 
vectors detailed in the previous section and εi,t is the error term. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu 
(2009) note that most of the explanatory variables are jointly determined with CDS 
spreads which may artificially inflate the explanatory power of the model. To avoid 
this simultaneity problem, lagged explanatory variables are included in the model. 
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Standard errors are adjusted using a variance/covariance matrix that is robust to 
clustering with respect to both time and firm (Thompson, 2009). This approach is 
adopted to adjust for potential bias in OLS standard errors. 
 
5.4.1 Summary statistics 
 
Table 5-1 reports summary statistics for CDS spreads and the explanatory variables 
discussed in the previous section. The statistics are reported for the whole sample and 
divided into rating categories based on credit ratings. The CDS entities are 
concentrated in the BBB (47%), AAA to A (35%) and BBB and below (18%) 
categories. Consistent with previous findings, CDS spreads exhibit significant cross-
sectional variation across the ratings categories. The highest-grade entities (AAA to 
A) have an average spread of 32.65 basis points (bps) compared to the lowest grade 
(BB and below) of 233.63 bps. Figure 5-1 shows that CDS spreads demonstrate 
significant time variation across the sample period (July 2006 to September 2008). 
There is an increase in CDS spreads that coincides with the onset of the GFC in June 
2007, with CDS spreads more than doubling in the remainder of the sample period.   
 
Short-interest, institutional ownership and utilisation, the measures relating to short-
selling and main explanatory variables of interest, also demonstrate cross-sectional 
variation. Across the ratings, entities with the highest ratings (AAA to A) have an 
average short-interest of 1.89% compared to the lowest ratings (BB and below) which 
have an average short-interest of 8.06%. Similarly, entities with the highest ratings 
(AAA to A) have an average utilisation of 6.90% compared to the lowest ratings (BB 
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and below) which have an average utilisation of 25.81%. Other explanatory variables 
behave as predicted by the literature. Leverage and volatility measures are lower for 
high-rating firms compared to low-rating firms, while return on equity and payout 
ratios are higher for high-rating firms compared to low-rating firms. 
 
Figure 5-1 Five-year CDS spreads (basis points) by rating groups 
The figure plots the weekly time series of average five-year CDS spreads for 330 
entities with senior unsecured obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 
July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. 
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Table 5-1 Summary statistics 
The table reports the summary statistics of all regression variables for the whole 
sample and three subgroups divided by credit ratings. The sample covers 330 entities 
over the period 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics of all firm-specific regression variables. These variables include five-year 
CDS spreads (CDS); recovery rates (Recovery) reported by Markit for senior 
unsecured obligations with modified restructuring clauses; firm-level equity return 
volatility (Historical volatility); firms’ balance sheet information, including the 
leverage ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; and measures relating to 
short-selling, including the amount of stock that is lent out for short-selling as a 
percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total 
number of shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided by 
the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest).  Panel B reports the summary 
statistics of the macro-financial variables: market return (S&P 500 return) and 
volatility (VIX); short-term rate (three-month Treasury rate); and slope (10-year 
Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate). 
Panel A: Firm-specific variables 
Credit rating category  AAA to A  BBB  BB and below  Whole sample 
Variable Mean Std dev  Mean Std dev  Mean Std dev  Mean Std dev 
CDS (bps) 32.65 28.04  65.21 61.51  233.63 192.98  77.21 107.97 
Recovery (%) 39.81 0.70  39.68 0.98  40.46 3.97  39.84 1.72 
Historical volatility (%) 1.47 0.49  1.69 0.57  2.30 0.85  1.70 0.65 
Leverage (%) 16.55 11.99  22.54 13.70  35.76 20.75  22.24 15.60 
Return on equity (%) 2.28 2.86  1.60 7.32  -1.62 16.16  1.39 8.25 
Dividend payout ratio 
(%) 0.51 0.40  0.53 1.39  0.50 3.56  0.52 1.68 
Short-interest (%) 1.89 2.46  3.13 3.99  8.06 7.41  3.38 4.67 
Institutional ownership 
(%) 20.37 5.50  22.15 8.37  23.96 9.46  21.76 7.74 
Utilisation (%) 6.90 9.83  12.93 17.44  25.81 22.09  12.57 17.08 
 
Panel B: Macro-financial variables 
 Mean Std dev 
S&P 500 return (%) 5.00 11.00 
VIX (%) 18.21 5.80 
3-Month Treasury rate (%) 3.73 1.41 
Slope 10Y – 3M (%) 0.66 1.02 
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5.4.2 Univariate regression analysis 
 
Prior to estimating multivariate regressions, the relationship between each individual 
explanatory variable and CDS spreads is estimated using OLS univariate regressions. 
The results are presented in Table 5-2 and are broadly consistent with previous 
literature. Specifically, the coefficients on the volatility measures (Historical and 
VIX) are positive and significant at the 1% level. Leverage and term spread exhibit a 
positive and significant relationship with CDS spreads, which is consistent with 
structural form models. Return on equity, spot rate and market return exhibit a 
negative and significant relationship with CDS spreads which is consistent with 
previous findings.  
 
The key coefficients of interest, short-interest, institutional ownership and utilisation, 
are positive and significant when regressed against CDS spreads. This suggests that 
CDS spreads are positively related to the amount of short-selling as measured by 
short-interest. The positive coefficient on institutional ownership suggests that an 
increase in the amount of stock available for short-selling is associated with an 
increase in CDS spreads. Therefore the positive coefficient on short-interest may arise 
due to an increase in the amount of stock available for short-selling. However, the 
positive coefficient on utilisation suggests that increases in CDS spreads are 
associated with higher levels of short-selling rather than higher levels of institutional 
ownership. Table 5-2 shows that the variables which explain the greatest variation in 
CDS spreads are those predicted by the structural form models along with short-
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interest. In particular, short-interest, leverage and historical volatility regressions have 
the highest R2 of 28%, 27% and 32%, respectively. 
 
5.4.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
While the univariate analysis in Table 5-2 documents that CDS spreads are positively 
related to short-selling, these regressions do not control for the theoretical 
determinants of CDS spreads. In Table 5-3, the results of the multivariate OLS 
regressions are reported. The regressions are first conducted using only rating dummy 
variables; firm-specific (excluding short-selling related measures) and macro-financial 
variables are then added before short-selling related measures are added separately in 
the final three regressions. Regression 1 shows that credit rating is an important 
determinant of CDS spreads. Consistent with previous studies (i.e., Zhang, Zhou and 
Zhu, 2009), firms with low credit ratings exhibit higher CDS spreads compared to 
high-rating firms. The R2 (39%) shows that credit ratings alone can explain a large 
amount of variation in CDS spreads. 
 
In Regression 2, all the explanatory variables (excluding short-selling related 
measures) are added to the rating dummy variables. The directions are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions and extant empirical evidence. Regression 2, in Table 5-3, 
documents that the coefficient on the spot rate (average three-month Treasury rate) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with previous evidence 
from corporate bond yield spreads (see inter alia Duffie, 1999) and CDS spreads (see 
inter alia Cao, Yu and Zhong, 2010). The coefficient on the slope of the yield curve 
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(the 10-year rate minus the three-month rate) is positive but insignificant. This differs 
from the univariate regressions in Table 5-2, where the coefficient is positive and 
highly significant. This suggests that when examined in a multivariate framework, 
controlling for other factors, its explanatory power diminishes and the explanatory 
power of the slope is subsumed by other explanatory variables. 
 
Consistent with the univariate results, the coefficients on the volatility measures 
(Historical and VIX) are positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on 
the market index (S&P 500 index average daily return) also remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level. For the other firm-specific variables: the coefficient of the 
leverage ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level; while the coefficient of the 
return on equity ratio is negative and significant at the 1% level; and the coefficient on 
the payout ratio is not significant. These regression coefficients, while not the focus of 
this chapter, are consistent with previous findings. Further, adding these variables 
increases the explanatory power of the regression (R2 increases to 61%), suggesting 
that these variables provide explanatory power over and above the rating information.  
 
The third regression in Table 5-3 incorporates all the variables in regression two and 
includes the first measure of short-selling (short-interest). The result is consistent with 
the univariate regression in Table 5-2. After controlling for the determinants of CDS 
spreads, the magnitude of the coefficient has fallen from 12.33 to 3.68. However, the 
coefficient remains positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting a positive 
relationship between CDS spreads and short interest. In terms of economic 
significance, this implies that a 1% increase in the short-interest ratio will lead to a 
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3.68% increase in CDS spreads (given CDS spreads are measured in bps, this is equal 
to 3.68 bps). 
 
The fourth regression in Table 5-3 replaces short-interest with a measure of the 
amount of stock available for lending, institutional ownership. After controlling for 
the determinants of CDS spreads, the institutional ownership coefficient is no longer 
significant (t-stat of 0.2). This result is inconsistent with the univariate regression in 
Table 5-2 and suggests that the explanatory power of institutional ownership is 
subsumed by other explanatory variables. The fifth regression in Table 5-3 replaces 
institutional ownership with utilisation. The result is consistent with the univariate 
regression in Table 5-2. After controlling for the determinants of CDS spreads, the 
magnitude of the coefficient has fallen from 2.52 to 0.57. However, the coefficient 
remains positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting a positive relationship 
between CDS spreads and utilisation.  
 
Given the coefficient on short-interest is positive and significant, while the coefficient 
on institutional ownership is insignificant, this suggests that the positive relationship 
between CDS spreads and utilisation is driven by an increase in short-interest. Overall 
the results in Table 5-3 suggest that CDS spreads are positively related to the level of 
short-selling (as measured by short-interest and utilisation), after controlling for the 
amount of stock available for short-selling (institutional ownership). This is consistent 
with main hypothesis (H5,1) of this chapter. 
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Table 5-2 Determinants of CDS spreads: Univariate regressions 
The univariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is 
CDSi,t = α + βe ExplantoryVariablei,,t-1+ εi,t. 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity 
return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-
financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) and slope (10-year 
Treasury rate minus three-Month Treasury rate); and measures relating to short-selling including the amount of stock that is lent out for short-
selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (Short Interest). Reported t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and firm effects (see Thompson, 
2009). 
 Dependant variable: Five-year CDS spread (bps) 
Explanatory variables Recovery Historical 
volatility 
Return on 
equity 
Dividend 
payout ratio  Leverage 
Spot 
rate Slope VIX 
Market 
return 
Short-
interest  
Institutional 
ownership Utilisation 
Intercept -347.13 -84.20 81.77 77.57 -2.19 172.39 55.17 -2.67 81.12 35.45 23.38 45.73 
t-stat -2.83 -6.04 18.59 16.67 -0.26 14.44 16.67 -0.67 16.59 8.78 1.43 10.60 
Coefficient 10.66 95.51 -3.14 -0.44 3.58 -25.31 34.17 4.40 -81.89 12.33 2.47 2.52 
t-stat 3.47 9.94 -4.14 -0.34 7.55 -11.81 11.76 11.73 -7.59 8.79 3.26 5.82 
Adjusted R2  0.03 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.27 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.28 0.03 0.16 
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Table 5-3 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate regressions 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi,,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 + βr Ratingi,,t-1 + βm Macroi,,t-1 +βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: credit rating dummy variables; recovery rates 
reported by Markit; firm-level equity return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, 
and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month 
Treasury rate) and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and measures relating to short-selling including the amount of 
stock that is lent out for short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total number of shares held 
by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided 
by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). Reported t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and 
firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 18.03 2.82  -35.13 -0.39  -17.71 -0.20  -36.54 -0.40  -26.84 -0.30 
AA 1.24 0.19  4.39 0.35  2.92 0.27  4.26 0.34  3.21 0.28 
A 17.25 2.63  -13.25 -1.00  -14.83 -1.31  -13.70 -1.04  -14.87 -1.23 
BBB 47.16 6.70  -1.88 -0.13  -5.01 -0.41  -2.44 -0.17  -5.37 -0.41 
BB 193.51 10.34  85.92 4.80  73.57 4.36  85.24 4.76  79.09 4.63 
B 320.48 6.58  194.49 4.49  174.71 4.26  193.79 4.58  185.29 4.39 
Recovery     -0.53 -0.23  -0.48 -0.21  -0.54 -0.23  -0.59 -0.25 
Spot Rate    -5.08 -1.85  -6.94 -2.93  -4.97 -1.75  -5.76 -2.21 
Slope    3.21 1.20  1.47 0.62  3.27 1.19  2.82 1.09 
VIX    0.71 4.54  0.49 2.94  0.69 3.82  0.68 4.34 
Historical volatility    52.48 6.33  45.27 5.50  52.31 6.07  50.44 6.12 
Market return    -24.52 -3.43  -22.36 -3.52  -24.75 -3.38  -24.29 -3.48 
Leverage     1.90 5.73  1.70 5.43  1.90 5.75  1.75 5.39 
Return on equity    -1.17 -2.49  -0.92 -1.84  -1.18 -2.49  -1.07 -2.19 
Dividend payout ratio    -0.49 -0.56  -0.57 -0.69  -0.47 -0.53  -0.64 -0.79 
Short-interest        3.68 3.21       
Institutional ownership           0.09 0.20    
Utilisation             0.57 2.59 
Adjusted R2              0.39           0.61           0.64           0.62            0.63 
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5.4.4 Changes in CDS spreads 
 
The results so far examine CDS spread levels, rather than changes in CDS spreads. 
Previous studies (see inter alia Greatrex, 2009; Zhang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009; and 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo, 2009) examine both levels and changes in CDS spreads. 
Greatrex (2009) finds that spread levels tend to be non-stationary, while spread 
changes are stationary. Thus any findings using levels (as opposed to changes) are 
potentially subject to spurious regression inferences. Therefore the following 
regression is also estimated: 
 
∆CDSi,t = α + βs ∆Short-sellingi,,t + βv∆Volatilityi,,t + βm∆Macroi,,t+ βf ∆Firmi,,t + εi,t 
(5.5) 
 
This regression examines the relation of weekly changes in CDS spreads with 
contemporaneous changes in explanatory variables. The regression includes all 
explanatory variables except rating information and recovery rates as these variables 
rarely display any variation. Overall, the results in Table 5-4 show the explanatory 
power of the model is much lower when examining spread changes compared to 
spread levels. This is consistent with previous studies on both credit spread changes 
(see inter alia Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001) and CDS spread changes 
(see inter alia Zhang, Zhou and Zhu, 2009; and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo, 2009).  
 
Importantly, the short-interest coefficient remains positive and statistically significant 
when regressed against CDS spread changes in both the univariate and multivariate 
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regressions. The institutional ownership coefficient remains positive and significant 
when regressed against CDS spread changes in the univariate regressions and 
insignificant in the multivariate regressions. The utilisation coefficient also remains 
consistent with the level regressions in Table 5-3. Overall, the results in Table 5-4 
remain consistent with the main hypothesis (H5,1) and suggest that short-selling is not 
only positively related to CDS spread levels, but also changes in CDS spreads. 
 
5.4.5 Additional tests 
 
The results in the previous sections suggest a positive relationship between short-
selling and CDS spreads. In this section, the robustness of these results is probed by 
examining various regression specifications and techniques. First in Table 5-5, 
following previous studies (i.e., Benkert, 2004), fixed effects are included for time 
and firm. Second in Table 5-6, following Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009), regressions 
are conducted excluding ratings dummies and dividing the sample into the three rating 
groups used in Table 5-1: AAA to A; BBB; and BBB and below. Third in Table 5-7 
and Table 5-8, following Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Ericsson, 
Jacobs and Oviedo (2009), average regression coefficients are calculated using a 
series of time-series regressions, one for each entity. These regressions, similar to 
including firm fixed effects, control for variation among firms. Fourth in Table 5-9, 
following Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009), CDS spread levels are regressed 
against contemporaneous explanatory variables. Fifth, it is possible that the results are 
being driven by a particular industry sector; therefore in Table 5-10 regressions are 
conducted by industry sectors. Finally, it is possible that the results are being driven 
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by a particular part of the sample period. Figure 5-1 shows that CDS spreads increase 
from July 2007, which coincides with the collapse of the Bears Stearns subprime 
mortgage hedge funds. Therefore, in Table 5-11 regressions are conducted by dividing 
the sample period into pre- and post-July 2007. 
 
The most notable changes between techniques include: incorporating fixed effects 
leads to increased explanatory power (R2 increases to 84%); conducting regressions 
by industry sector leads to significant and positive coefficients on short-interest and 
utilisation in five of seven sectors (consumer goods, healthcare, industrials, oil and 
gas, and technology) and insignificant coefficients in the remaining two sectors (basic 
materials and telecommunications); and using contemporaneous explanatory variables 
increases the magnitude and significance of the relationship between short-selling and 
CDS spreads. Overall, the coefficient direction and significance of the explanatory 
variables, in particular short-interest and utilisation, remain qualitatively unchanged. 
This demonstrates the results are robust to different specifications and regression 
techniques. 
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Table 5-4 Determinants of CDS spread changes 
The regressions examine the determinants of weekly changes in five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured obligations with a 
modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is   
∆CDSi,t = α + βs ∆Short-sellingi,,t + βv∆Volatilityi,,t + βm∆Macroi,,t+ βf ∆Firmi,,t + εi,t 
Explanatory variables include contemporaneous weekly changes in firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: measures relating to 
short-selling including the amount of stock that is lent out for short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending 
(Utilisation), the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) 
and the total number of shares lent, divided by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest); firm-level equity return historical volatility; 
firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; and macro-financial variables 
including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus 
three-month Treasury rate). ∆ represents the first difference in variables. Reported t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust 
for both time and firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.01 29.06  0.01 28.86  0.01 29.00  0.02 31.17  0.02 31.42  0.02 31.13  0.02 31.30 
∆ Short-interest  0.01 1.98           0.01 1.96       
∆ Institutional ownership    0.02 2.36           0.01 0.36    
∆ Utilisation       0.01 1.92           0.01 1.81 
∆ Spot Rate          -0.01 -0.84  -0.01 -0.66  -0.01 -0.63  -0.01 -0.64 
∆ Slope          0.01 11.02  0.01 11.01  0.01 10.98  0.01 11.01 
∆ VIX          0.12 17.32  0.12 17.29  0.12 17.23  0.12 17.32 
∆  Historical volatility          0.05 1.52  0.04 1.44  0.04 1.45  0.04 1.44 
Market return          -0.16 -24.79  -0.16 -24.88  -0.16 -24.91  -0.16 -24.90 
∆ Leverage           0.08 3.51  0.08 3.50  0.08 3.49  0.08 3.49 
∆ Return on equity          -0.01 -1.68  -0.01 -1.67  -0.01 -1.68  -0.01 -1.68 
∆ Dividend payout ratio           0.15 5.59  0.15 5.59  0.15 5.58  0.15 5.59 
Adjusted R2   0.01    0.01        0.01    0.09    0.10     0.10    0.10 
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Table 5-5 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate regressions using firm fixed effects 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi,,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 + βr Ratingi,,t-1 + βm Macroi,,t-1 +βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: credit rating dummy variables; recovery rates 
reported by Markit; firm-level equity return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, 
and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month 
Treasury rate) and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and measures relating to short-selling including the amount of 
stock that is lent out for short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total number of shares held 
by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided 
by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). Fixed effects for each firm are included. t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors 
that adjust for both time and firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -20.59 -0.79  23.50 1.01  38.36 1.67  12.14 0.52  26.90 1.16 
AA 26.91 2.03  -17.33 -1.73  -14.10 -1.43  -17.04 -1.70  0.47 13.64 
A 13.16 0.58  -0.11 -0.01  -2.74 -0.16  -0.05 0.00  -3.71 -13.33 
BBB 68.70 2.92  22.08 1.24  19.25 1.10  22.04 1.24  0.50 0.42 
BB 429.42 17.78  242.93 13.30  236.98 13.13  242.49 13.28  6.10 3.74 
B 626.60 25.02  398.83 21.03  387.00 20.66  397.70 20.98  0.73 8.87 
Recovery     -3.66 -13.11  -3.64 -13.20  -3.63 -13.00  57.77 53.58 
Spot Rate    0.86 0.71  -0.01 -0.01  1.69 1.39  -29.38 -7.57 
Slope    6.38 3.90  4.97 3.07  6.81 4.16  3.85 53.95 
VIX    0.75 9.07  0.59 7.25  0.70 8.33  0.19 4.62 
Historical volatility    58.28 53.90  55.47 51.70  58.58 54.13  -0.11 -0.60 
Market return    -29.80 -7.65  -28.37 -7.37  -31.11 -7.97  -16.33 -1.64 
Leverage     4.08 58.75  3.63 51.24  4.09 58.79  -1.61 -0.10 
Return on equity    0.19 4.52  0.25 6.10  0.20 4.82  23.25 1.31 
Dividend payout ratio     -0.08 -0.47  -0.25 -1.39  -0.08 -0.45  244.69 13.44 
Short-interest        3.23 26.44       
Institutional ownership           0.38 5.05    
Utilisation             399.48 21.14 
Adjusted R2     0.69        0.82         0.83       0.83         0.83 
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Table 5-6 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate regressions by rating 
groups 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year 
CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured obligations with a modified 
restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The regressions are 
conducted dividing the sample into the three rating groups: AAA to A; BBB; and 
BBB and below. The OLS regressions specification is 
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 +  βm Macroi,,t-1 +βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr 
Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables 
including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity return historical 
volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on 
equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the market 
return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) 
and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and measures 
relating to short-selling including the amount of stock that is lent out for short-selling 
as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total 
number of shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided by 
the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). t-statistics are based on clustered 
standard errors that adjust for both time and firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
Rating category  AAA to A 
 1  2  3  4 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 30.61 0.77  30.03 0.78  24.44 0.61  22.34 0.56 
Recovery  0.01 0.01  0.13 0.14  -0.07 -0.08  0.27 0.29 
Spot Rate -7.67 -6.51  -8.14 -7.05  -7.18 -5.80  -7.98 -6.67 
Slope 1.22 1.28  0.84 0.84  1.44 1.46  1.24 1.19 
VIX 0.14 2.52  0.07 1.39  0.06 0.87  0.13 2.18 
Historical 
volatility 15.70 4.63  12.85 4.86  15.08 4.42  13.43 4.93 
Market return -14.36 -4.81  -14.26 -4.84  -15.86 -5.30  -15.18 -5.15 
Leverage  0.49 4.38  0.44 4.45  0.49 4.42  0.42 4.27 
Return on 
equity -0.82 -0.75  -0.71 -0.75  -0.84 -0.78  -0.77 -0.77 
Dividend 
payout ratio  -2.18 -0.63  -2.96 -0.91  -1.43 -0.41  -2.72 -0.82 
Short-interest     2.28 2.94       
Institutional 
ownership        0.46 1.71    
Utilisation          0.53 2.48 
Adjusted R2             0.48                0.52                 0.49                0.51 
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Table 5-6 – Continued 
 
Rating category  BBB 
 1  2  3  4 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -196.65 -2.77  -182.84 -2.62  -199.88 -2.82  -191.35 -2.72 
Recovery  4.58 2.72  4.37 2.65  4.59 2.73  4.47 2.68 
Spot Rate -8.48 -3.49  -9.04 -3.72  -8.32 -3.44  -8.64 -3.57 
Slope -0.26 -0.13  -0.76 -0.38  -0.17 -0.09  -0.33 -0.16 
VIX 0.29 1.93  0.22 1.41  0.26 1.57  0.28 1.86 
Historical 
volatility 43.69 6.21  41.51 5.49  43.32 6.02  43.37 6.09 
Market return -8.48 -1.36  -8.45 -1.37  -8.85 -1.42  -8.28 -1.34 
Leverage  1.58 5.79  1.52 5.36  1.59 5.82  1.54 5.41 
Return on 
equity -1.21 -2.91  -1.17 -2.88  -1.21 -2.89  -1.20 -2.91 
Dividend 
payout ratio  0.84 1.10  0.87 1.14  0.94 1.27  0.76 0.98 
Short-interest     1.00 1.64       
Institutional 
ownership        0.13 0.53    
Utilisation          0.10 0.78 
Adjusted R2             0.45              0.47                0.46              0.46 
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Table 5-6 – Continued 
 
Rating category  BBB and below 
 1  2  3  4 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -52.60 -0.30  -27.07 -0.17  -35.88 -0.19  -47.68 -0.29 
Recovery  -0.27 -0.08  -0.12 -0.04  -0.23 -0.07  -0.25 -0.08 
Spot Rate -12.58 -0.81  -18.28 -1.34  -13.64 -0.85  -15.76 -1.09 
Slope 12.04 0.69  4.55 0.28  11.64 0.66  7.67 0.45 
VIX 3.06 3.67  2.45 2.76  3.13 3.74  3.00 3.56 
Historical 
volatility 62.99 2.45  51.71 2.06  63.03 2.44  56.25 2.20 
Market return -70.90 -1.77  -48.83 -1.35  -72.13 -1.81  -71.75 -1.81 
Leverage  3.81 4.07  3.29 3.57  3.83 4.02  3.39 3.80 
Return on 
equity -0.37 -0.49  0.12 0.16  -0.35 -0.47  0.04 0.05 
Dividend 
payout ratio  -1.34 -1.73  -1.47 -2.15  -1.28 -1.66  -1.15 -1.54 
Short-interest     6.21 2.96       
Institutional 
ownership        -0.68 -0.43    
Utilisation          1.59 2.36 
Adjusted R2            0.46              0.51                0.46              0.49 
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Table 5-7 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate regressions (average 
coefficients) 
The average regression coefficients are estimated using a series of time-series 
regressions, one for each entity. For each entity weekly data is used to explain the 
determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 
2008. The OLS regressions specification is  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi,t + βv Volatilityi,,t +  βm Macroi,,t +βf Firmi,,t + εi,t 
Explanatory variables include contemporaneous firm-specific and macro-financial 
variables including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity return 
historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, 
return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the 
market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury 
rate) and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and 
measures relating to short-selling including the amount of stock that is lent out for 
short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending 
(Utilisation), the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of 
shares lent, divided by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). t-statistics 
are calculated using the time-series regression coefficients as in Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001). 
 
 1  2  3 
 Avg. coefficient t-stat  Avg. coefficient t-stat  Avg. coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 64.58 0.87  79.96 0.97  78.64 1.07 
Spot Rate -20.87 -5.89  -19.90 -4.54  -24.56 -3.05 
Term spread -6.74 -2.38  -6.96 -1.96  -11.34 -1.45 
VIX 0.77 3.52  1.08 2.50  0.96 2.22 
Historical 
volatility 8.33 1.66  13.02 2.21  8.00 0.78 
Market return -9.92 -1.61  -8.81 -1.48  -10.06 -1.58 
Leverage  14.22 0.80  79.30 1.20  21.67 1.20 
Return on equity -4.75 -0.33  6.30 0.32  -4.58 -0.32 
Dividend payout 
ratio  1115.74 1.05  928.17 0.83  846.98 1.05 
Short-interest  4.08 1.27       
Institutional 
ownership     -0.16 -0.16    
Utilisation       -0.38 -0.62 
Adjusted R2                     0.82                     0.81                     0.81 
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Table 5-8 Determinants of CDS spreads: Univariate regressions using contemporaneous variables 
The univariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is  
CDSi,t = α + βe ExplantoryVariablei,,t+ εi,t. 
Explanatory variables include contemporaneous firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-
level equity return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; 
macro-financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) and slope 
(10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and measures relating to short-selling including the amount of stock that is lent out for 
short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total number of shares held by all beneficial owners 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares lent, divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (Short Interest). t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 Dependant variable: Five-year CDS spread (bps) 
Explanatory  
variables Recovery 
Historical 
volatility 
Return on 
equity 
Dividend 
payout ratio Leverage 
Spot 
rate Slope VIX 
Market 
return 
Short-
interest  
Institutional 
ownership Utilisation 
Intercept -334.31 -84.71 81.50 77.43 -2.32 172.10 54.36 -3.43 80.70 35.32 23.19 45.36 
t-stat -2.63 -6.11 18.57 16.72 -0.28 14.51 16.63 -0.86 16.61 8.92 1.44 10.74 
Coefficient 10.33 95.31 -3.09 -0.42 3.58 -25.42 34.36 4.43 -75.83 12.08 2.43 2.47 
t-stat 3.25 10.03 -4.07 -0.33 7.62 -11.89 11.83 11.83 -6.85 8.80 3.25 5.84 
Adjusted R2  0.03 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.28 0.03 0.16 
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Table 5-9 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate regressions using contemporaneous variables 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The OLS regressions specification is  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-sellingi i,,t + βv Volatilityi,,t + βr Ratingi,,t + βm Macroi,,t +βf Firmi,,t + βr Recoveryi,,t+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include contemporaneous firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: credit rating dummy variables; recovery 
rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on 
equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-
month Treasury rate) and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and measures relating to short-selling including the 
amount of stock that is lent out for short-selling as a percentage of the total amount available for stock lending (Utilisation), the total number of 
shares held by all beneficial owners divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Institutional ownership) and the total number of shares 
lent, divided by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and 
firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 17.93 2.84  -26.72 -0.28  -15.42 -0.18  -32.95 -0.37  -24.08 -0.28 
AA 1.22 0.19  4.30 0.34  2.98 0.28  4.30 0.35  3.26 0.29 
A 17.24 2.66  -13.56 -1.02  -14.45 -1.29  -13.24 -1.01  -14.50 -1.21 
BBB 47.28 6.78  -2.21 -0.16  -4.54 -0.38  -1.92 -0.14  -4.90 -0.38 
BB 192.49 10.42  84.37 4.71  73.30 4.39  84.62 4.78  78.53 4.64 
B 319.14 6.72  192.47 4.55  174.75 4.37  193.13 4.67  184.78 4.49 
Recovery     -0.68 -0.28  -0.43 -0.19  -0.49 -0.22  -0.53 -0.24 
Spot Rate    -6.53 -2.36  -8.72 -3.67  -6.88 -2.44  -7.60 -2.92 
Slope    0.67 0.25  -1.54 -0.69  0.16 0.06  -0.25 -0.10 
VIX    0.87 5.35  0.70 4.16  0.89 4.93  0.88 5.52 
Historical volatility    52.93 6.39  45.18 5.54  51.94 6.09  50.10 6.12 
Market return    -11.36 -1.49  -6.54 -1.01  -8.75 -1.18  -8.38 -1.19 
Leverage     1.89 5.74  1.67 5.49  1.86 5.79  1.71 5.45 
Return on equity    -1.13 -2.39  -0.86 -1.77  -1.10 -2.42  -1.00 -2.13 
Dividend payout ratio     -0.44 -0.49  -0.55 -0.68  -0.46 -0.53  -0.62 -0.78 
Short-interest        3.50 3.14       
Institutional ownership           0.06 0.14    
Utilisation             0.54 2.57 
Adjusted R2              0.39           0.61           0.64           0.62            0.63 
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Table 5-10 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate Short-interest 
regressions by industry Sector 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year 
CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured obligations with a modified 
restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The regressions are 
conducted dividing the sample by industry sector. The OLS regressions specification  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-interest,,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 +  βm Macroi,,t-1 +βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr 
Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables 
including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity return historical 
volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on 
equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-financial variables including the market 
return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) 
and slope (10-year Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and  the total 
number of shares lent, divided by the number of shares outstanding (Short Interest). t-
statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and firm 
effects (see Thompson 2009). 
 
 Basic materials  Consumer goods  Healthcare  Industrials 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -196.97 -3.92  -191.80 -1.23  287.62 2.10  -162.79 -1.59 
Recovery  5.16 8.22  1.56 0.41  -7.31 -2.21  0.26 0.11 
Spot Rate -5.09 -0.86  3.16 0.59  -10.67 -2.06  3.41 0.58 
Slope -1.61 -0.32  9.58 1.75  -8.23 -1.30  2.58 0.48 
VIX 0.18 0.61  0.68 1.83  0.50 1.04  0.71 1.80 
Historical volatility 27.51 2.12  62.23 4.94  14.65 1.68  93.52 3.25 
Market return -3.25 -0.28  -51.16 -3.26  -21.03 -1.61  14.48 1.28 
Leverage  1.43 2.32  2.57 2.76  4.31 5.88  1.53 4.14 
Return on equity -1.46 -1.14  -0.18 -0.27  4.39 1.29  -3.20 -3.22 
Dividend payout 
ratio  
0.31 0.02 
 
0.93 0.06 
 
-1.37 -4.05 
 
2.12 1.58 
Short-interest  -1.04 -0.74  6.41 4.10  2.09 1.92  3.57 1.66 
No. Obs.      29          111       26        74 
Adjusted R2      0.29          0.57       0.77        0.59 
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Table 5-10 – Continued 
 
 
Oil and gas  Technology  Telecom 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -309.37 -4.03  97.56 0.40  -806.95 -2.73 
Recovery  7.56 3.92  -2.61 -0.41  10.81 1.72 
Spot Rate -7.65 -3.10  -2.99 -0.40  18.96 1.60 
Slope 3.56 1.30  3.72 0.55  3.27 0.28 
VIX 0.41 1.67  0.63 1.47  1.60 2.20 
Historical volatility 29.29 2.79  35.45 2.91  116.69 6.37 
Market return -12.27 -1.54  -31.44 -1.10  -102.15 -3.44 
Leverage  1.40 4.35  2.23 2.77  5.79 2.61 
Return on equity -1.28 -0.82  -19.29 -3.99  0.12 0.93 
Dividend payout ratio  -1.19 -0.24  -15.18 -0.41  21.11 1.49 
Short-interest  2.06 1.74  4.76 2.07  -1.11 -0.53 
No. Obs.        51            20           19 
Adjusted R2        0.50            0.50            0.76 
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Table 5-11 Determinants of CDS spreads: Multivariate short-interest regressions by sample period 
The multivariate regressions use weekly data to explain the determinants of five-year CDS spreads for 330 entities with senior unsecured 
obligations with a modified restructuring clause from 1 July, 2006 to 1 September, 2008. The regressions are conducted dividing the sample into 
the periods pre and post July 2007. The OLS regressions specification  
CDSi,t = α + βsShort-interest,,t-1 + βv Volatilityi,,t-1 +  βm Macroi,,t-1 +βf Firmi,,t-1 + βr Recoveryi,,t-1+ εi,t 
Explanatory variables include lagged firm-specific and macro-financial variables including: recovery rates reported by Markit; firm-level equity 
return historical volatility; firms’ balance sheet information, including the leverage ratio, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio; macro-
financial variables including the market return (S&P 500 return) and volatility (VIX), short rate (three-month Treasury rate) and slope (10-year 
Treasury rate minus three-month Treasury rate); and  the total number of shares lent, divided by the number of shares outstanding (Short 
Interest). t-statistics are based on clustered standard errors that adjust for both time and firm effects (see Thompson 2009). 
Sample period 1 July, 2006 - 31 June, 2007  1 July, 2007 - 1 September 2008 
 Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -115.41 -2.81  11.30 0.1 
AA 1.89 0.39  7.61 0.52 
A 3.35 0.62  -19.41 -1.26 
BBB 19.50 3.28  -9.46 -0.58 
BB 75.92 7.19  89.03 3.78 
B 168.06 7.46  190.67 3.61 
Recovery  2.86 3.22  -1.70 -0.58 
Spot Rate -0.36 -0.08  -8.03 -2.72 
Slope 8.64 3.48  -3.64 -0.72 
VIX -0.37 -1.86  0.69 5.84 
Historical volatility 17.37 3.67  50.53 4.37 
Market return -54.95 -2.7  -17.06 -2.62 
Leverage  0.56 3.41  2.33 5.27 
Return on equity -1.52 -1.05  -0.62 -1.19 
Dividend payout ratio  0.08 0.38  -0.37 -0.25 
Short-interest  1.51 2.41  3.88 2.81 
Adjusted R2              0.66           0.64 
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5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the determinants of firm-level CDS spreads are examined, using a new 
measure of the likelihood of firm default - short-selling. By examining the 
relationship between CDS spreads and short-selling, this chapter adds to the existing 
literature which examines the determinants of CDS spreads and also adds to the 
existing literature on the information content of short-selling. This chapter firstly 
estimates the relationship between CDS spreads and the theoretical determinants of 
CDS spreads using OLS univariate regressions. The univariate results reveal that the 
variables which explain the greatest variation in CDS spreads are those predicted by 
the structural form models. The key coefficients of interest, short-interest and 
utilisation (measures of short-selling) are positive and significant when regressed 
against CDS spreads. While the univariate analysis shows that CDS spreads are 
positively related to short-selling, these regressions do not control for the theoretical 
determinants of CDS spreads.  
 
After controlling for the determinants of CDS spreads (credit ratings, firm-specific 
variables and macro-financial variables), the coefficient on the measures of short-
selling (short-interest and utilisation) remain positive and significant. These results are 
economically significant and robust to various controls including controlling for the 
supply of stock for short-selling, the use of changes in CDS spreads, cross-sectional 
controls for fixed effects, subgroup analysis by industry sector and credit rating 
categories, calculation of average regression coefficients using time-series regressions 
and the use of contemporaneous explanatory variables. 
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While results indicate that short-selling exhibits a positive relationship with CDS 
spreads, the question remains whether short-selling leads the CDS market or vice 
versa. Previous studies which examine the relationship between CDS spreads and 
stock markets (see inter alia Norden and Weber, 2009, and Forte and Pena, 2009) 
document that stock market returns lead CDS spread changes, suggesting price 
discovery occurs in the stock market more often than in the CDS market. Given short-
selling occurs in the stock market, this implies that short-selling is likely to lead the 
CDS market. This is consistent with the notion that short-sellers are informed (see 
inter alia Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008), given the majority of price discovery 
occurs in the stock market. Possible explanations for stock returns leading CDS 
spreads could be the structural difference between the markets in which the assets are 
traded. The structural differences could imply probable differences in the relative 
speed with which respective markets respond to the changes in credit conditions. For 
example, CDS markets for individual firms are OTC compared to stock markets 
which are traded through an electronic exchange. 
 
6 Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation analyses the impact of short-selling in financial markets. The 
importance of this subject is underscored by the increasing participation by short-
sellers in equity markets. The increasing prevalence of short-selling has also been 
associated with the common belief that short-selling precedes market price declines 
and produces unfair speculative profits. This belief has sparked regulation to forbid 
short-selling during the recent financial crisis. Given the prevalence of short-selling 
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and the potential harm to markets, it is critical for investors, regulators, and academics 
to further understand the impact of short-selling in financial markets. Hence, the main 
objective of this dissertation is to empirically examine the impact of short-selling in 
financial markets.  
 
Chapter 3 empirically examines the impact of the 2008 short-selling bans on the 
market quality of stocks. While short-selling has long been a contentious issue (see 
Chancellor, 2001), relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact 
of short-sale restrictions on market quality. The 2008 short-sale bans provide an ideal 
setting for these tests because it provides a binding constraint.
 
Thus, there is no need 
to rely on proxies for short-sale constraints, as in previous research. Using data from 
14 equity markets the market quality of financial stocks subject to the bans is 
examined by comparing them to stocks not subject to the bans. Evidence indicates 
that restrictions on short-selling lead to artificially inflated prices, indicated by 
positive abnormal returns. This is consistent with Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory 
and suggests that the bans have been effective in temporarily stabilising prices in 
struggling financial stocks.  
 
Market quality is reduced during the restrictions, as evidenced by wider bid-ask 
spreads, increased price volatility and reduced trading activity. While these effects are 
strong, regulators may have seen the deterioration in market quality as a necessary by-
product of the bans to maintain prices and protect investors. Regulators feared the 
possibility of manipulative short-selling in financial stocks and felt it was necessary to 
undertake extreme measures. Perhaps the regulatory intervention was designed to 
boost investor outlook and confidence to provide positive externalities through the 
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economy. Overall, whether the net effect of the short-selling bans is positive (higher 
prices versus lower market quality) is open to debate.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of allowing naked short-selling on the securities 
lending and equity market in a unique market setting where naked short-sales are 
restricted to certain securities on an approved list. The existing literature on the 
impact of short-selling examines changes in the rules governing either covered short-
sales, or changes to short-sale constraints that affect both naked and covered short-
sales. This is interesting as, despite the apparent assumption that naked short-selling is 
detrimental, relatively little or no empirical evidence is available on the impact that 
naked short-selling has on financial markets. The purpose of the second chapter is to 
bridge this gap in the literature by directly examining the impact of allowing naked 
short-selling on returns, volatility and liquidity. 
 
Consistent with Miller (1977), stocks with the highest dispersion of opinion and 
highest short-sale constraint (higher lending fees) are the only stocks to exhibit 
significant and negative abnormal returns in the post event period. These stocks 
experience a -3.4148% abnormal return on the event date, significant at the 1% level. 
The impact of allowing naked short-selling on volatility and liquidity is examined 
using both a matching and regression discontinuity design. The results, consistent 
across both methods, reveal a small increase in the daily and intraday volatility of 
individual stock returns. Further, allowing naked short-selling leads to small reduction 
in liquidity via increased transaction costs (wider bid-ask spreads and effective 
spreads). Further testing reveals that the impact of naked short-selling on market 
quality variables is greater, both in magnitude and significance, in stocks with higher 
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short-sale constraints. Stocks with relatively low short-sale constraints experience 
smaller or no significant change from the introduction of naked short-sales. This is 
consistent with the notion that stocks with lower lending fees experience relatively 
little naked short-selling since covered short-selling is less expensive.  
 
Using the Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) spread decomposition model, the increase in 
bid-ask spread is attributed to an increase in the adverse selection component. This is 
consistent with the notion that short-sellers are likely to be informed traders. Analysis 
of the securities lending market reveals that the demand for securities lending is 
reduced following the introduction of naked short-selling. While the evidence is not 
conclusive, naked short-selling appears to occur once stocks are added to the 
designated list of eligible stocks. Therefore the results in this chapter can be attributed 
(at least in part) to the introduction of naked short-sales. Overall, the results are of 
interest to policy makers who have recently moved towards curbing naked short-
selling. It appears that these moves may be warranted, with the evidence suggesting 
that allowing naked short-selling impairs liquidity and increases stock price volatility. 
However, there appears to be some improvement in price efficiency and the results 
are largely limited to stocks with high short-sale constraints.    
 
Chapter 5 examines the determinants of firm-level CDS spreads, using a new measure 
of the likelihood of firm default - short-selling.  By examining the relationship 
between CDS spreads and short-selling, this chapter adds to the existing literature 
which examines the determinants of CDS spreads and also adds to the existing 
literature on the information content of short-selling. This chapter first estimates the 
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relationship between CDS spreads and the theoretical determinants of CDS spreads 
using OLS univariate regressions. The univariate results reveal that the variables 
which explain the greatest variation in CDS spreads are those predicted by the 
structural form models. The key coefficients of interest, short-interest and utilisation 
(measures of short-selling), are positive and significant when regressed against CDS 
spreads. While the univariate analysis shows that CDS spreads are positively related 
to short-selling, these regressions do not control for the theoretical determinants of 
CDS spreads.  
 
After controlling for the determinants of CDS spreads (credit ratings, firm-specific 
variables and macro-financial variables), the coefficient on the measures of short-
selling (short-interest and utilisation) remain positive and significant. These results are 
economically significant and robust to various controls including controlling for the 
supply of stock for short-selling, the use of changes in CDS spreads, cross-sectional 
controls for fixed effects, subgroup analysis by industry sector and credit rating 
categories, calculation of average regression coefficients using time-series regressions 
and the use of contemporaneous explanatory variables. 
 
While results indicate that short-selling exhibits a positive relationship with CDS 
spreads, the question remains whether short-selling leads the CDS market or vice 
versa. Previous studies which examine the relationship between CDS spreads and 
stock markets (see inter alia Norden and Weber, 2009, and Forte and Pena, 2009) 
document that stock market returns lead CDS spread changes, suggesting price 
discovery occurs in the stock market more often than in the CDS market. Given short-
selling occurs in the stock market, this implies that short-selling is likely to lead the 
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CDS market. This is consistent with the notion that short-sellers are informed (see 
inter alia Boehmer, Jones and Zhang, 2008), given the majority of price discovery 
occurs in the stock market. Possible explanations for stock returns leading CDS 
spreads could be the structural difference between the markets in which the assets are 
traded. The structural differences could imply probable differences in the relative 
speed with which respective markets respond to the changes in credit conditions. For 
example, CDS markets for individual firms are OTC compared to stock markets 
which are traded through an electronic exchange. 
 
Several potential future research directions lead from the work in this dissertation. 
The results in Chapter 4 provide the first empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
naked short-selling on market quality. Further evidence is called for to validate and 
extend these findings. The ability of this research hinges on the quality and 
availability of naked short-selling data. The availability of intraday data on naked 
short-sales would allow a more precise examination at an increased granularity. The 
relationship between CDS spreads and short-selling, as examined in Chapter 5, is also 
a new area which requires further work. Further examination of the directional 
relationship is required to determine whether short-sales lead CDS spreads or vice 
versa. 
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